Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

333. National Intelligence Estimate⁰

NIE 42.1–2–60

Washington, November 22, 1960.

PROSPECTS FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The Problem

To estimate the prospects for the Republic of Korea over the next few years.

Conclusions

1. The revolutionary forces set in motion in the Republic of Korea (ROK) by events in March and April 1960 have not yet run their course. Prime Minister Chang Myon has achieved a slim majority in the House of Representatives, but in view of the highly fluid political situation and the number and magnitude of the problems facing him, he probably has less than an even chance to retain a working majority over the next two years. (Paras. 7, 10–15)

2. Changes in leadership and realignments of forces will probably occur in the next few years before a new political equilibrium is arrived at. This will probably improve some shift away from the present dominance of conservative parties and an increase in the strength of socialist forces. The mood of the Korean people will remain uneasy and could be exploited by authoritarian or revolutionary leaders if the Seoul Government falls far short of meeting popular aspirations. (Paras. 16, 41)

3. The major, long-term problem confronting the ROK is and will remain the poverty of its economy. In fact, because of the paucity of basic resources in its territory, the military burden, and the division of the country, the ROK will not be able to achieve a self-supporting economy in the foreseeable future. If the ROK is to exist as an independent nation allied with the West, it will almost certainly continue to require large-scale foreign aid. (Paras. 26, 40)

4. The level of efficiency of the ROK armed forces has been reduced by the elimination of a number of experienced senior officers and the consequent retraining and adjustment necessary. With the National Police suffering the effects of personnel shakeups and reorganization, the armed forces continue to represent an important element of stability in the Korean domestic scene. We believe that conditions in the ROK would have to deteriorate considerably before the military would attempt to supplant the civilian authorities and that a military coup is unlikely under present conditions. (Paras. 14, 30–31)

5. The ROK has committed itself to a new and positive approach to foreign relations, especially with respect to Japan. Within the limits imposed by the remnants of anti-Japanese feeling, the Chang government will probably be willing to negotiate settlement of most outstanding issues with Japan. However, there are many obstacles to be overcome before ROK-Japanese relations will be normal. Although prospects for US–ROK cooperation have generally improved since the revolution, they will be complicated by the Korean public’s new and somewhat touchy sense of nationalistic pride. (Paras. 32–39)

6. We believe that the national consensus will continue to support attachment with the US and the West as being essential for defense against renewed Communist aggression and necessary for maintenance of the economy. However, the new feeling of nationalism, together with the yearning for unification and a vague resentment over Korea’s weak position in the East-West power struggle, will probably cause increased interest in neutralism and diminished responsiveness to US guidance. (Para. 42)

[Here follows an eight-page “Discussion” section; see Supplement.]

0. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred in this estimate on November 22, except the AEC and FBI representatives who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.