Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

326. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea⁰

Washington, July 21, 1960, 6:11 p.m.

61. For Ambassador from Parsons. Embtel 67.¹ In view analysis of delicate problem we face in attempting influence current Korean political picture as outlined reftel I accept your judgment that our best course of action is through informal contacts of Embassy officers and yourself with political leaders as occasion arises. Continue however to believe that political developments in next few months are of critical importance from standpoint our objectives in Korea.

Regarding Democratic Party unity agree that emergence two conservative parties from DP factions and other conservative elements would be excellent basis long-term stability. Danger as we see it is that if DP splits neither faction will have broad popular support or adequate grass-roots organization and that National Assembly will become collection of power-seeking cliques. Even if two conservative parties emerge, they may have to form coalition to control Assembly majority. Result again would be situation in which popular support would be subordinated to short-sighted political maneuvering with resultant loss of public confidence. On other hand optimum stability might result as Embassy suggests if DP forms first government and control subsequently passes to new conservative party if latter by that time organized at grass roots. If this analysis valid, DP split immediately after election on anything like fifty-fifty basis would add to prospect of political instability, ineffective leadership, popular disillusionment with democratic process and consequent opportunity for Communist agitation. As you point out our capacity to avoid this outcome is severely limited, but within this limitation I think we should exert such informal influence as we reasonably can to hold Korean leaders to effective and farsighted political course.

Agree that you should continue work for long-run improvements Korea’s economy as recommended last para reftel. In view previous reports progress this field (e.g. penultimate para Embtel 8),² we are concerned over your report (paras 5 to 8 reftel) of adverse political impact at this time of various recent steps taken by US. Therefore in order obtain more complete picture of situation would appreciate more detailed report and analysis background and present status these and other actions and proposals economic field.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/7–1860. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Macdonald and Vettel and cleared by Bane, Steeves, and Parsons.
1. In telegram 67 from Seoul, July 18, McConaughy replied to telegram 32 to Seoul (Document 325) indicating that he did not believe it would be appropriate to approach the leaders of the Democratic or other parties as suggested by the Department. He felt that a climate of determined independence had been engendered by the April revolution, and that Koreans were watching the U.S. Embassy for signs of unwarranted efforts to influence Korean political developments, particularly during the election campaign. He added that U.S. efforts to “start cleaning up Korea’s economic augean stable,” including proposals adopted by the Combined Economic Board for U.S.-Korean cooperation in formulating the South Korean budget, had reinforced growing Korean concern about U.S. interference in internal Korean affairs. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/7–1860) See Supplement. McConaughy amplified his arguments in a personal letter to Parsons on July 22. (Department of State, FE/EA Files: Lot 63 D 168, K20.1 U.S. Policy in Korea) See Supplement.
2. Document 324.