Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress, With the Annual Message of the President, December 4, 1883
No. 39.
Mr. Logan
to Mr. Frelinghuysen.
Santiago, December 13, 1882. (Received January 16, 1883.)
Sir: Upon the failure to undertake the voyage to Arequipa with Señor Calderon, as recorded in my dispatch No. 26, I determined to address an unofficial communication upon the existing situation to Vice President Montero. A copy of this document is inclosed under cover of this dispatch.
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I have, &c.,
Mr. Logan to Vice-President Montero.
Santiago, November 13, 1882.
Sir: I ask the privilege to waive the usual diplomatic formality, and address your excellency directly upon the subject which must now be uppermost in the minds of all Peruvians, viz, that of peace.
Your excellency is doubtless aware that since my arrival in Chili I have been endeavoring to bring about a recognition of your Government and the arrangement of terms of peace between Peru and. Chili. Difficulties which seem almost insurmountable have up to this time prevented the realization of my desires.
The present situation may be briefly stated thus: Chili, as the resuit of my mediation, has abandoned the demands of the Trescot protocol, and has consented to make peace upon the following terms: First, absolute cession of Tarapaca as war indemnity, Chili to pay all of the debts of the province legitimately following it under the provisions of international law, although she refuses to make any particular stipulation to that effect, as, being already committed to it by various public declarations, she does not deem it necessary. Second, the acquisition of Tacna and Arica by purchase for the sum of $10,000,000, to be paid in three equal annual installments.
Chili has been willing to treat with his excellency Señor Calderon upon these terms, and to recognize his Government as the legal Government of Peru. Señor Calderon, however, has constantly refused the stipulation relating to Tacna and Arica, as he has had no evidence that the people would indorse it. I have proposed various compromises to reconcile the difference between the parties, and at one time I thought that success was about to attend my efforts. For reasons not necessary to go over at this time, however, all these have failed, until at this moment it seems that the parties are farther apart than ever.
I need not state to your excellency the deep distress of the Peruvian people, as you are as familiar with their sad state as myself. My object in writing you is to make one last effort to bring about a peace through the recognition of the Government which your excellency represents.
Chili now claims that your excellency’s proclamation of October 14 last, calling an election for members to a new congress, virtually declares that Señor Calderon has no authority to treat for peace, but that that faculty is reserved to the congress alone. I cannot concur in the opinion that the proclamation is meant to say this, nor can I believe that the executive has not a right to make a treaty under the constitution, provided that it be submitted to the congress afterwards for consideration. Article 2 of Chapter I of the constitution contains a general provision relating to the alienation of territory, but in the same instrument, and in a subsequent part, this article is modified in a very important way. Article 11 of Chapter XI gives the executive the right to make treaties and direct diplomatic negotiations, and this right carries with it, logically and legally, the right to make those treaties effective, by any necessary means. Thus, if a peace treaty is to be made, undoubtedly the right is implied to sequestrate the national territory, if it be necessary in order to make the treaty. In Article 16 of Chapter VIII the Congress is given the faculty of approving or disapproving treaties of peace, &c., made by the executive. There can be no doubt whatever of the legal right of the executive to make a treaty of peace and to sequestrate territory if it be necessary in order to accomplish the making of the treaty. The right of ratification or rejection is distinctly reserved to the Congress.
Under the construction of your proclamation heretofore mentioned, however, Chili declares the inexpediency of treating with Señor Calderon, even if the terms themselves were agreed upon. The situation to me appears critical in the extreme. Internal disorders, through the action of Iglesias and the expected arrival of Pierola, are imminent in Peru, and threaten to annihilate all that has been or will be left by the conquering army. It is claimed that a Government erected under either of those leaders would be pledged to make a peace far more detrimental to Peru than that promised through my own negotiation.
As you are also aware, the Bolivian Congress has passed a resolution determining to make a truce, which will soon be followed, probably, by a peace. It is within my knowledge that Chili, for reasons connected with her own policy, is willing to make a truce with Bolivia, though she will deny it to Peru. Under the general laws of nations, allies are bound to protect each other in the making of peace, to a certain extent; but if Bolivia, in view of the absolute hopelessness of continuing the struggle, can be made to believe that Peru is resisting the inevitable and is thereby likely to bring utter destruction upon both nations, she will find a strong justification in breaking the [Page 87] alliance. In the event of the alliance being broken by the withdrawal of Bolivia, Peru will doubtless be compelled to submit to very severe terms of settlement.
I do not assume to speak from official knowledge in what I am now about to say, but simply to give you my opinion of the consequences of a failure of Peru to accept the Chilian terms of peace within a very short time. I have obtained from the Chilian Government, as before said, a bona fide offer to pay Peru $10,000,000 cash for Tacna and Arica. This offer was obtained for Señor Calderon’s immediate acceptance. But it is not a standing offer of peace. Upon the contrary, I have every reason to believe that if no settlement is reached until the Peruvian Congress assembles in March next, that Peru will be compelled to cede Tarapaca and Tacna and Arica, without the payment of any money indemnity at all. If Señor Calderon could at once be legally empowered by your excellency to accept these terms of peace, I believe the Chilian Government would feel itself under moral obligation to me to pay this amount to Peru. If, however, the war is prolonged for four or five months longer, Chili will undoubtedly claim a just right to increase her demands.
As further resistance on the part of the allies would seem to be entirely useless, from a total lack of all resources to continue the war successfully, and as it seems certain that no belligerent interference by outside nations is to take place, it appears to me, your excellency, that every motive prompts to the immediate acceptance of terms which I sincerely believe to be more favorable to Peru than those which will be offered later, when it is demonstrated that the allies must of necessity accept any conditions offered to them.
Your excellency will excuse me for the frankness with which I speak. I am laboring for the interests of your excellency’s people; and if it were only the question of saving $10,000,000 to the Peruvian treasury, it would be a powerful motive for action in this terrible crisis. But when we consider the personal suffering of the people and the utter ruin staring them in the face, it seems to me there ought not to be a moment’s hesitation about closing the struggle at once.
My Government has constantly maintained that it would be better for the ultimate interests of both Chili and the allies to settle the question at issue upon the basis of a money indemnity, without the cession of territory. The Government of Chili does not concur in that opinion, and such being the fact it is useless to discuss the matter. The practical question at issue is, have the allies the power to resist the demand for territory? As there can no longer be a doubt that they have not, then the wiser plan is to accept the inevitable and to obtain as many advantages as possible. By an immediate acceptance of the Chilian terms the sufferings of the Peruvians from an army of occupation will cease at once, and the sum of $10,000,000 will be placed in the Peruvian treasury, which, it is my fear, will not he received if the settlement is postponed until the meeting of Congress.
The United States stipulated to pay Mexico for the great and rich territory in which are embraced California, Texas, and New Mexico the sum of $15,000,000. The district of Tacna and Arica has but little intrinsic, value—no guano, no nitrates, and but small agricultural possibilities. It is not even important to Peru as a military point in the protection of her territory. Yet Chili offers to pay for it two-thirds the sum paid by the United States for territory incomparably greater in extent and richer in resources than Tacna and Arica.
I could have made peace nearly two months ago if Señor Calderon would have accepted these terms. How much personal suffering has been endured, how much more Peruvian wealth has been lost in these two months your excellency can judge as well as I.
To Señor Calderon’s unwillingness to comply with the sale of Tacna and Arica there is now added the other difficulty herein alluded to, viz, the feeling of the Chilian Government that, in view of your excellency’s proclamation, there is nothing to be gained by treating with him. But one way out of the difficulty presents itself, which is, for your excellency to immediately send a formal power to Señor Calderon to accept the Chilian terms. I beg leave to earnestly recommend this measure to your excellency. As the representative of a Government which throughout this whole struggle has most anxiously desired to lend its aid toward a satisfactory settlement of the difficulties dividing them, and as one who has studied the whole situation from an impartial standpoint, I do not hesitate to place on record my recommendation to this effect.
Both in my official and personal character, I assure your excellency of my entire willingness to render any assistance within my power, in the best settlement of the controversy between the Republics of the Pacific.
I embrace, &c.,