Office of the Historian

71. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan0

Washington, June 8, 1959, 7:30 p.m.

1911. State–Defense message. Re Secnogs 11 and 12.1GOJ position Acheson–Yoshida notes of September 8, 1951 very carefully considered. Continue believe status of notes should be considered as undisturbed by revision of bilateral US-Japanese security arrangements.

In connection points made Fujiyama Tokyo’s 2344, it may be pointed out:

(1)
In US, notes were published as integral part document with Peace Treaty (Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2490);
(2)
As notes constituted exchange between Acheson and Yoshida, would have been inappropriate have all plenipotentiaries signing Peace Treaty sign note also;
(3)
Undertaking originally proposed as addendum to Security Treaty was different in substance and form from notes as finally exchanged. Notes also refer specifically to treaty of peace. Notes have independent status from Security Treaty and are not affected by its revision or abrogation.

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Apart from legal question there are important substantive reasons making it highly desirable to preserve notes particularly with respect renewal Korean hostilities. There is also strong Congressional interest in this problem. In addition we could not accede to GOJ position without full consultations with signers of UN SOF and countries contributing forces to UN Command in view specific provisions UN SOF, although they are technically only third party beneficiaries of notes.

While appreciate political considerations facing Kishi, we would hope you can nevertheless convince GOJ of desirability of not affecting legal status of notes in view 1) Congressional interest this matter; 2) common US and Japanese concern in not taking any action which would reflect decreased interest in UN position Korea; 3) desirability of avoiding actions which could have adverse effect on our continuing efforts deter renewal Communist aggression there and elsewhere in Far East, and 4) Japan’s membership in UN, particularly present position on Security Council.

We are thus not prepared accept or acknowledge in any way unilateral GOJ interpretation in Secnog 11.

For foregoing reasons notes contained Secnog 12 not acceptable and you should continue urge GOJ accept our position.

Dillon
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/5–859. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Sneider on June 5, cleared with L/FE and OSD/ISA, and approved by Robertson. Repeated to CINCPAC exclusive for POLAD and Admiral Felt and to COMUS/Japan exclusive for General Burns.↩
  2. Document 55 and footnote 3 thereto.↩