Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress, With the Annual Message of the President, December 4, 1882

No. 60.
Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Special Mission of the United States in South America,
Lima, Peru, May 3, 1882. (Received May 26.)

No. 24.]

Sir: Referring to my dispatch No. 19, April 5,I have to inform you that I left Lima, as telegraphed, on the 15th for Casma, the only open port on the Peruvian coast, and thence proceeded to Huaraz, the seat of the provisional constitutional government of Peru. The journey having been safely accomplished, no reference to its incidents is necessary. But it is perhaps proper that I should call your attention to the fact that it is scarcely proper that the minister from the United States to Peru should reside within the lines of the Chilian military occupation, and if, as he ought, he goes to the seat of the provisional government he must be prepared to meet great discomfort. Huaraz is an old Indian town one hundred miles from the coast, lying between the Black Cordillera and the Cordillera Nevada, which is the line of perpetual ice. The elevation is high enough to occasion great uneasiness to persons unaccustomed to such elevation, and it can only be reached by the mountain road traveled by the pack-mules which bring to the coast the ore from the silver mines of the province.

I undertook the journey because I believed that the presentation of my letters of credence would strengthen what is unquestionably the real Government of Peru, recognized and obeyed at present by all parties of the Peruvian people. It is, of course, confined in its sphere of authority, is feeble in strength, and restricted in resources, but it is an actual government, and represents whatever Peruvian nationality still exists. You will remember that while accepting the disavowal of the Chilian Government of any intended offense in the arrest of Señor Calderon, I took the ground that such action could not destroy the existence of the Government of Peru, and I felt bound to do whatever was necessary to maintain the recognition of that government by the United States.

I was also authorized, as dispatch No. 19 has informed you, to indicate to the Peruvian Government that certain modifications in the terms of the protocol would be considered by the Chilian Government. The only government in Peru which, under my instructions, I was authorized to recognize was the provisional government; and if there was any possibility of bringing the belligerents to a negotiation for peace, the matter was too important for any but direct communication with the President of Peru himself.

I arrived in Huaraz on Saturday, the 22d April, and presented my credentials to General Montero on Tuesday, the 25th. I inclose the very brief speech which I made, and the President’s reply. (Inclosures No. 1 and 2.) After several conferences with Señor Alvarez, the secretary for foreign affairs, he addressed me the letter which you will find in inclosure No. 3.

I found General Montero and his advisers fully alive to the importance to Peru of peace, and perfectly aware that under existing circumstances peace could only be obtained at the cost of great sacrifice. But I am obliged to modify to some extent the impression which I had received in Lima, and which I communicated in dispatch No. 19. I am still of opinion that three-fourths, if not more, of the business men on the coast would make peace at the cost of the cession of Tarapaca, and I believe that the government also recognizes the necessity. But the government is not strong enough to act independently, and the papers from the United States containing Senator Call’s speech and your instruction to me of the 24th February have induced a belief here that a practical intervention of the United States to save cession of Tarapaca is still possible.

There is not, in my opinion, the slightest possibility of Peru’s contributing anything to such a result. She depends entirely upon the action of the United States. I cannot express too strongly my conviction that the time has come when the United States Government should say distinctly to Peru to what extent it is prepared to act practically in the way of intervention. As I wrote you, the Chilian Government is perfectly aware that if the United States determine to intervene forcibly, the opportunity must be given to Peru to pay a sufficient indemnity and save the cession of territory. But Chili does not believe that the United States will so interfere, and she will maintain her position until the demonstration of such forcible intervention is made. Peru ought not to be allowed to delude hereself with such an expectation if it is not to be realized.

As I have said, General Montero recognized the necessity for peace, and while he was not prepared to accept either the terms of the protocol or the modifications indicated in dispatch No. 19, he was prepared to make an earnest and serious effort for peace upon the preliminary conditions—

1. That the Chilian Government should recognize him as the lawful executive representative of the existing provisional government of Peru. This he undoubtedly is. All parties and factions in Peru have agreed to recognize and obey his authority, and I cannot see how the Chilian Government can expect him to make peace until it is willing to recognize his authority to do so; which can only be derived from his official position as the executive of an actual government.

2. If so recognized, he is a constitutional ruler, although a provisional one, and can only act within the limits of his constitutional authority. A treaty signed by him without the consent of the National Congress would be simply worthless, and he cannot, as an honest and honorable man, pledge himself in advance to any treaty. General Montero therefore asks that the Chilian Government will grant such an armistice as will enable him to call his Congress together at Arequipa, the only place where it can be conveniently called. I am so sure that you will consider these requests reasonable that I have urged their concession upon the Chilian Government, and you will find in inclosure No. 4 my letter to the Chilian secretary for foreign affairs.

I addressed him this letter because I had this morning a long interview with General Lynch, the military commander, and Señor Novoa, the representative of the civil authority of Chili here. Señor Novoa, who informs me that he is authorized to conduct the negotiation for peace, was not prepared to act upon my representations, and, as he felt bound to refer the question to his government, I addressed the secretary for foreign affairs directly.

What the terms of peace should be I will not now attempt to discuss. I suppose my views would not be entirely acceptable to either party. But I do think that the requests of General Montero are reasonable, and that their refusal affords a fair ground for protest on the part of the independent powers who desire to see peace restored.

My letter, however, to the Chilian secretary for foreign affairs expresses my views so fully as to render their repetition here unnecessary.

If these requests are granted, I think an earnest negotation may be expected, with some assurance of a practical result. In that case I deem it of the utmost importance that I be allowed to come home and lay before you the results of my observation here, which I can scarcely do with sufficient fullness in a dispatch. You will then be enabled, I trust, to give definite instructions to the excellent, experienced, and able ministers who have been recently appointed to supply the vacant missions in Chili and Peru.

I have, &c.,

WM. HENRY TRESCOT.

[Inclosure No. 1 in No. 24.]

speech of mr. trescot to president montero

Mr. President: I have the honor to present to your excellency my credentials as special envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary from the President of the United States to your Government.

I need not assure your excellency of the sympathy felt by the United States in the efforts made by the provisional government of Peru to establish order and to obtain peace. The prompt recognition of Señor Calderon, the continued recognition of the government, after it had been deprived of the eminent and patriotic services of that distinguished citizen, and the earnest and persistent efforts made by my government to find a basis upon which its intervention, in a spirit of equal friendship and respect for all the belligerents, could contribute to effect a secure and honorable peace, are proofs sufficient.

It would be manifestly unbecoming in me to discuss the causes which have so far obstructed the success of this endeavor. But I have felt it my duty to wait upon your excellency, not without the hope that means may yet be found by which, with mutual and honorable concession, negotiations may be initiated, which will reconcile the interests of all the belligerents and restore the peace so much desired.

[Inclosure No. 2 in No. 24.]

president montero’s reply

Mr. Minister: I receive with the greatest satisfaction the credentials of the envoy of the great republic, called upon, on account of its progressive ideas and unlimited prosperity, to exercise its beneficial influence in the moral order of the continent.

The sympathy of the United States towards the provisional government has not only been demonstrated by the great proofs that you have just shown, but by visible results. Your predecessor, General Hurlbut, whose memory will be preserved in Peru with eternal gratitude on account of his opportune mission near the provisional government of Señor Garcia Calderon, and on account of having strengthened the constitutional government in our country, caused that sympathy to produce unspeakable good at the time.

My government highly esteems the recognition of it, and welcomes with the most profound esteem the mission that you have come to fulfill at this time.

The basis upon which the efforts of your government wishes to make peace is easy to be understood in justice and in the interest of the entire continent.

It appears that some countries have considered the question of the Pacific as one of simply a private interest between three belligerent republics. The Government of Chili expressed to the neutral powers in its war circular against Peru, that it would not be reasonable to suppose that the government of Santiago would attempt to modify the geographical limits of the neighboring nations. That statement caused the war on the Pacific to be looked upon in that light; but afterwards that government changed, after having solemnly averred it, and therefore the face of the question was completely changed.

The pretensions of Chili, palpable before the war, and exposed after its victories, have transformed the apparent question of private interests among three republics into a question of continental interest.

To-day the question is whether a State that declares war to settle disputes which are susceptible of a peaceable solution can, as a consequence of its victories and of the sacrifices that it had no necessity to make, exact not only complete success, but the acquisition of territory and riches to which it never pretended to have a right.

The question is one of conquest; a continental and American question.

In your great nation and the others of this continent, you have to consider if by Chilian preponderance on the Pacific, by means of the appropriation of foreign territories and the boundless wealth they contain, the door would be left open for other encroachments by force of arms and for national changes in consequence of conquest.

Peru has to look forward, as likewise all America, to the influence and the results that these transformations would bring about in the relations between the old and the new continent. Finally, Peru has to struggle for the triumph of principle.

Every epoch has its moral progress and some prevailing idea for the good of humanity; Chili has not been capable, with the fortune of its arms, of combating in this war for the triumph of a beneficent idea, but only for usurpation. Peru is capable, in the midst of its misfortunes, of sacrificing its present in order to contribute by determined resistance, toward securing the future of America, and will not abandon that course without disappearing as an independent nation.

The solidity of interests and the nature of the social and political basis upon which the existence of the American states depend, in their internal order and in their external relations, permit us to hope that the generous exertions of the great republic of this continent, in favor of the re-establishment of peace upon honorable and equitable conditions, have not been concluded, since reasons of justice, political morality, and legitimate influence, which initiated them with such a laudable purpose and which is sanctioned by the history and the traditional policy of your government, still exist.

Peru desires peace and is ready to make any concession that will not wound its honor, its rights, and interests, or the rights, honor, and interests of the allies.

Your noble mission will contribute, I hope, to avoid the dismemberment, and with it the destruction, of the ancient nationalities of America.

The eminent qualities which adorn and make you personally so estimable are a guarantee for the happy success of these ideas.

[Inclosure No. 3 in No. 24.]

Señor Alvarez to Mr. Trescot

Minister of Foreign Affairs for Peru,
Huaraz, April, 26, 1882.

Sir:The mission which your excellency has come to fulfill near the Government of Peru is another proof of the repeated efforts of your excellency’s government to bring about peace between the belligerent republics on the Pacific; but up to now these efforts have only met with two impediments, which cannot be considered insuperable to a peaceful mind. The first is found in conditions which Chili proposes to impose— conditions which I need not define with particularity, since the government of your excellency has viewed them as inacceptable as a starting point in its good offices. The second is the resistance that Chili makes to all previous discussion. The purpose is clearly not to allow a discussion, and this determination, which is not reasonable, nor according to the usual practice of modern nations, shuts the door to every way to an arrangement.

Peru wishes peace and is ready to make for that purpose, in concert with its ally, the Republic of Bolivia, any sacrifice that will not compromise the future which both have had the right to expect since they entered the list of independent republics. But it is impossible to know either the nature of these sacrifices or how far they may go without a reasonable debate that would carry conviction to the mind. It is not impossible, on the other hand, that Chili itself may become persuaded of the convenience and necessity of modifying its pretension to some acceptable terms, and it would appear incompatible with the rules of human prudence for Chili itself to place, with unnecessary persistence, obstacles in the path of its own interests.

The inconveniences that appear to have been alleged by Chili at one time against entering into conferences with Bolivia and Peru were on account of the internal dissensions of the latter; but your excellency is a witness that they do not exist and that there is only one government recognized without exception from one end of the country to the other; that this government is the emanation of a constitutional congress, and that all factions have yielded to its authority.

It would not be possible to explain in truth how a government recognized by the government of your excellency, before which your excellency is discharging your mission, and which is the only one in the country, should not be considered by the Government of Chili as the Government of Peru with which to discuss the points of an arrangement. The Government of Chili can do no less than abandon this idea, because by the force of things it has to come to an understanding with some political entity that may represent Peru, and this cannot be any other than the legal government recognized by all the nation.

In such a case, the provisional government being a constitutional government and being bound by a treaty to the constitutional government of Bolivia, it should proceed with its approval in all its resolutions. Therefore the road to peace might be shortened and facilitated if both governments could get together, and Peru arrange the best means of assembling Congress, without whose approval any arrangement is impossible.

As your excellency’s mission is one of peace, I deem it proper to make you the present suggestions, that tend to level the first difficulties which come in the way, and thus to show the sincere wish that my government entertains of reaching it.

With sentiments, &c.,

M. ALVAREZ.

[Inclosure No. 4 in No. 24.]

Mr. Trescot to Señor Aldunate

Special Mission of the United States in South America,
Lima, Peru, May 3, 1882.

Sir: You are aware that in my last confidential conversation with your predecessor, Señor Balmaceda, it was understood that if the opportunity offered, I was authorized to indicate to the provisional government of Peru certain possible modifications in the terms of peace stated in the protocol.

I have presented my credentials to General Monteroas Vice-President of the provisional constitutional government of Peru and have had several conferences with Señor Alvarez, his secretary of state for foreign affairs.

I found General Montero and his advisers fully aware of the importance of peace to Peru and not disposed to conceal from themselves or the country that at the end of an honorable, patriotic, but unsuccessful war, peace would have to be purchased at the cost of great sacrifices. He would have found himself unable to discuss the acceptance of the terms stated in the protocol. But if he was at liberty to assume that these terms were capable of modification, he would gladly, in concert with his ally, the Government of Bolivia, make every effort to reach such modification as would satisfy the just demands of Chili.

But you are aware that the President is only the executive officer of a government which is constitutional while it is provisional. A treaty signed by him, without the authority of the National Congress, especially if it should provide for the cession of territory, would be simply worthless.

It would seem therefore only reasonable that before the President makes any overtures looking to peace, he should have an assurance from the Chilian Government on two points:

1. That he will he recognized by the Chilian Government as the lawful executive representative of the provisional constitutional government of Peru.

I think it cannot be denied that at the present moment the government of General Montero, however reduced his forces or restricted his resources, does represent the existing nationality of Peru, and is recognized and obeyed by the Peruvian people.

2. In order to initiate the negotiations which it is hoped may lead to a secure and honorable peace, the President would have to receive the authority of the National Congress to make the necessary concessions. Is the Government of Chili willing to agree to such an armistice as would allow the President to summon Congress to meet him at Arequipa, the only place at which it could be conveniently assembled? If so, the President is prepared immediately to call Congress together to lay before them the condition of the country, the necessity for peace, and the terms upon which it may probably be obtained. I venture to express the earnest hope that you will find an acceptance of these preliminary conditions consistent with the rights and interests of your government.

It is needless for me to recall to you the fact that General Montero holds his office by virtue of the authority of Congress, which gave him power to make peace, but which forbade his doing so on the basis of cession of territory. It is therefore impossible for General Montero to make any promises implying territorial cession in advance. Such promises would have no official weight whatsoever; nor do I think that with due regard to his honor you could ask him to make assurances of such a nature. But I am of opinion that as all parties in Peru have recognized him as the constitutional head of the government, and as Chili has never denied the national existence of Peru, he may rightfully ask, when expressing, as he does, a sincere desire for peace, that his path may be thus far facilitated by your government, and recent instructions received from my government warrant me in expressing to you the earnest desire and hope of the United States that Chili may be able to agree to the request made by General Montero.

At present it seems to me that the anomalous conditions of the relations between Chili and Peru are the real obstacles to a satisfactory peace. Until Chili recognizes the existence of a lawful and responsible government in Peru, there is no authority with which to deal, and a peace—if such a solution can properly be called a peace— can be reached only by the imposition by force of such terms as Chili may dictate.

Nor can I perceive that these concessions would in the slightest degree weaken the present position of the Chilian Government. The terms upon which the armistice would be granted could provide that there should be no change in the military condition, either by increase of the Peruvian forces or the acquisition of supplies, while the full responsibility of accepting or rejecting the terms of peace would be placed where they must finally rest before any peace can be made secure upon the Peruvian people.

In making these suggestions you will understand that I am acting upon my last conversation with Señor Balmaceda, rather as a friendly mediator than in my official character as the special envoy to the belligerents. The views of General Montero, as I have expressed them, have been transmitted to my government.

I have furnished a copy of this letter to Señor Novoa, and I beg to request that, as it is most important for my government to be informed of the intentions of Chili, you will send an answer to Señor Novoa by cable as soon as possible.

I avail, &c.,

WM. HENRY TRESCOT.