Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

336. Memorandum of Discussion at the 470th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, December 20, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–3.]

4. U.S. Policy Toward Korea (NSC 5907; NSC 5913/1; OCB Report on NSC 5907, dated July 27, 1960; NSC Action No. 2280; NIE 42.1–2–60; NSC 6018; NSC Action No. 2344)¹

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on NSC 6018. (Copy of Mr. Gray’s briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.)²

Mr. Gray pointed out that paragraph 32 of NSC 6018 reads: “Insofar as consistent with U.S. policy objectives, undertake to reach agreement with the Government of the ROK on [such proposals as it may make with regard to]³ reductions in ROK military forces.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff propose inclusion of the bracketed words. The President said he also felt that the bracketed words should be included in the paper. Secretary Herter pointed out that the United States might wish to propose reductions in ROK forces and would not wish to have its hands tied by language which referred only to those proposals which the ROK might make. Mr. Stans also felt that this government should retain the initiative to consider any such reductions in ROK forces, whether proposed by the ROK or not. The President said the military services wish to include the bracketed language because they feel Korean forces have already been reduced to a minimum. General Lemnitzer agreed, adding the ROK had a long frontier which must be adequately defended if attack by North Korea were not to be invited. The Joint Chiefs believed that Korea had the manpower to meet the present force levels which, however, were marginal. If the military situation changed, the United States might be able to take the initiative in proposing ROK force reductions. Mr. Stans pointed out that NIE 42.1–2–60 indicated that reductions in ROK forces would be necessary if Korea were to stand a chance of developing a viable economy. He also noted that the Korean Democratic Party platform in the recent election had promised to reduce ROK forces by 100,000 men, the money thus saved to be shifted to economic development. Mr. Stans felt that the United States was in the position of opposing reductions in ROK forces while conceding that the only salvation for the Korean economy was a reduction of ROK forces.

The President felt that the language suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was satisfactory because it said we would consider proposals made by the ROK Government. Mr. Stans believed the language precluded us from making proposals on our own initiative. General Lemnitzer said we had a great stake in Korea. He had once had responsibility for administering both the economic and military assistance programs in that country. He believed that unless we assured the military security of Korea we would merely be building up the Korean economy so that it could be taken over by the Communists whenever they wanted it. He believed the present Korean forces represented the minimum necessary to defend the 155-mile frontier. Mr. Stans said he understood the North Korean forces included in the neighborhood of 300,000 men. General Lemnitzer pointed out that the North Korean forces were backed up by large Communist Chinese armies deployed just across the Yalu. The President said the bracketed language should be left in the paper. In effect we are saying we won’t push for further reductions in the ROK forces at this time because the Chiefs of Staff believe further reductions would jeopardize the security of Korea.

Mr. Gray referred to pages 33 and 34 of the Financial Appendix.⁴ He said he understood that Defense was reconsidering the whole framework of military assistance as a result of the decision to reduce the FY

1962 military assistance program appropriation request from $2.4 billion to $1.8 billion. Secretary Gates confirmed the need for reviewing the military assistance figures, and said such a review involved obtaining the views of the unified commanders. This process, which would of necessity be followed by a joint State–Defense review, could not be completed until some time in January.

Mr. Gray then turned to page 15 of NSC 6018, and pointed out that the Defense and JCS Planning Board representatives propose deletion of a sentence in the General Considerations.⁵ The President said he believed the statement in question was not a proper statement for an NSC paper, and directed that it be deleted. Secretary Herter agreed.

Mr. Scribner asked whether Table I was to be left in the Financial Appendix, later figures being supplied by the Department of Defense. Secretary Gates said the Department of Defense proposed to adjust the FY 1962 military assistance figures in early January and submit them for inclusion in the Financial Appendix. Mr. Stans asked whether the FY 1963 and FY 1964 figures would also be adjusted. He said he assumed that if these figures were not adjusted the footnote on page 9 of NSC 6018 would apply–that is, that any proposal for a significant increase over present levels of U.S. support would be brought to the Council for consideration.

Mr. Gray then read a proposed paragraph for the Record of Action, dealing with preparations for negotiating under paragraph 37 of NSC 6018. (The paragraph read by Mr. Gray appears as subparagraph d in the action below.) The President said he believed this paragraph represented wishful thinking, but he had no objection to its inclusion. Mr. Gray said there appeared to be more developments in connection with unification now than at any previous time.

The National Security Council:⁶

a. Discussed further the statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 6018.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 6018, with the following further amendments:

(1) Page 9, paragraph 32: Include the bracketed words, deleting the brackets and the footnote thereto.

(2) Page 15, paragraph 3: Delete the bracketed sentence and the footnote thereto.

c. Noted that the Department of Defense submit in January a revised estimate of the Military Assistance portions of the Financial Appendix to NSC 6018, after obtaining the views of the unified commanders and subsequent joint State–Defense review in the light of the decision to request $1.8 billion for the total FY 1962 Military Assistance Program, rather than the $2.4 billion which had been used for planning purposes at the time the Financial Appendix to NSC 6018 had been prepared.

d. Agreed that, in order to be prepared to negotiate under paragraph 37 of NSC 6018, the Departments of State and Defense, with the participation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should report to the National Security Council, at an early date, the results of their review of the politico-military considerations involved in the issue of Korean unification as specified in paragraph 38 of the policy.

Note: NSC 6018, as amended by NSC Action No. 2344–b, the further amendments in b above, and subject to revision of the Financial Appendix as indicated in c above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 6018/1⁷ for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

[Here follows agenda item 5.]

Marion W. Boggs

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs on December 21.
1. See footnotes 1 and 3, Document 335.
2. See Supplement.
3. Brackets in the source text.
4. See Supplement.
5. The sentence in question is the final sentence in the first paragraph on page 15, as published in the Supplement.
6. Paragraphs a–d and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2358, approved by the President on January 3, 1961. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
7. Dated January 18, 1961. (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6018 Series)