54. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State0
2254. Secnog 10. Verbatim text. CINCPAC exclusive for POLAD and Admiral Felt. COMUS Japan exclusive for General Burns and Captain Harrison (CINCPAC Representative). Naha exclusive for Deming and General Booth. In my meeting with Fujiyama April 28 on revision of security treaty, he referred to Japanese position on treaty area excluding Ryukyus and Bonins and again expressed desire for public reaffirmation from US that Japanese have residual sovereignty over these islands. He referred to our conversation April 23 (Embtel 2201)1 in which I had suggested reaffirmation along lines of language of 1957 Eisenhower–Kishi communiqué and said this suggestion raised real problems. He explained that in Eisenhower–Kishi communiqué, Kishi had first emphasized strong desire for return to Japan of administrative control of Ryukyus and Bonins and President had then made clear that while Japan possesses residual sovereignty, US found it necessary to continue present status so long as conditions of threat and tension exist in FE, et cetera.
Fujiyama referred to my understanding with Kishi that as long as situation in Ryukyus was calm, GOJ will not publicly press US for return of administrative control. He said neither he nor Kishi wished to raise return to Japan of administrative control, but would be obliged to do so if reaffirmation of our position included fact that we would have to remain in Article 3 islands indefinitely. He asked that consideration be given to a simple exchange of notes whereby US note would (a) make clear that when administrative control is returned to Japan, Article 3 islands will be included in treaty area under Article V of new treaty, and (b) that Japan possesses residual sovereignty. Japan would make simple acknowledgement. Fujiyama handed me following draft note for our consideration:
Begin text draft US note:
I have the honor to refer to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan signed today.
It is the understanding of my government that any territories of Japan presently not under its administration shall as a matter of course come within the purview of Article V as they are restored to the administrative control of Japan.
[Page 162]In this connection I wish to reaffirm the United States position that Japan possesses residual sovereignty over the islands mentioned in Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan which have not yet been restored to the administrative control of Japan. End draft US text.
Begin text draft Japanese note: I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of today’s date concerning the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, which reads as follows: (Text of US note to be inserted here.)
I appreciate the reaffirmation of the United States position that Japan possesses residual sovereignty over the islands mentioned in the above and have the honour to confirm that the understanding of the United States Government concerning territories presently not under the administration of Japan is also the understanding of my government. End draft Japanese text.
Comment: Neither Kishi nor Fujiyama wishes to handle this matter in a way which would oblige GOJ publicly to request return of administration of Okinawa. On other hand, both feel that reaffirmation of Japanese residual sovereignty is major element in their ability to defend present treaty area, which excludes Article 3 islands. I think they have in mind particularly Ryukyuans, but also Kono and certain anti-mainstreamers. While originally I had felt reaffirmation of Eisenhower–Kishi communiqué language was best solution, on second thought this would be unwise since it would reopen Japanese demand for return of administration. I now feel there is advantage in going along with substance of Japanese proposal since by doing so we can avoid possibility that GOJ would feel obliged to press US publicly for return of administrative control. I would greatly appreciate General Booth’s views.
In conclusion, it would certainly seem strongly in our own interest to try to assist Kishi and Fujiyama to handle this problem in way which will gain fullest acceptance of treaty area both in Ryukyus and Japan and at same time give us some assurance that GOJ will not publicly raise question of return of islands to Japanese administration.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/5–159. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC, COMUS/Japan, and Naha.↩
- See footnote 1, Document 46.↩