No. 253.
Mr. Adee
to. Mr. Fish.
Legation of
the United States,
Madrid, October 10, 1876.
(Received October 26.)
No. 336.]
Sir: My No. 321 will have made you acquainted with
the probable dispatch to Cuba of General Martinez Campos. It was, however,
at that time uncertain, and remained so until yesterday, whether he would go
out as governor-general in substitution of General Jovellar, or simply as
the commander-in-chief of the army of operations. It was generally
[Page 474]
understood that, in reporting the
surprise of Las Tumas, General Jovellar tendered his resignation, but that
the government, after consultation with General Martinez Campos, proposed
that the latter should go in an exclusively military capacity, leaving
General Jovellar at the head of affairs. It is certain that a delay of
nearly a week has occurred, taken up by the constant interchange of cipher
telegrams with Havana, at the close of which the appointment was definitely
announced, and is confirmed in the Gaceta of to-day,
of Captain-General Don Arsenio Martinez de Campos to be general-in-chief of
the army of operations of the island of Cuba; while, at the same time, it is
officiously denied by the ministerial press that General Jovellar has ever
offered his resignation.
This experiment of an almost complete separation of commands in Cuba is
apparently a step in the right direction. You will, of course, recall how
often, during the reign of Don Amadeo, and later on through the year of the
republic, minister after minister admitted the necessity of confining the
exercise of civil power in the Antilles to the hands of a civilian, under
the exclusive control of the ministry of Ultramar, leaving the military
power equally limited in the person of an officer representing the war
department. And although the present step does not go so far, it is, at
least, encouraging.
It remains to be seen how the two generals will pull together in the complex
double harness of Cuban administration, and with such a load behind them.
Although rivals, it is in a generous sense, and not as antagonists. They are
of equal rank, and have alike attained the highest military honor which can
be conferred in Spain, that of the Grand Cross of San Fernando. In the
campaigns of the Centre and of Cataluna, General Martinez Campos served
equally well, now as the subordinate, now as the peer, of General Jovellar.
He is essentially a soldier, not a man of politics or of government. He has
the desire and the genius to win, and he generally does it. He is
comparatively young, and is ambitious for military fame, well knowing that
other honors fall thick in Spain on the successful soldier. I think he goes
to Cuba with the honest resolve to end the war if it is within human skill
to end it; while the memory of Seo de Urgel and the valley of the Baztan
give him a prestige which no general has as yet brought to the task of
conducting operations in the field in Cuba.
The government, too, seems equally determined to end the war. It has “staked
its life upon the cast,” and must “stand the hazard of the die.” Its
recently contracted loan of $15,000,000 is the last which may be looked for
while Cuba hangs in the balance. It is pushing forward re-enforcements with
unexampled energy. While I write, soldiers are passing to the southern
railway-station to take cars far Valencia. By the 26th of this month the
whole re-enforcement of 24,800 will be on the way. And it is said, and with
general credence, that the government is meditating the increase of the
total force now sent out to 40,000 before the end of November—the
suggestion, as report says, of General Martinez Campos. But this I cannot
vouch for. Another such effort as the present one cannot reasonably be
expected or even hoped for from Spain in her actual circumstances. And the
result, it is felt, must be commensurate with the effort. It will not do for
Spain merely to bold her own to the west of the trocha and on the coasts during this campaign; she must win or face the consequences.
A translated leader from last night’s Político, will
show you the current of opinion of the press. You observe that it attaches,
as most of them do, equal importance to the change of command and to the
loan.
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With respect to the latter,
I cannot help but note the prominence given to the exclusion of foreign
capital from participation in its benefits, and remember the unsuccessful
attempt of the bidders to place the loan in London and in Paris, as
heretofore reported to you.
I have, &c.,
[Inclosure.—Translation.]
Editorial article on Cuban affairs from La Politica,
Madrid, October 9, 1876.
THE SEPARATION OF COMMANDS, AND THE CUBAN LOAN.
Some opposition papers are surprised that the government has adopted the
measure, which they regard as grave and transcendental, of separating
the commands in Cuba, leaving General Jovellar at the head of the
general government of the Great Antilla, and giving to General Martinez
Campos the superior command of the army, and the direction of the
operations of the war. On this point it is said that a conservative
party should not have adopted a measure which has hitherto been the
constant aspiration of the advanced parties, and they inquire if this
division of commands will be effected as an exception, or if it shows a
variation in the system of government of Cuba.
As we are not the government, nor in the secrets of the future, we do not
know whether the separation of commands will be an exception or a change
of system; what we are able to say is, that at the present time it meets
our approbation from all points of view; and let it not be said to us
that it has been the aspiration of the advanced parties, because, in the
first place, in the question of Cuba there have, generally speaking,
been no other parties than Spaniards; in the second place, the radicals
and the republicans have been in power and have not carried out this,
their supposed aspiration; and lastly, if the step is a reasonable one,
let it come from whence it will, it may be well accepted by a
conservative government, because conservatism does not signify
immobility, neither does it reject progress when it is slow, well
pondered, and advantageous.
When, in the epoch of the viceroys, three and sometimes six months were
needed in order to send communications to America and receive them from
thence, the unity of the command and the powers of the government in one
sole hand was necessary. But, now that in fifteen days we go to Cuba,
and in five minutes, by the electric wire, news is transmitted and
received, conferences held with the Antillean authorities, consultations
effected, and the most arduous matters readily decided, the
concentration of powers is not so necessary, and the division of labor,
a general rule of good administration, may find advantageous application
in Cuba as everywhere else.
In these circumstances, we can do no less than applaud the patriotism of
Generals Jovellar and Martinez Campos. The former places himself at the
disposal of the government for whatever post it may assign to him; and,
not having the immediate care of the operations of the campaign, he will
be able to devote himself to other and most important cares of
government, and to more efficiently facilitating the resources which a
general-in-chief in the field needs at the points and in the manner
which befits his plans. For his part, General Martinez Campos abandons
the important position he holds in the peninsula; he responds to the
call of the nation, and gives a proof of abnegation and
disinterestedness, which ought to be very highly appreciated. Once in
Cuba, and not having more to occupy him than the war and its
connections, his military talents will shine as brilliantly as ever, and
we doubt not that they will yield to us the happiest results. As in the
Centre and in Cataluña, the two generals will mutually aid each other in
Cuba, and we doubt not with the same brilliant and satisfactory
result.
We, therefore, approve without reserve the solution which the government
has given to this matter, whether as an exception or as a permanent
system. The exception in the present case is justifiable. Of the
permanent system we can treat later on, and for the present we have
nothing to add to what we have said.
The government during the month sends, as it has promised, its 24,000
men. The draft to complete this number was made day before yesterday
with the greatest order in the ranks of the army, and those whom fortune
has designated to cross the seas in defense of the national integrity
are making ready to fulfill their duty as Spaniards and as brave and
disciplined men.
What a contrast between the strength which the government now has and
that of other governments, which did not dare to undertake a draft on a
much less scale when General Concha asked for the dispatch of 6,000
men!
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So then, when these powerful efforts are made by the government; when it
is needful to display activity and to prepare everything for military
operations and for the indispensable sustenance and the highest possible
well-being of those who go to risk their lives in the defense of their
fatherland, the more or less per cent. at which it has been practicable
to realize a loan which it was urgently necessary to realize is not for
us, nor do we think it is for any one, a subject of criticism.
The government, in the matter of the Cuban loan, has followed a standard
of judgment which we applaud, that of realizing it by means of Spanish
capital and a Spanish company, thus giving no participation or power of
intervention to foreigners in the customs-revenues of Cuba. Although
foreign capital might have offered, with respect to interest or in other
points, greater advantages than the proposers of the accepted contract,
still the circumstance of their being foreigners, and of the
customs-revenues being in question, would have stayed us. The loan being
adjudicated to Spanish houses, none but Spaniards taking part in the
collection of the Cuban revenues, the use of the funds necessary for the
transportation and equipment of the troops having already commenced, the
expedition surfers no delay of any kind; in the early part of November
the expeditionists will disembark in the Great Antilla, and the final
campaign will be carried on with vigor.
The duty of all good Spaniards is, then, in this question, to lend their
aid to the government for the conclusion of the war. If there is any
improvement to be made in the admitted loan-contract, the Cortes will
investigate it; and the deputies, finding their inspiration in their
patriotism, will emit all due observations, and the government will ably
answer them all.
