Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

39. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State⁰

Tokyo, December 7, 1958, 3 p.m.

1184. Exclusive for CINCPAC and POLAD. Exclusive for General Burns. Exclusive for Deming and General Booth. Re Embtel 1179.¹ I met secretly with Kishi yesterday afternoon (December 6) to discuss Security Treaty revision. (Only Wada was present to interpret.) I said that Treaty revision seemed now to have become entangled not only with domestic political situation and conflict between conservatives and socialists but also in intra-party dispute within LDP. I felt it was important to assess where we stood in order to decide how best to proceed and therefore I wanted his estimate of situation.

Kishi said he wanted to discuss this matter very frankly with me, particularly as it related to intra-party situation within the LDP. He then said that the unhappy outcome of the attempt to revise the police law had caused a wave of factionalism within the LDP. This was probably the most unfortunate result of the police law affair. When GOJ/LDP liaison committee had met December 4 to discuss Security Treaty there had been no agreement reached as to how to proceed. Kishi said it was quite clear that certain anti-main-stream factions, having in mind forthcoming election next year for LDP presidency, were using revision of Security Treaty in connection with factional maneuvering within LDP.

Discussing attitude of anti-main-stream factions on treaty revision, Kishi said Miki–Matsumura faction was opposed to treaty revision if it would strengthen and make closer Japanese military relations with US. On other hand, Ikeda–Yoshida group indicated it was opposed to treaty revision unless Japan’s military and security ties with US would be strengthened thereby. Kishi said that views of Ikeda–Yoshida group as to objective of revising Security Treaty were similar to views of Kishi, his brother Sato and mainstream in that they all wanted revision of Security Treaty to make security relations between Japan and U.S. even closer than they had been before. Specifically, Ikeda–Yoshida group wished to have Ryukyus and Bonins included in treaty area, whereas Miki–Matsumura group were strongly opposed. However Miki–Matsumura group were minority in LDP and their views in themselves would not be decisive.

Kishi said in light of factional situation within LDP he doubted that there could be unified position on Security Treaty on part of Conservative party until after elections for presidency of LDP. Kishi went on to say that while his 2-year mandate as president did not expire until March, he felt it was very important that present uncertainties as to future leadership of LDP be resolved as soon as possible. Therefore he believed elections for LDP presidency should be held in January at regular annual meeting of party convention now tentatively scheduled for about January 17. If elections were held in January, Kishi felt it was certain he would be reelected and quite possibly nobody would run against him. On other hand if elections were postponed till March he believed factional maneuvering within LDP would increase, with strong possibility that anti-mainstream might agree to back Ishii against him. Furthermore delaying presidential election till March would have very unsettling and adverse effect on LDP campaign for important Upper House election scheduled for beginning of June. Kishi said he believed chances were at present 80% in favor of elections for presidency of LDP in January.

Kishi said that insofar as public opinion relating to revision of Security Treaty is concerned, general public is groping because it is not certain precisely what revision of treaty will mean. He had been confidentially in touch with certain leaders of public opinion such as political commentators, et cetera, and they were all generally in favor of treaty revision, particularly if treaty area were confined to Japanese-administered islands. He had also been privately in touch with Nishio (right wing) Socialist faction and had received most confidential indications that Nishio group would probably not oppose treaty revision if Ryukyus and Bonins were not included and if revision followed general lines which were envisaged and did not increase chances of Japan becoming involved in war. Kishi said recent interventions of ChiComs and Soviets against treaty revision had definitely influenced Nishio group, which is not desirous of giving impression they were Communist stooges. This, Kishi believed, was one important reason Nishio group would not oppose sensible revision of treaty. Furthermore, Japanese public opinion in general had reacted adversely to ChiCom and Soviet blasts against treaty revision.

I asked Kishi how he thought we should proceed in light of his estimate of situation, saying that until Conservatives were solidly behind treaty I had some doubts as to wisdom of proceeding with publicly announced meetings between Fujiyama and myself, although I would, of course, be glad to meet privately with them whenever convenient.

Kishi replied he thought we should continue to meet secretly to discuss detailed aspects of treaty revision. In addition to these confidential discussions [he] thought it would also be useful, following my return December 12 from my trip to Hiroshima and Shikoku, for me to have relatively short publicly announced meeting with Fujiyama before Christmas.² This would not have to be of great lengths but would serve notice that treaty discussions had not been abandoned. We would thereafter continue to exchange views and work confidentially, together with perhaps occasional publicly announced meetings, if this seemed useful, until meeting LDP convention in January when he anticipated president of LDP for next two years would be elected. Once LDP president had been elected, he felt factional maneuvering with respect to Security Treaty revision would vanish and he would be able to move forward with solid support of Conservative party.

With respect to treaty area, Kishi believed majority of LDP leadership might end up by favoring inclusion in treaty area of Ryukyus and Bonins despite strong opposition of Miki–Matsumura. However, this was speculative and he emphasized that treaty area was most important single aspect of entire treaty revision problem insofar as Japanese were concerned. The final decision would depend not only on views of different factions within LDP but also on his final assessment to public opinion which admittedly was at present strongly against inclusion of Ryukyus and Bonins.

In light of above situation and since I am leaving tomorrow for official speaking tour of Hiroshima, Matsuyama, Takamatsu and Nagoya, I will not send comments on Deptel 802³ until some time after my return to Tokyo December 12 when can further assess situation.

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/12–758. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Naha, CINCPAC, and COMUS/Japan.
1. Telegram 1179 from Tokyo, December 5, reported the result of a GOJ/LDP Liaison Committee meeting held December 4 concerning the treaty area in the draft treaty. LDP faction leaders did not reach an agreement. (Ibid., 794.5/12–558) See Supplement.
2. See Document 40.
3. Document 37.