Mr. Beaupré to Mr. Hay.
Bogotá, October 21, 1903.
Sir: I have the honor to inform you that there is no disguising the alarm existing as to the possible action of the Government of the United States should the feeling of disaffection undoubtedly existing in the department of Panama find expression in overt acts. This alarm took the form of a heated debate in the Senate yesterday when the Government was again attacked for the apointment of Señor Obaldia as governor of Panama. The reply elicited from the minister for foreign affairs was rather significant. He read an extract from the treaty of 1846, in which the United States guaranteed Colombian sovereignty on the Isthmus, and assured the Senate that in case of an insurrection in the department of Panama the United States would be bound to support the Government.
In the course of this debate Señor Caro said that the minister for foreign affairs had the notes of the American minister read to the Senate, in secret session, with the object of convincing that body of the necessity of accepting the Hay-Herran treaty, in view of the menacing attitude outlined in those communications. Finding in that secret session that the Senate disapproved the treaty and was determined to act accordingly, the Government, through Senator Lorenzo Marroquin, its spokesman, obtained a resolution demanding that those notes be read in public session, with the object of making it appear that the rejection of the treaty was influenced by a sentiment of indignation at the threatening attitude assumed by the United States minister. This comedy became known to the Government of the United States, and it has resented it. He was not influenced, generally, by what was reported in the newspapers, but the statement universally given expression to in the press of the United States, that the Washington Government resented the criticism made against the United [Page 215] States minister in carrying out the orders emanating both from the President and Secretary Hay can not be without foundation. This was only one instance proving that the Colombian Government had not acted in good faith in these negotiations. The refusal on the part of President Marroquin to sign the treaty before presenting it to the Senate was another. Whatever reasons the Government adduced as to there being no necessity for such a signature was outside the point. The intention was clear that the treaty was not signed because the Government wanted to have a loophole whereby to escape their obligations to the United States. In other words, it did not want to be under the obligation of coming forward to defend and support a treaty which was signed by its order. It was bound in good faith to the United States to do so. It was for Congress alone to accept or reject it. Had such a course been followed there would have been no reason to look forward with alarm to the attitude which the United States might adopt. The Colombian Government had nothing to fear from the United States had it clearly done all in its power in supporting the treaty. No responsibility would then have attached to this country for the rejection of the treaty by Congress, a body which had the perfect right to reject or accept as it pleased. What he feared was that the United States might take the Isthmus from us under the just plea that we had acted in bad faith with them. The only strength which a small nation has is its good faith.
In reply the minister for foreign affairs said that the press of the United States was given entire liberty of public discussion, but that the statements made therein were not always to be accepted as entire statements of fact. That he had just received positive information that no resentment was entertained by the Washington Government for this Government’s action in having Mr. Beaupré’s notes read.
The report of the committee on the canal question, which was read in the Senate on the 14th instant, has not yet been called up for discussion. As a matter of fact, the Government and Congress are playing a waiting game. At various times it has been announced authoritatively that the Congress would adjourn at a given date, but thus far there have been timely reconsiderations and other dates fixed. Last week it was said that the President had certainly and definitely concluded that an adjournment must take place on the 30th instant, now that it has been determined that the closing day shall be the 14th proximo.
As a matter of fact, the Government and the Congress have waited and are waiting to acertain, if possible, the final attitude of the Government of the United States concerning the canal matter before the life of this Congress is ended.
An effort was made by the Government to falsely place the blame for the rejection of the Hay-Herran treaty upon the notes addressed by this legation to the minister for foreign affairs, and the result was awaited in the belief that this view would be accepted by the Government of the United States. This attempt failed; the situation is disturbing; and now the further delay is, quite apparently, for the purpose of awaiting the action of President Roosevelt in his message to the special session of our Congress which is to meet, it is understood here, on the 9th proximo, and the attitude of that Congress upon receiving the President’s message.
I am, sir, your obedient servant,