Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

40. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State⁰

Tokyo, December 17, 1958, 8 p.m.

1247. Exclusive for CINCPAC and POLAD. Exclusive for General Burns. Exclusive for Deming and General Booth. Re Embtels 1184,¹ 1189,² and 1244.³ In my publicly announced meeting with Fujiyama yesterday to discuss revision of security treaty, Fujiyama opened by saying he wished to outline to me political situation within LDP Conservative Party as it related to our discussions. Since our last meeting he had number of consultations with party leaders and these had convinced him of three things: (a) None of factional leaders presently making trouble over treaty revision is really opposed to new security treaty. Present differences within party stem essentially from considerations of intra-party politics; (b) this squabbling will disappear and unity on treaty question will be quickly restored once election for party presidency is out of way; (c) anti-mainstream elements in party are not really trying to oust Kishi from direction of party but are gunning for certain other personalities in party directorate (i.e., Kono, Kawashima, and Fukuda). Even Yoshida, whom Fujiyama had recently seen, had voiced to him private opinion that there is no alternative to Kishi as PriMin at present time. Fujiyama said in light of foregoing it is essential that elections for party president be got out of way at earliest possible time, and PriMin agrees with him on this. Present indications are that those elections will take place in LDP convention about January 18 rather than in March, although final decision has not yet been taken. Meanwhile Fujiyama was continuing to conduct active public relations program, including large number personal contacts with public opinion leaders, to dispel misunderstandings about treaty negotiations and unify public opinion. However, it was clear Fujiyama said that until Conservative Party itself is unified there can be no negotiations on basic substantive questions such as treaty area, although there were one or two other matters that could be talked about. I agree that treaty negotiations on basic issues would be fruitless unless Conservative Party gives strong and unified support.

He said one aspect of treaty revision problem which had been studied very carefully by Japanese legal experts was administrative agreement. They had come to conclusion that administrative agreement derives from present security treaty and is based upon it, so that it would legally cease to be valid when new mutual security treaty enters into effect. Consequently, even if no change at all were made in present admin agreement, it would have to be signed again and would acquire “another personality” in order to be valid in connection with new mutual security treaty. Moreover, while present admin agreement had not been submitted to Diet for ratification, subsequent UN Status of Forces Agreement⁴ had been submitted so that in view of Japanese legal experts a new admin agreement would have to be submitted to Diet together with new mutual security treaty.

Theoretically, Fujiyama continued, matter might be dealt with in one of following ways: (1) There might be minimum adjustments in language of present admin agreement to conform it to new mutual security treaty, but this could not be done by simple exchange of notes as we had proposed but would have to be done by changing text of agreement. (2) There might, in addition, be renegotiation of certain provisions which have caused difficulties in past, thereby making it in fact a new admin agreement. (3) Present admin agreement would be submitted to Diet with minimum adjustments conforming it to new treaty, but on “tacit” understanding with us that necessary modifications in admin agreement would be made in future by mutual agreement.

Fujiyama said he wished to make quite clear that while in Japanese view new admin agreement was necessary, they intended to recognize without question the maintenance of existing US facilities and areas in Japan and had no intention of questioning present procedures for acquisition and release of facilities, nor would they propose any modifications in provisions governing jurisdiction and status of US forces in Japan.

I said to Fujiyama that question of admin agreement together with treaty area were, it seemed to me, the two fundamental problems we had to deal with in text of new treaty. I said it would not be possible for us to sign any new treaty until we were in complete agreement on text of new admin agreement. I furthermore stated that until we knew exactly what Japanese had in mind with respect to new admin agreement and we were in basic accord with them, it would not in my judgement be feasible to move forward on text of new treaty. Therefore, it was important that we know precisely what they had in mind. If it was to conform present admin agreement to new treaty, without basic changes of substance, I felt matter might be handled without undue delay. If, however, Japanese had in mind basic changes of substance, it was clear we were in for long negotiation which would delay concluding treaty itself. Fujiyama said he fully recognized that we must be completely satisfied with new admin agreement before we could sign treaty, and he furthermore recognized that we would not be in position to sign new treaty unless new admin agreement could be signed before or simultaneously with signature of new treaty.

Fujiyama said he thought period between now and time difficulties within LDP were straightened out might most usefully be used to have some informal private discussions about admin agreement. I said I fully agreed since it was imperative that there be agreement on how we were going to handle admin agreement before we could usefully move forward with treaty. Fujiyama said his people would get in touch with Embassy at staff level in due course for further informal exchange of views on admin agreement.

I have agreed and have asked General Burns to make available an officer from COMUS who can sit in on private informal discussions which we will have with FonOff on admin agreement. General Burns’s staff has already prepared draft to conform present admin agreement with new treaty. I am forwarding this draft in following telegram.⁵ General Burns and I recommend urgent approval of this draft so that at appropriate point in informal discussions with Japanese, we can table it and have it, rather than a Japanese draft, serve as basis for discussion and negotiation with Japanese.

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.00/12–758. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Naha, CINCPAC, and COMUS/Japan.
1. Document 39.
2. Telegram 1189 from Tokyo, December 8, informed the Department that in a private meeting on December 7 Fujiyama asked MacArthur to hold a publicly announced meeting to discuss some aspects of the security treaty other than the question of the treaty area. The Ambassador agreed to hold such a meeting but warned Fujiyama that the United States would not like to see treaty negotiations enmeshed with intraparty disputes, and that the United States would be content to wait until after the election of the LDP President. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/12–858) See Supplement.
3. Telegram 1244 from Tokyo, December 16, contains a statement to the press that Fujiyama and MacArthur had a general discussion on the security treaty during the publicly announced meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/12–1658) See Supplement.
4. Agreement regarding the status of the U.N. forces in Japan, and agreed official minutes, signed at Tokyo February 19, 1954, and entered into force for the United States June 11, 1954. For text see 5 UST (pt. 2) 1123.
5. Changes in the Administrative Agreement proposed by COMUS/Japan were transmitted in telegrams 1248 and 1263, December 17 and 18 from Tokyo. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/12–1758 and 794.5/12–1858) See Supplement.