55. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State0
2344. CINCPAC exclusive for Adm Felt and POLAD. COMUS/Japan exclusive for Gen Burns and Capt Harrison (CINCPAC Rep). Secnog 11. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of negotiating instructions Deptel 474 of September 30 [29], 1958,1 I raised with Fujiyama as remaining item of “package” the question of continued validity of Acheson–Yoshida exchange of notes of September 8, 1951.
Fujiyama said GOJ has no objection to keeping substance of Acheson–Yoshida exchange alive, but cannot accept our position that it is linked only to peace treaty and would remain unaffected by expiration of old security treaty since (A) notes were submitted to Diet as integral part of security treaty and were ratified as one item, closely linked, under same title; (B) notes were signed by Yoshida only and not by other plenipotentiaries who signed peace treaty; (C) US originally proposed that undertaking be an addendum to security treaty. Fujiyama said since basic substance of Acheson–Yoshida notes is duplicated in UNSOF agreement which Diet has ratified and which will remain in effect after expiration of present treaty, our desire to have continued validity of substance of notes would seem to be met.
I replied to Fujiyama that I hoped very much that we could find way to continue validity of Acheson–Yoshida notes themselves through a new exchange of notes.
When I saw Fujiyama today he said he concurred with my suggestion and handed me draft of proposed US note (see immediately following telegram),2 which would continue validity of Acheson–Yoshida notes. In giving me proposed note, Fujiyama made following statement from talking paper which at my request he subsequently handed me:
Begin Verbatim Text:
- 1.
- The Japanese Government understands that the exchange of notes between Mr. Acheson and Mr. Yoshida covers only any further action which would be taken by the United Nations forces in Korea in case there is resumption of the attack against them.
- 2.
- It is stated in the note that “Japan will permit and facilitate the support in and about Japan, by the member or members, of the force [Page 164] engaged in such United Nations action.” The term “support” as used here is understood to mean the so-called “logistic support” to be provided to the forces. Therefore, the notes should not be interpreted as permitting the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations by United States armed forces without consultation under the agreed formula. End Verbatim Text.
After Fujiyama made foregoing statement he said he did not think it was necessary for us to have any exchange of notes on this Japanese understanding. Essential point, he felt, was to be sure that we clearly understood each other as to nature of Acheson–Yoshida commitment, and statement which he had given me was Japanese understanding of the existing commitment. Fujiyama said that text of notes to be exchanged on Acheson–Yoshida notes (Secnog 12)3 would be made public but that Japanese did not intend to publish the two point statement he had made to me. However, if questions are raised in Diet on this subject GOJ would in response to queries take the position set forth in this statement.
I strongly recommend we accept Japanese proposal as it would provide the assurance which I feel we must have and is the very best we can obtain from them.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/5–859. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC and COMUS/Japan.↩
- Document 28.↩
- Telegram 2345 from Tokyo, May 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/5–859) See Supplement. This text is substantively similar to the exchange of notes in Washington on January 19, 1960; see 11 UST (pt. 2) 1647.↩
- Same as telegram 2345 from Tokyo; see footnote 2 above.↩