Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

72. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State⁰

Tokyo, June 10, 1959, 7 p.m.

2643. CINCPAC exclusive for POLAD and Admiral Felt. COMUS/J exclusive for General Burns. For Acting Secretary and Robertson. Deptel 1911.¹ I am not certain I fully understand exactly what Dept has in mind re instructions in reftel. Situation re Acheson–Yoshida notes is as follows:

1. Unanimous and strong view of GOJ, legal experts, Diet specialists, and cabinet including PriMin, is that Acheson–Yoshida notes themselves will, unless otherwise kept alive, lapse under Japanese law when new security treaty comes into effect. Embtel 2344 (Secnog 11)² sets forth reasons.

2. As result of very strong urging on my part, Japanese have agreed to keep Acheson–Yoshida notes alive through exchange of notes proposed in Embtel 2345 (Secnog 12).³ In my argumentation I used same four considerations Deptel 1911 cites in third from last paragraph and Japanese finally agreed to continue validity of notes by new exchange in order to meet our view of political considerations involved. At same time both Kishi and Fujiyama have made it forcefully and unequivocally clear that if hostilities were to break out in Korea whether or not security treaty and related agreements are revised, their interpretation of their commitment under Acheson–Yoshida notes would be as set forth in Secnog 11. I must emphasize once again two points: (1) Their interpretation has nothing to do with entry into force of new security treaty since they have made clear that it applies to situation now; (2) no GOJ will take any more favorable position on this issue than foregoing, and Kishi himself holds strongest possible views on this matter.

3. In light of above, there are two alternatives open to us:

A. To keep Acheson–Yoshida notes themselves alive, in a public reaffirmation of their validity, as Japanese are willing to do under Secnog 12. At same time we would not give Japanese any positive indication of acceptance of Japanese interpretation in Secnog 11, which Japanese have not requested.

B. Alternatively, we can inform Kishi and Fujiyama that: (i) under our interpretation, which we can not change, Acheson–Yoshida notes remain in effect for reasons set forth in paras 1–3 Deptel 1911 despite signing of new treaty. Therefore no exchange of notes or other action is required. Kishi and Fujiyama on their part will then inform us that under Japanese law these notes themselves do not remain in effect without exchange of notes but that their substance remains in effect under UN SOF; (ii) in keeping with penultimate para Deptel 1911 we would also tell Kishi we are not prepared to accept or acknowledge GOJ interpretation in Secnog 11. Kishi will then ask if in event of renewal of hostilities in Korea or UN hostilities elsewhere, we are in fact telling him that we will deliberately commit Japan to an act of belligerency without consultation. If we replied that we could not accept Japanese interpretation and reserved right to launch direct combat operations from Japanese bases without consultation, I believe we would shortly be told that our position flatly contradicted spirit of new era of equal partnership and letter of new consultation formula and that we could either agree to consult or get out. Kishi could do no less because GOJ will be very closely questioned in Diet re status of Acheson–Yoshida notes; it seems to me that under what I understand to be proposal in Deptel 1911 we get worst of all worlds. At very best we will end up in disagreement with Japanese on whether Acheson–Yoshida notes themselves are alive, and with different Japanese and US interpretations and understandings of their meaning. At worst we could face a request to withdraw our forces if we refused to accept and acknowledge Japanese interpretation in Secnog 11. This uncertainty and confusion would produce hopeless basis for our own military planning, and when differences between US and GOJ became publicly known, as they would be sure to in Diet debate, UN Korean position would be gravely damaged and Communists might well be tragically emboldened. I am reluctant to proceed on this course unless there is full understanding in Washington of major disaster which could befall our entire position in Japan and western Pacific.

4. In conclusion I must emphasize once again that under Secnogs 11 and 12, as practical matter we are losing nothing that we now have. I can assure you that if hostilities broke out in Korea under present treaty and we did not act in accordance with Kishi’s interpretation of what Acheson–Yoshida agreements mean (which Kishi and Fujiyama have made crystal clear apply to present) and if we deliberately committed Japan to an act of belligerency without even consultation, we would be out of business here within a matter of hours. No Japanese Government or Prime Minister can ever again, under Japan’s new and restored position in world, voluntarily acquiesce that Japanese territory be used without consultation as base for launching active combat operations in hostilities in which we, but not Japan, are engaged thus committing Japan to acts of belligerency which could involve her in war, without even consultation.

5. In light of above I urgently request reconsideration of this matter. It is one of such fundamental importance in our whole relationship with Japan that I think it imperative that we be clear on it. I must strongly urge that it be taken to President if necessary. This is a case where we now have and can continue to have everything we can reasonably expect from this or any other Japanese Government. If we attempt to stand rigidly on past positions drawn up when Japan was under occupational status and totally subservient to and dependent on us, we will certainly end up not only by losing what we now have but alienating Japan from us in process.

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/6–1059. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC and COMUS/Japan.
1. Document 71.
2. Document 55.
3. See footnote 3, Document 55.