NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD KOREA
The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject, prepared by the
NSC Planning Board pursuant to
NSC Action No. 2280–b, is
transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council
at its meeting on Thursday, December 8, 1960.
Attention is invited to the fact that U.S. policy with respect to
unprovoked Communist armed attack against U.S. personnel, aircraft, or
vessels in the Far East outside Communist territory is contained in
paragraph 38 of NSC 5913/1 (“U.S. Policy
in the Far East”).
It is contemplated that the Departments of State and Defense, with the
participation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, undertake the review called
for in paragraph 38 hereof and report the results to the National
Security Council.
The enclosed statement of policy, if adopted, is intended to supersede
NSC 5907.
It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed statement of
policy, it be submitted to the President with the
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recommendation that he approve it; direct
its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies
of the U.S. Government; and designate the Operations Coordinating Board
as the coordinating agency.
[Enclosure]
8
DRAFT STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD KOREA
Objectives
Long-Range Objective
1. A unified Korea with a self-supporting, growing economy,
possessing a free, independent and representative government
responding effectively to popular aspirations and dealing
effectively with social problems, oriented toward the United States
and other countries of the Free World, and capable of maintaining
internal security and offering strong resistance in the event of
external attack.
Interim Objectives
2. A strong, stable ROK government
and society, with policies, institutions, and positive programs of
action which will increasingly promote national unity and progress,
meet popular aspirations, minimize corruption, and realize Free
World ideals of individual freedom and social justice.
3. Economic progress conducive to political and social stability, to
lessened dependence on external military and economic assistance,
and to the eventual attainment of a self-supporting economy.
4. A Korea closely allied to the United States and cooperating fully
with the UN and with other Free World
nations, especially with Japan and other free nations of Asia and
Africa.
5. ROK membership in the United
Nations.
6. Preservation of the territorial and political integrity of that
portion of Korea under control of the Republic of Korea against
Communist expansion or subversion.
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7. ROK armed forces capable of
assuring internal security and, together with U.S. forces and
logistic support available in the Far East, deterring Communist
aggression in Korea or of successfully resisting such aggression
until Free World assistance can be brought into action.
8. Progress toward Korean unification on terms which are consistent
with U.S. security interests.
Majzor Policy Guidance
Domestic Political and Social
Development
9. Continue to strengthen the governmental and democratic
institutions of the ROK, through
UN agencies as feasible and
desirable, and to make clear to the Government of the ROK the importance with which the
United States views the strengthening of such democratic
institutions.
10. Emphasize to ROK leaders the view
that, whatever their short-term problems, the long-run viability of
Korea as an independent and self-sustaining nation will depend on
what they do to meet the aspirations of their citizens for social
progress and for individual dignity.
11. Project to Korean leaders and people a steady and reliable vision
of the increasingly democratic and progressive society which they
can develop and of the interest of the United States in furthering
these Korean objectives. In this context, emphasize contacts with
and programs for young people–especially students–labor leaders, and
other potential sources of leadership and influence.
12. Promote among Korean leaders and the public an understanding of
Free World political, economic, and cultural ideals as valid bases
for realizing the material and spiritual aspirations of the Korean
people, in contrast with the illusory short-term material successes
claimed by the Communists.
13. Encourage ROK leaders to
formulate appropriate national goals consonant with Free World
principles, and to direct the growing Korean nationalist feeling,
especially among students, intellectuals and labor leaders, into
support for programs of reform and development, thus discouraging
tendencies toward totalitarian ideologies, Marxism, or neutralism.
Encourage and assist the ROK
Government to complement this effort with appropriate educational,
informational, and internal security programs and actions consistent
with democratic principles, including a vigorous campaign for the
elimination of corruption in government.
14. Encourage (a) the development and implementation of constructive
labor policies by the ROK
Government, (b) the development of free labor and management
organizations, and (c) the improvement of labor-management
relations.
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Economic Development
15. Encourage the ROK to undertake a
vigorous drive toward the eventual achievement of a self-supporting
economy and seek to develop confidence on the part of the ROK Government and people in their
ability ultimately to achieve a self-supporting economy.
16. Encourage and assist the ROK in
promptly preparing and vigorously implementing plans and policies
which will establish a sound national economic and fiscal foundation
through such means as:
- a.
- Reforming the foreign exchange system so as to reduce the
tendency to import and stimulate domestic production for
both export and domestic use.
- b.
- Normalizing commercial relations with Japan.
- c.
- Eliminating excessive bureaucratic controls.
- d.
- Reforming the tax structure, improving business practices
and rationalizing utility rates.
17. Encourage and assist the ROK in
preparing and implementing plans and policies which will further
economic progress and stability by:
- a.
- Emphasizing increased investment and holding per capita
consumption to present levels insofar as feasible.
- b.
- Increasing agricultural, fishing and marine
production.
- c.
- Increasing industrial production at the maximum rate
consistent with economic stability.
- d.
- Stimulating local self-help measures, particularly in
rural areas, and coordinating with community development
activity where possible.
- e.
- Devoting special attention to projects affecting basic
development, especially in such fields as power and
transport.
- f.
- Undertaking labor-intensive projects in such fields as
reforestation, reclamation and public works in order to
relieve unemployment.
- g.
- Promoting increased participation by domestic and foreign
private investment in Korean economic development.
- h.
- Seeking more effective utilization of human and material
resources through education and training and improving
productivity.
18. Provide economic and technical aid to contribute to the support
of ROK armed forces and to support
ROK efforts to achieve economic
progress and eventually a self-supporting economy. Progressively
reduce the grant component of economic assistance programs.
Programs for Reform and
Development
19. Encourage and assist the Korean leadership in formulating and
carrying out economic, labor, military, educational, and cultural
programs which can survive changes in government and which benefit
the people as a whole, rather than a particular ruling group. Seek
to ensure that these programs are consonant with Free World
principles and
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objectives,
but are conceived and executed in Korean terms and so chosen,
announced, and fulfilled as to strengthen the public faith in the
legitimacy and efficacy of ROK
governmental principles, institutions, and leaders.
International Relations
20. Where appropriate, influence the ROK administration leadership and the Korean public
generally to support U.S. views on major foreign policy issues.
21. Encourage the development of cooperative relations, mutual
respect and participation in multilateral activities as between the
ROK and other free nations,
especially Japan and other nations of Asia, as a means of lessening
the dependence of the ROK upon the
United States. Endeavor, in particular, to develop a community of
interest between the ROK and Japan,
and also with the Philippines, Vietnam, and the Republic of
China.
22. Promote, among ROK leaders and
people, understanding of and support for the United Nations
organization, principles, and activities, and cooperation with
United Nations agencies and activities.
United Nations Membership
23. Encourage the ROK to promote Free
World support for its admission to the United Nations through
continued democratic progress internally and through diplomatic
activity abroad and at the United Nations. Give all appropriate U.S.
support to the application of the ROK for UN membership,
both in UN bodies and through
diplomatic contacts.
Safeguarding the ROK
24. Maintain in Korea U.S. combatant and support forces adequate to
ensure, in conjunction with ROK and
other U.S. and Free World armed forces in the Far East, prompt and
effective resistance by the United Nations Command to any Communist
aggression in Korea.9
25. Continue to observe and support the Korean Armistice Agreement,
except where relieved of this obligation by Communist violations of
subparagraph 13–d of the Agreement (Annex B),10 as explained by the United
Nations Command Statement of June 21, 1957 (Annex A).10
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26. Establish through adequate evidence the nature and scope of any
violations of the Armistice Agreement by the Communist side,
especially with respect to Article 13–(d).
27. In order to maintain an adequate balance of strength vis-à-vis
the Communist forces, continue to replace the equipment of U.S.
forces with improved models of such equipment and continue to equip
them with modern weapons, [less than 1 line of
source text not declassified] when the United States
determines:
- a.
- That the UN Command is at a
disadvantage because of the violations mentioned in
paragraph 26 above; and
- b.
- That the advantages of taking action outweigh the
political disadvantages thereof, including the possible
non-agreement of the UNC
allies to such a course. Prior agreement of our UNC allies for this action
should be sought, but they should not be given a veto on
U.S. action.
28. Maintain security arrangements provided in the U.S.–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty (Annex
C),11 including
rights to dispose U.S. forces in and about the territory of the
Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.
29. Seek to maintain the support of United Nations members for the
independence and territorial integrity of the ROK. Specifically, seek to preserve the
United Nations Command, to assure support for the 1953 Joint Policy
Declaration of nations participating in the UN Command (Annex D),11 and to continue the commitment of forces to
Korea by the participants in the UN
Command.
30. If Communist forces renew hostilities in Korea:
- a.
- Implement the U.S.-ROK
Mutual Defense Treaty (see Annex C).
- b.
- Invoke the 1953 Joint Policy Declaration of nations
participating in the UN
Command (see Annex D) by calling upon the signatories to
carry out the commitment that “if there is a renewal of the
armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United
Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist. The
consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so
grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to
confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.”
- c.
- Counter any argument designed to establish that a failure
of the United Nations “fully and faithfully to carry out”
and “scrupulously observe” the Armistice Agreement has
relieved the subscribers to the Joint Policy Declaration of
any obligation under the Declaration.
- d.
- If Communist Chinese military power participates in or
supports such hostilities, take whatever direct military
action becomes necessary to offer effective resistance and
to achieve U.S. objectives [2 lines of
source text not declassified]. In taking such
action:
- (1)
- Make clear our intent to preserve the independence
and territorial integrity of the ROK.
- (2)
- Apply force promptly and resolutely in a degree
necessary to defeat such local aggression and in a
manner and on a scale best calculated to prevent
hostilities broadening into general war.
- (3)
- Call on other UN
members for effective military action against the
Communist Chinese.
ROK Armed
Forces
31. Continue to support and develop the ROK as a military ally by:
- a.
- Providing military assistance for the support of Korean
armed forces at mutually-agreed levels to meet the
objectives as stated in this policy.12
- b.
- Developing the military capacities of the ROK military leadership.
- c.
- Cultivating the friendship of the ROK military leadership.
- d.
- Impressing upon the ROK
military leadership, U.S. views on Far Eastern and global
military strategy.
32. Insofar as consistent with U.S. policy objectives, undertake to
reach agreement with the Government of the ROK on [such proposals as it may make with regard
to]13 reductions in ROK
military forces.
33. Promote understanding among the ROK military leadership of the appropriate role of the
armed forces in Korean national life, including (a) political
neutrality, (b) support of the civilian government, (c) support of
the Korean Government’s program to eliminate corruption in the armed
forces, and (d) assistance to the civilian economy, to the extent
consistent with primary military responsibilities, through use of
the technical skills and manpower of the armed forces in development
projects.
Unification
34. Accept the division of Korea on the present demarcation line,
while seeking a satisfactory solution of the Korean problem by the
use of other than military action.
35. Seek to ensure that the ROK does
not unilaterally renew hostilities. In the event of such renewal,
U.S. and UN forces will not
participate in offensive action but will provide for their own
security and for the security of U.S. citizens and interests to the
extent possible. All U.S. military and economic aid to Korea will be
terminated and the renewal of hostilities will be considered as
terminating the U.S.-ROK Mutual
Defense Treaty.
36. However, under circumstances approved by the President, agree to
actions by the ROK against north
Korea which are prompt and
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clear retaliation against a Communist attack, provided such
retaliation is against targets of military significance which meet
U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are
selected with due consideration for the risk of provoking heavy
Communist reaction against free Asian countries.
37. a. Seek Korean unification on terms which are consistent with
U.S. security interests. Be prepared to negotiate with the
Communists, with or on behalf of the United Nations or its Free
World members and the Republic of Korea, for the unification of
Korea when it appears that such negotiations would be productive
either in realizing unification on meaningful terms acceptable to
the United States and the Free World, or in crystallizing world
opinion in favor of the United Nations position on unification as
expressed in the current UN General
Assembly resolution. Encourage the ROK Government to support these efforts at Korean
unification insofar as it appears that the ROK Government efforts will be consistent with U.S.
security interests.
b. Make no commitments or public statements concerning the basis on
which Korean unification would be acceptable to the United States
without specific approval of the President.
38. Review periodically the politico-military considerations involved
in the issue of Korean unification, including particularly:
- a.
- Arrangements to guarantee the political and territorial
integrity of a unified Korea;
- b.
- The level of Korean armed forces needed for internal
security and for resistance in the event of attack by a
foreign power;
- c.
- Implications for U.S. forces and bases in Korea;
- d.
- Continuing assistance to Korea from the United States and
other Free World nations as required for internal stability,
security and alignment with the Free World;
- e.
- The risks of permitting the Communists to seize the
initiative on this issue; and
- f.
- The desirability and timing of negotiations.
North Korea
39. Pending the realization of Korean unification:
- a.
- Emphasize the collection and analysis of data by U.S. and
ROK agencies, overt and
covert, upon political, economic, and social conditions in north
Korea, and the policies and intentions of its government, as an
essential basis for U.S. policy formulation and action.
- b.
- Make clear that the United States does not regard the north
Korean regime as legitimate; and seek to derogate its prestige
and to minimize its influence and recognition, both in Korea and
internationally, by all appropriate means.
- c.
- Encourage the people of north Korea to oppose the north Korean
regime, to reject Communist doctrines, and to press for
unification on terms consistent with U.S. security
interests.
- d.
- Continue to apply financial controls against and an embargo on
trade with north Korea.
- e.
- Encourage the ROK Government
to promote and support covert activities in north Korea designed
to further anti-Communist aims.
U.S.-ROK Relations
40. Conduct U.S. relations with the ROK and activities in the ROK in a spirit of partnership and equality, consulting
with the ROK Government on matters
of mutual interest. Continue to regard community relations as a
particularly delicate aspect of our activities in Korea.
41. Hold the staffing levels and facilities of U.S. agencies and
organizations to the minimum in size, extent, and scope of operation
consistent with the proper execution of U.S. policies on Korea.
[Here follow an 11-page discussion of “General Considerations”
underlying policy; Annex A, United Nations Command Statement of June
1, 1957; Annex B, Korean Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953; Annex
C, Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic
of Korea; Annex D, Joint Policy Declaration; and a Financial
Appendix. See Supplement.]
