Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress, With the Annual Message of the President, December 4, 1882
61.
Mr. Trescot to
Mr. Frelinghuysen.
Lima, Peru, May 9, 1882. (Received June 2.)
Sir: I beg to forward herewith dispatches from Mr. Walker Blaine to myself referring to his recent visit to Bolivia.
I have, &c.,
Mr. Walker Blaine to Mr. Trescot
Lima, Peru, May 8, 1882.
Sir: Referring to the subject of my dispatch numbered one, and dated Arequipa, March 28, 1882, which is hereunto attached, marked inclosure No. 1,I have the honor to further report that on Wednesday, March 29, 1882, I left Arequipa for La Paz, Bolivia, arriving at the latter place at noon of Friday, March 31. In the afternoon of that day I had the pleasure of receiving visits from Señor Zilveti, Bolivian minister of foreign affairs, and from Señor Del Valle, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary from Peru to Bolivia. These visits were purely of a personal nature, and our conversation was of the most general character.
On Saturday morning, April 1,I was, however, received officially by Señor Zilveti, and, in company with the gentleman who accompanied me to La Paz, presented to Señor Salinas, the vice-president of Bolivia, and to the ministers of the government, the President of the country, General Campero, being then with the army (consisting of some five thousand men) at Oruro. The conversation between Señor Zilveti and myself, which followed this presentation, is, with one or two noted exceptions, summarized with sufficient accuracy in the memorandum of Señor Zilveti, which was forwarded to you through Mr. Adams, of which a copy and translation are herewith inclosed (marked inclosures 2 and 3).
I had, also, during the evenings of March 31 and April 1, two long interviews with Señor Del Valle, the minister from Peru to Bolivia. Our conversation was unreserved and confidential; the principal incident worthy of comment was that Señor Del Valle showed me a memorandum, signed on the 11th of February last by Señor Zilveti and himself, the effect of which is to strengthen the alliance now subsisting between Peru and Bolivia, and by which the two parties agree to act in entire harmony and concert in all negotiations and efforts for peace with Chili. This agreement was shown to me in such confidence that I beg to earnestly request that knowledge on our part of its existence may be kept secret.
Señor Del Valle further stated to me that he feared that his government would not regard with favor the proposition to exchange a portion of its littoral for an interior province of Bolivia, an arrangement which had been suggested by Señor Carrillo, in our conversation at Arequipa. (See my dispatch, inclosure No 1.) The acquisition of such territory would, in his opinion, add nothing to the revenues of Peru; its care and government would be, in fact, only a source of expense, while the port upon the Pacific which Bolivia would obtain by the exchange is a source of large revenue to Peru. It was, however, thought Señor Del Valle, possible for an arrangement to be made by which the effective neutrality of some selected port of Peru—for example, Arica or Mollendo—could be guaranteed to Bolivia, and all the imports and exports of that country admitted and dispatched free of duty. In expressing these opinions Señor Del Valle spoke in a personal capacity, as he had no instructions from his government, nor was he informed as to its views. In the opinions expressed by Señor Carrillo, and reaffirmed by Señor Zilveti, the suggestion is made that Bolivia will cede her littoral to Chili only as in lieu of an indemnity, and that it shall be clearly expressed in the treaty of peace that acquisition of territory as the rightful result of conquest in war is not in any way recognized, but is, on the contrary, expressly disavowed. Señor Del Valle, who was informed of these views of the Government of Bolivia, stated to me that they would doubtless coincide with those of his own government, but he was unable to see how, in accordance with these ideas, Peru could justly surrender Tarapaca. Bolivia yields Atacama only because she finds hereself unable to pay a war indemnity, the amount of which is to be specified in the definitive treaty, and which she admits that, as a vanquished nation, she ought to pay. But how can Peru be called upon to cede territory when she is willing and amply able to pay the most liberal indemnity to Chili? I make mention of these views merely for the purpose of pointing out a stumbling-block, which would seem to obstruct united and harmonious effort on the part of Peru and Bolivia to make peace with Chili.
Leaving La Paz on the morning of Sunday, April 2, I arrived in Arequipa on the evening of Monday the 3d. That evening Señor Carillo, the Bolivian minister, called upon me, and again expressed his desire to proceed to Lima, requesting me to obtain from the Chilian authorities the necessary permission to do so. This, as you are aware, I did, upon returning to Lima, and on April 15 forwarded to him the passport which, at my request, Señor Novoa had obtained for him and for his secretary from Admiral Lynch, but so poor are the postal arrangements that, though Señor Carillo did not leave Arequipa until the 4th of May, my letter containing the passport and marked upon the envelope as from the special mission of the United States never reached him.
I returned to Mollendo on Tuesday, April 4, and sailing upon the U. S. S. Alaska [Page 97] had the pleasure of rejoining you in Lima on Friday, the 7th. As Señor Carrillo has arrived in Lima, and as you have conferred with him upon the desires and expectations of his government, it is not necessary for me to elaborate views and present facts with which you are entirely familiar. I desire, however, to say—
- First. That, so far as I can judge, my journey to La Paz and conference with the Bolivian minister of foreign affairs was opportune and productive of good results. A great deal of importance was apparently attached by the Bolivian Government to the protocol signed on the 11th of February last by yourself and Señor Balmaceda. The purport of this paper had been, according to what Señor Zilveti and Señor Carrillo stated to me, greatly misunderstood, and they expressed themselves as pleased with my explanation and with what they at once admitted to be the just and true meaning of the protocol. I am inclined to think that the sensitiveness, natural to a small country like Bolivia, accounted in large measure for the feeling of the government upon this subject. In all our diplomatic correspoudence, in the comments of the press of the United States and of Europe, the war has been constantly spoken of as one between Chili and Peru, and the implied slight had, in Bolivian public opinion, been aggravated by the fact that Bolivia was, in the protocol, referred to only in the most casual manner. This feeling was sensibly diminished by the fact that you had, on leaving Chili, at once sent me to La Paz, being unable at that time to make the journey in person, as I took care to explain to Señor Zilveti.
- Second. While the war has, up to this time, not been carried on within the limits of Bolivia, and she has for this reason suffered, in comparison with her ally, but slight direct injury, yet it is of very great importance to the country that either a truce or peace should be made as speedily as possible. Business is at a stand-still; exports from the country, which were for a time entirely suspended, are now permitted by the Chilian authorities only upon payment of onerous duties, and imports are, I think, still, or at all events were very recently, absolutely prohibited. As the government depends for the larger portion of its revenues upon foreign commerce, and as, owing to the state of war, a larger army than usual is now being maintained, the taxation is necessarily increased, and this naturally tends to produce irritation; the danger of revolution (always great) is enhanced, and the continuance of orderly government imperiled. The war has, however, taught the Bolivians (if such a lesson can be learned in so short a time as has elapsed since the downfall of Daza, and if I am to believe the statements of Senor Zilveti) that constitutional and honest government is a possibility, and the men who are truly patriotic, and who desire a well-established state, profess themselves as being greatly encouraged by the present public feeling in Bolivia.
- Third. Should it prove impossible to save her present littoral (the province of Atacama) to Bolivia, and I do not see how this can be done—and if, as Señor Del Valle and as other prominent Peruvians with whom I have conversed think, Peru is not willing to sell or exchange for other territory a portion of her sea-coast—if, in short, as the result of the war, Bolivia is to be altogether shut out from the Pacific, then the years of Bolivia’s existence as an independent nation are few in number. It is true that Bolivia might rind an outlet for a large part of her products, and perhaps an inlet for imports by the river Amazon and the Atlantic Ocean, but for this a large expenditure of money in the construction of railways and the deepening of rivers and the lapse of many years for the completion of the undertaking is necessary; even then her commerce in going to and from the ocean must pass through other countries, and those countries may see fit to impose vexatious duties, and impose other restrictions upon her trade, which would seriously hamper if not destroy it. Nor, supposing this untrue, are the financial resources or public credit of Bolivia equal to this undertaking; and it is more than probable that before its completion, surrounding states, covetous of her territory, would have secured her partition.
Moreover, the geographical position of Bolivia requires, in any event, an outlet upon the Pacific. I am aware that for many years her commerce has not sought ingress and egress by way of her own sea-coast. The ports of Mollendo and Arica have offered superior advantages, but Atacama has proved a valuable check upon Peru, and has prevented her from seriously overtaxing Bolivian imports and exports, fearful lest, should she do so, the country’s trade would desert Mollendo and Arica and find refuge in Antofogasta and the other sea-ports of Bolivia. Compacts and agreements were made between the two countries, by which a certain portion of the revenues collected from Bolivian goods at Peruvian ports was to be paid to the former country. At the outbreak of the war, Peru owed Bolivia on this account more than four hundred thousand silver soles (Peruvian dollars). This fact serves to show how unsatisfactory in the past, and how probably unsatisfactory in the future, would be any commercial treaties giving to Bolivia only outlet and inlet through Peru.
Without considering the question as to whether it is best for the interests of the United States and of the world that the nationality of Bolivia should be preserved, I venture to express the opinion that the most feasible way by which, at the present time, her dismemberment can be avoided is by a strong and effective confederation between Peru and Bolivia, preserving to each an independent national existence, but [Page 98] making such an identity of interest as shall render imperative the strict fulfillment of any obligations and treaties into which they may enter. It seems to me that the self-interest of those countries would tend to such an end. Peru fears gradual absorption of her territory by Chili; Bolivia fears her own dismemberment by and division among surrounding nations. Traditions and natural national jealousies would render impossible any close union; self-preservation and resultant benefit would strongly urge upon each the course which I have suggested. I am not unaware of the fact that the interest of Chili would lead her to strongly oppose such a confederation, but, as I have offered this merely in the nature of personal opinion, and as you are better informed than myself, and a better judge of the advantage and practicability of such a political step, I do not consider it necessary to discuss the subject further.
In conclusion, permit me to observe that I cannot but think it of the greatest importance, both to ourselves and to the belligerents, that the United States should, as speedily as practicable, decide what course it will take with regard to the war of the Pacific. It was most embarrassing not to be able to inform Señor Zilveti and Señor Carrillo of the views of my government, as I felt that the great interests of Bolivia now at stake entitled them to ask and to expect a speedy answer, and I think that, both for our own prestige and as a matter of justice, Bolivia should not be compelled to wait for longer time than is necessary for a definite decision on the part of the United States.
I further recommend that for the future our minister to Bolivia should be kept fully informed as to the policy of his government and of any action which may be taken by his colleagues at Lima and at Santiago. The unfortunately almost directly contradictory official communications made at one time by our ministers to Chili and Peru would have made the position of General Adams, in Bolivia, had he not fortunately been absent on leave, extremely embarrassing. Without full knowledge and concert of action on the part of our diplomatic representatives any final settlement by our government or any assistance in the solution of this question is rendered almost impossible.
I have the honor, &c.,
Mr. Walker Blaine to Mr. Trescot
Arequipa, Peru, March 28, 1882.
Sir: I have the honor to inform you that we arrived in the harbor of Mollendo on Sunday, the 26th instant, between two and three o’clock in the afternoon. Mr. Cochran, the agent of the Mollendo and Puno Railway at that place, visited the ship shortly after our arrival, and most kindly placed the facilities of his road at our disposition. Learning that General Adams was at Arequipa, I telegraphed him to await me at that point, and, in accordance with arrangements made by Mr. Cochran, left Mollendo by special train at eight o’clock Monday morning, Captain Belknap and servant, Lieutenant Hale, and Dr. Whiting, of the United States steamer Alaska, accompanying Mr. Cuthbert Trescot and myself. Half way between Mollendo and Arequipa we were met by General Adams, who accompanied us to Arequipa, where we arrived about four o’clock in the afternoon. On arriving we were met by the adjutant of Señor Carrillo (now the representative in this section of the government of Vice-President Montero), who accompanied us to our hotel. This morning Señor Carrillo called upon us in person, and I have just come from returning his visit. We have been received with great courtesy and cordiality by all the officials of the government, and those connected with the railway have very kindly placed at our disposition all the facilities afforded by their line.
By appointment, I this morning met Señor Juan C. Carrillo and had a Iong conference with him. He was formerly minister of foreign affairs of Bolivia, and represented that country at the Arica conference. He is now accredited by Bolivia as minister near the Governments of Peru and Chili, and is thus far on his way to those countries. Señor Carrillo began by saying that he desired to speak with all frankness and confidence, in which I told him I would heartily concur. He then asked General Adams to read me a letter which he had on the twenty-fifth instant addressed to the general, a copy and translation of which you will find inclosed, marked inclosures 1 and 2. Having listened to the translation of the letter by General Adams, I replied in substance as follows:
“In order, Señor Carrillo, to make a satisfactory and full explanation of and answer to the question contained in your letter, I will begin by recalling to your mind that after the failure of the conference at Arica the United States still persisted in its effort to [Page 99] bring about a peace between Peru, Bolivia, and Chili. As the instructions given to Mr. Trescot have been made public, I Can refer to them without embarrassment. From them you will have learned that the government of Garcia Calderon was recognized in Peru by the United States, as the latter power understood that such recognition was desired by Chili and would tend toward the establishment of peace. After the said government had been so recognized by the United States, Chili, without explanation and without notification to the United States, arrested Garcia Calderon and carried him as prisoner to Chili. You will, I think, agree with me that this act, thus unexplained, and in view of the attendant circumstances stated in Mr. Trescot’s instructions, might well seem like one of intentional insult to the United States. Mr. Trescot’s was, therefore, instructed to frankly state to Chili the view which the United States was forced to hold of this arrest, and to request of the Government of Chili an explanation. This lay at the threshold of Mr. Trescot’s mission, and was the first point discussed in his interview with Señor Balmaceda. After this had been fully discussed, and Chili had made explanation (and I beg you, sir, to remark that this question was one wholly and only concerning Chili and my government), the conversation turned upon what terms Chili was disposed to offer to Peru as a basis of peace. The conclusions thus reached were afterward summarized in the protocol to which you have referred in your letter. And here I beg you to observe that a protocol of this nature does not differ from a written memorandum of conversation, not being in any sense, as you seem to have understood, a contract or binding agreement. It is not with us the custom to seal such memoranda, but Señor Balmaceda stated that it was the diplomatic usage in South America so to do, and Mr, Trescot assented to it, observing that the seal could add nothing to its force.
“It will perhaps, however, be more satisfactory to examine the protocol itself, which states:
- “First. The question of Garcia Calderon, which is of interest only to the United States and Chili, is disposed of.
- “Second. The question of armed intervention (in effect a declaration of war) is not within the province of diplomacy, and is, therefore, not contemplated by the mission of Mr. Trescot. I cannot but think that such a question is never within the purview of any diplomatic mission.
- “Third. The United States will offer mediation (which is almost identical with arbitration) only when conducive to the good of all the belligerents, and when asked by all. Chili states that she does not desire it, and therefore the United States does not offer it.
- “Fourth. Referring to the question of good offices Chili states that if the United States will offer them on the bases proposed by herself (Chili), all facilities at her command in Peru shall be extended to Mr. Trescot.
- “Fifth. The terms on which Chili will make peace with Peru are stated.
“Finally, it is stated that Mr. Trescot thought it best to telegraph to his government as to whether the good offices should be offered on the conditions named, and awaits a reply, which reply forming part of the protocol and published at the same time, is stated in Mr. Trescot’s letter to Señor Balmaceda. The effect of this reply, you will at once see, was to render the whole protocol blank paper, for in any event and on any supposition, but the first three articles can be regarded as in any way binding, and of these the first states simply a question which concerns the United States and Chili alone, and the second and third enunciate principles recognized in all international law. Mr. Trescot was, therefore, entirely correct when he wrote to Mr. Adams what I now state to you, that nothing had been signed which in any way bound the United States as to its action in this matter.
“Further, permit me to say that this will fully explain why Bolivia is not mentioned in the protocol, for it is evident that if the United States could not offer its good offices to bring about peace with Peru on the bases proposed by Chili, there was no need of discussing the Bolivian question. If the offer of Chili with regard to Peru was accepted, then the Bolivian question would naturally come up next in order for discussion.
“One matter further: The United States has replied to Mr. Trescot’s telegram, stating that she cannot offer good offices or take any part in bringing about a peace based upon both money indemnification and a cession of territory, and that the question as to the future action of the United States has been referred to Congress, and while awaiting the decision of that body it has seemed good to Mr. Trescot to himself go to Peru and to send me to Bolivia, in order to ascertain the intentions and desires of those governments with regard to peace.
“I ought perhaps to add that it was not intended that the protocol referred to should be made public, but, the essential portions having been published in the United States by some mistake (as they were communicated in a confidential dispatch), Mr. Trescot did not consider that he could refuse permission to Señor Balmaceda to publish the entire document.”
Señor Carrillo thereupon replied that he was pleased to hear my explanation, and that [Page 100] he would state to me with frankness and in confidence what were the views of his government and people. He said that they had been led to believe from the declarations of Mr. Hurlbut in Peru (for during the time Mr. Adams was absent from Bolivia) that the United States would not, in any event, permit peace upon the basis of annexation of territory, and that Bolivia had patiently awaited the result of the influence of the United States, not expecting a forcible intervention, but led to believe that our government would lend its moral influence, as it had done with so much effect in the case of Mexico; that after his return to Bolivia, in the early part of January last, Mr. Adams had informed the government of the mission of Mr. Trescot, and had requested, to which the government had cheerfully acceded, that pending the result of your negotiations in Santiago things might remain in statu quo; that just about this time Señor Baptista had been sent as delegate from Bolivia to the proposed congress in Central America, and that secret instructions had been given him to converse, while on his journey, with any men of prominence with whom he might meet in Chili or Peru, that he might inform the Government of Bolivia as to the views of these countries with regard to peace; that at Tacna, Señor Baptista had met Señor Lillo, who, on behalf of Chili, had proposed that peace should be made between his government and Bolivia, to which Señor Baptista replied that his government would not make peace, save after consultation with and with the approval of Peru, and had suggested, speaking for himself, that it seemed best to make a truce rather than a peace; that conferences had been held, and that certain conclusions, subject to the approval of his government, had been assented to by Señor Baptista, but that the Government of Bolivia would never have agreed to peace, even with the consent of Peru, and this independent of any suggestion or request on the part of Mr. Adams. He also gave me to understand that Chili had offered to cede Tacna, Arica, and Pisagua to Bolivia (all this territory being Peruvian), in exchange for Atacama. Further continuing, Señor Carrillo said that we could not regard it as strange, in view of the attitude of the United States, if Bolivia felt that the time had arrived when it was wise for her to make the best terms possible for herself and by herself, supposing that the United States had finally withdrawn from the question.
I replied that I did not understand that the United States had as yet definitely decided its future policy, and requested him to state to me the intentions of Bolivia.
In answer, he said that he would state them frankly, but begged that his views might be regarded as personal and confidential. He said that, first, it might be advantageous to consider that the same results could be brought about, without offending either Peru or Bolivia, by a careful use of language. For example, Bolivia could cede territory to Chili, provided it was regarded as in lieu of a money indemnity, and not as a right of conquest; for to affirm the latter proposition to be a recognized principle would, in effect, place the territory of Bolivia at the mercy of any nation stronger than herself, rather than do which she would prefer the immediate termination of a national existence. I replied that I thought that I could safely affirm that my government would never take part in any negotiation for peace which recognized cession of territory, without any other consideration, as the legitimate result of victory in war. He then added that it was absolutely essential to Bolivia to have a free and independent outlet and inlet upon the Pacific, the reasons for which he detailed, but which it is not necessary for me now to repeat. With these considerations as premises, he thought his government would make peace on the following conditions:
- 1st.
- Recognizing indemnification as the right of the victor in war.
- 2d.
- The indemnity due from Bolivia to Chili shall be fixed at a definite sum, and in default of payment, Chili shall be allowed to take Atacama; the fact shall also be recognized that, as a result of the war, a new demarkation of boundaries between the three nations has become necessary, and that the natural affinity of Atacama to Chili, arising from population and proximity, may be regarded in settling the demarkation.
- 3d.
- Bolivia desires, for the purpose of procuring a port upon the Pacific, to make an independent treaty with Peru by which, in exchange for Tacna and Arica, she would give the province of Caupolican, bordering upon Lake Titicaca and contiguous to Peru, and possibly would assume a portion of her debt or pay an additional compensation in money, the details to be hereafter arranged between the two countries.
Reverting to previous conversation, Señor Carrillo then inquired as to what I thought would be the attitude of my government upon the question.
I told him that I could not form an opinion; that it was within the bounds of possibility that Congress, to which body I understood that the question had been referred, might decide to withdraw altogether, or to intervene with effect; that I had no information or intimation on which to predicate an opinion; that, possibly, so indefinite a. reply might be somewhat embarrassing to his government, but that a definite decision would, in all probability, be reached by the United States in a short time, and that it did not seem to me that a maintenance of affairs in statu quo for a limited period could seriously hamper or prove detrimental to Bolivia.
In this he concurred and informed me that he was accredited both to Chili and Peru, and, for the purpose of conferring with you and with the Government of Peru, would [Page 101] gladly at once proceed to Lima, but was prevented from doing so for certain reasons. (See my dispatch numbered 2.) He also said that he was empowered by his government, on the understanding that the United States had entirely withdrawn from the question, to request the aid of the Argentine Republic, Brazil, or any other American power, and failing in this to request the intervention of Europe, and inquired of me what opinion my government would entertain of the latter course.
I replied that the traditional policy of the United States had ever viewed with disfavor European intervention upon this hemisphere, and that unless this policy had been radically overturned (of which I was not informed), it could not but view such a step with disfavor. This was the substance of our conversation.
I inquired of Señor Carrillo as to whether I was at liberty to refer to it in the conference which I hope to have in La Paz with Señor Zilveti, Bolivian minister of foreign affairs, to which he replied that, though he did not doubt that I would find Señor Zil-veti’s opinions to be identical, he preferred that the latter should express them voluntarily and spontaneously. I therefore take advantage of the mail, which I am informed leaves to-morrow for Callao, to send this for your guidance and information, and will report further after my return from La Paz.
I have concluded to go thither, and shall leave for Puno at six o’clock to-morrow morning. I have made arrangements which will, I trust, bring me to Mollendo on Monday or Tuesday next, and shall join you in Lima as quickly as possible. It seems to me to be more respectful to proceed to the Bolivian capital, and I cannot but think it extremely doubtful as to whether you will personally be able to go there.
There are some incidental questions as to the effect of the Balmaceda protocol in Bolivia and other matters touched upon in our conversation, to which I do not now deem it necessary to refer, but which I will hereafter explain to you, either orally or in writing.
I have written hastily, but I trust I have made myself intelligible, and that what I said and its results may meet with your approval.
I am, &c.,
Señor Carrillo to Mr. Adams
Arequipa, March 25, 1882.
Sir: The undersigned, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Bolivia accredited near the Government of Peru, is informed of the early arrival of Mr. Walker Blaine at the port of Mollendo, charged with a special mission from the United States, in order to have an interview with your excellency, and, as the distance prevents the Government of Bolivia from taking advantage of this opportunity to obtain some data necessary to the development of its policy, the undersigned takes the liberty of asking your excellency to please to make clear in the said interview the points contained in this letter.
In the protocol of the 11th of February last, signed by the Chilian minister of foreign affairs and his excellency Mr. W. H. Trescot, special envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States of America, it is stated that “the mediation (of the United States) does not conform to the convenience of the belligerents, nor is it solicited by Chili,” and it is added that, eliminating from all discussion the possibility of armed intervention, the United States “will offer its mediation only in case that the belligerents shall manifest a desire of obtaining it, and when its acceptance will conduce to results satisfactory to both.” At the same time it is declared, in the third clause, that the mediation of the United States is a point eliminated from all discussion and definitely concluded
Notwithstanding that the allied governments have shown by their official acts a respectful deference to the conciliatory policy of the United States, confiding in its efficacious influence for the restoration of peace, the declaration just recited leads one to consider that the new action upon which the government of your excellency entered, after the conference at Arica, in the present international conflict upon the Pacific, is definitely ended and withdrawn.
This consideration and the fact that no mention is made of the republic of Bolivia in the conference at Santiago, nor in the agreement signed at Viña del Mar, notwithstanding that, in consequence of the declarations made by your excellency in your respectful note of the 10th of January last, addressed to the Bolivian cabinet, all action was suspended until the result of the mission of Mr. Trescot should be made known, have determined the undersigned to interest your excellency in order that, in your approaching interview with Mr. Blaine, the reasons may, so far as possible, be made clear why Bolivia was not mentioned in the matters already referred to, and at the same [Page 102] time a declaration may be obtained as to the true meaning and extent of the conclusions of the aforesaid protocol relative to the mediation of the Government of the United States with regard to the three belligerent nations. The undersigned does not doubt that your excellency will entertain the present suggestion, as it will show the Government of Bolivia another proof of that delicate attention which your excellency has shown in the discharge of the duties of your high office.
With every consideration, &c.,
(Private copy.)
In the city of La Paz, on the 1st of April, 1882, in accordance with an agreement made the previous day, Mr. Walker Blaine with General Adams, minister resident of the United States, met Doctor Pedro José Zilveti, in the office of the minister of foreign affairs for Bolivia. The minister commenced by asking Mr. Blaine what character they would give to the interview, to which he replied that he had instructions from the plenipotentiary, Mr. Trescot, to ascertain the opinions and intentions of the Government of Bolivia, and that the conference would, therefore, be entirely confidential.
Señor Zilveti having signified his wish to know the extent and importance of the protocol of February 11th, signed by Messrs. Trescot and Balmaceda, Mr. Blaine made the same statements that he did, in reference to this matter, in his interview of March 28th with Señor Carrillo, stating, therefore, as a conclusion, that there was entire freedom of action for American diplomacy, in conformity with the friendly character of its relations towards the three belligerent nations. Señor Zilveti was permitted to ask Mr. Blaine what position the United States would take if Chili persisted in demanding the conditions of peace set forth in the protocol of the llth of February, which on the part of Bolivia are absolutely inadmissible. The reply was as follows: the government of the United States sincerely desires the cessation of the actual war, but does not find itself in a position to itself assume a warlike attitude because it does not desrie to make war, nor do the American people desire it; that for this reason, if the indicated conditions were not modified and the demand of cession of territory were maintained by Chili as the right of a conqueror and as a condition, sine qua non, of a settlement, the Government of the United States could do nothing more than to retire completely. (See foot note.) Señor Zilveti replied that he did not think that the point could be reached. That the United States would have to declare war against Chili, because one determined word from the former government would suffice to bring the conqueror to reason and make him consent to an equitable and satisfactory arrangement. He called attention, besides, to the fact that the retirement of the United States in such a case would make worse the condition of the allies and make another victory for Chili.
Señor Zilveti, being asked upon what base Bolivia would enter into an arrangement for the cessation of the present war which causes so much injury to the belligerents, replied, that, according to the conditions imposed by Chili, it would amount to a perpetual closing in of Bolivia, its deprivation of every outlet upon the Pacific, and its consequent death; that Bolivia could accept no such arrangement, preferring to indefinitely maintain a defensive attitude; but that, in his opinion, a preliminary arrangement for peace might be made, recognizing the right to a just indemnity, the mode and payment of which would be matter for a future international contract, the express declaration being made that the right of conquest was not recognized, and that this must be done without impairing the loyalty which Bolivia owes Peru, in accordance with their treaty of alliance.
Referring to the case of an absolute impossibility of arriving at any definite agreement, and of the wisdom of stipulating for an armistice or temporary truce, Mr. Blaine asked on what conditions Bolivia would accept it. Señor Zilveti replied that he could not say with certainty what these conditions would be, but, as his own private opinion, he might say that, in the event of treating for a truce jointly with Peru, the war occupation should be limited to the department of Tarapacá and the littoral of Bolivia, a neutral zone should be determined, liberty and necessary guarantees given that Peru may be organized in a stable manner, and liberty of commerce accorded to Bolivia, through its own and Peruvian ports, in accordance with the existing treaties between the two nations. Señor Zilveti having asked if it was true that Mr. Trescot, in his special mission, expected new instructions from his government, and if they would be soon communicated, Mr. Blaine replied that they were actually expected, but that they could not be given until after the Congress of the United States, to which the question had been submitted for its consideration, should have passed upon it, and that he thought it improbable that this would be done immediately, since to obtain more exact [Page 103] information Mr. Hurlbut had been summoned home, and was to leave Lima on the 6th of April.
Referring to the mission of Señor Carrillo, with whom Mr. Blaine had conversed in Arequipa, Señor Zilveti stated that if Chili sincerely wished to enter into an arrangement leading to a solution of the present conflict, she would give Señor Carrillo a passport and the necessary guarantees that he might put himself in communication with the Government of Peru, to which he has been accredited. Mr. Blaine said that he thought so, too, and had, on his part, addressed Mr. Trescot from Arequipa, recommending him to obtain from the Chilian authorities all the guarantees wished for, that Señor Carrillo might proceed to the fulfillment of his mission.
Here the confidential interview, of which this is a brief summary, ended.
Approved.
Chief Clerk of Foreign Affairs.
Note.—The statement made by me was that, in the present complicated condition of affairs, Chili would not yield her claim to the cession of Tarapacà, unless compelled to do so by a manifestation on the part of the United States of a purpose to force her to that determination; that neither the people nor the Government of the United States had ever contemplated the possibility of assuming a warlike attitude.