Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

335. Memorandum of Discussion at the 469th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, December 8, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–4.]

5. U.S. Policy Toward Korea (NSC 5907; NSC 5913/1; OCB Report on NSC 5907, dated July 27, 1960; NSC Action No. 2280; NIE 42.1–2–70; NSC 6018)¹

Mr. Gray presented NSC 6018 on the subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum.)² Mr. Gray said that the first “split in the paper occurred in Paragraph 30 dealing with the contingency of a renewal of hostilities in Korea by Communist forces. State and OCDM would provide that in our response to such renewal of hostilities, we would “insofar as possible limit these hostilities to the Korean Peninsula.” The majority would allow more latitude for our response by deleting the phrase “to the Korean Peninsula,” while still retaining the general restraint imposed by the words “insofar as possible”. The Joint Chiefs of Staff propose that the entire sentence be deleted.

General Lemnitzer felt that it would be impossible to make a greater mistake with respect to Korea than to say now that we would create some sort of sanctuary for the enemy in the event of a renewal of hostilities. Secretary Herter said he would agree to eliminate the entire sentence as proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Gray then referred to the difference in view reflected in Paragraph 31. In this paragraph the majority would continue providing military assistance to the Republic of Korea (ROK) at mutually-agreed levels, whereas Treasury and Budget would limit such assistance to levels not exceeding those of recent years. Mr. Gray pointed out that the Financial Appendix contained a corresponding split reflecting this majority and Treasury–Budget view of the cost implications of the proposed military assistance policy. Mr. Gray said that the difference of view in Paragraph 32, dealing with our policy toward the desires of the new ROK Government to reduce its forces, was related to the split over military assistance policy in Paragraph 31.

Mr. Dillon said the question of the level of ROK forces and the level of our military assistance to Korea were not closely related. Reduced force levels for Korea might result from an increase in military assistance which enabled the ROK forces to be modernized with new equipment.

Mr. Stans pointed out that the Financial Appendix figures for military assistance reflected a 75 per cent increase over previous years. The purpose of the Budget position on this question was to bring in focus the question of such a substantial increase in military assistance. Mr. Stans then pointed to a statement in the General Considerations of NSC 6018 (Paragraph 3) that “it is unlikely that we will be able to devote the same proportion or amount of foreign aid to the ROK in future years as has been the case in the past decade.” Mr. Stans said the Budget position on Paragraph 31 was intended to reflect the statement he had just read and to counter the Financial Appendix figures. Mr. Stans believed this was a very important issue. He said there were many other statements both in NSC 6018 and in recent National Intelligence Estimates which made it clear that Korea wants both a large defense establishment and increased consumption. He wondered whether Korea could continue to bear the burden of such large forces. The latest National Intelligence Estimate on Korea indicated that barring unification, a large-scale reduction in ROK forces would be necessary if the needs of the Korean civil economy were to be met. Mr. Stans thought the question was, will the U.S. support and encourage the efforts of the ROK Government to reduce its armed forces? Mr. Stans felt this was a question which should not be decided hastily; he therefore wondered whether further consideration of NSC 6018 should not be deferred to a later meeting.

Mr. Scribner agreed with Mr. Stans’ comments. He added that the Financial Appendix assumed that the total U.S. budget for military assistance would be $2.4 billion whereas it now seemed likely that the total military assistance budget would be $1.8 billion. NSC 6018 therefore was based on assumptions which could not be realized. The major point was how long could Korea maintain a 600,000 man army and remain an economically viable nation.

Secretary Dillon said the military assistance figures in the Financial Appendix to NSC 6018 was based on the Five Year Military Assistance Plan which indicated that $2.2 billion was the minimum necessary total figure. Korean divisions were now equipped with second-hand World War II equipment which was obsolete, inadequate, and inferior to North Korean equipment. The large sums suggested for military assistance to Korea were intended to effect a large-scale re-equipment of the Korean forces and in addition to add three surface-to-air missile battalions which would be placed in the more important Korean ports. Moreover, it was intended to equip the Korean Air Force with Century series airplanes to keep up with the qualitative standards of the North Korean Air Force. In the absence of this modernization of the ROK forces, Korea would have to accept substantial inferiority vis-à-vis North Korean forces or else U.S. forces would have to be provided to make up the difference in capabilities. The fact that future ROK Government actions or future developments in Korea could not be completely foreseen was not a reason for providing in an NSC paper that military assistance could not be increased. Rather it was desirable in the paper to provide some flexibility so that military assistance could be fixed at mutually-agreed levels. However, Mr. Dillon agreed that military assistance for Korea for FY 1962 would probably be less than the sums shown in the Financial Appendix. He believed it would be a mistake nevertheless to attempt to write the budget into each NSC paper. He therefore proposed that the majority language for Paragraph 31 be adopted.

Mr. Stans believed that the majority language in Paragraph 31 together with the figures in the Financial Appendix constituted an endorsement of the spending program reflected in the Financial Appendix. Mr. Gray suggested that the Financial Appendix be revised to reflect current assumptions as to expenditures on military assistance. Mr. Dillon pointed out that the Council was not being asked to approve the Financial Appendix. Indeed, each Financial Appendix contained a statement to the effect that it was not approved policy. Mr. Gray suggested that in view of the time, the remainder of the discussion on NSC 6018 be postponed to a later meeting.

The National Security Council:³

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 6018; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, as read at the meeting by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Agreed to delete the following sentence of Paragraph 30–d of NSC 6018, and the footnote relating thereto:

“Insofar as possible, limit these hostilities [to the Korean peninsula]* and avoid provoking or inviting Soviet intervention.”⁴

c. Discussed the difference of view reflected in Paragraphs 31 and 32 and the Financial Appendix to NSC 6018; and agreed to consider NSC 6018 further at a subsequent meeting.

Marion W. Boggs

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs.
1. NSC 6018 is printed as Document 334. For citations to the other documents listed here, see footnotes 1–5 thereto.
2. See Supplement
3. Paragraphs a–c constitute NSC Action No. 2344, approved by the President on December 17. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellanous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
4. Brackets in the source text.