Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

324. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State⁰

Seoul, July 3, 1960, 3 p.m.

8. For Assistant Secretary Parsons. Re Deptels 1160,¹ 1317.² With passage Constitutional Amendment, transition “of Korea from April “Democratic Revolution” to new political era begins. Even over short-run, political prospects contain large element uncertainty, and possibilities indicated Deptel 1317 certainly cannot be discounted. At present however Embassy believes following are most likely prospects for period immediately following elections:

(1) In all probability DP will win narrow majority in lower house elections possible 120 of 233 seats. If party does not split in two its ability form government and constitute effective working majority in Assembly will depend in part on support obtained from independents (including ex-liberals), who may hold as many as 70–80 seats. Remaining lower house seats will be divided among various “Reformist” parties; in such circumstances, non-conservative (“Progressive”) element not likely be in position wield balance power.

(2) Ability DP to constitute basis of moderately oriented and working majority (Deptel 1160) likely be seriously limited by factionalism which again has approached critical point. If both factions emerge from elections relatively equal in strength, there will be greater incentive for compromise than in case one faction being appreciably stronger. Emergence stronger non-conservative block than now anticipated similarly might reduce likelihood major break in DP ranks.

(3) In any event organization new government will require compromise between two factions DP each attempting draw support from independent and minor party ranks. Successful compromise in all likelihood would divide Presidency and Prime Ministership between two factions with roughly equal representation in Cabinet and Assembly leadership. (See Chang Myon’s views this point Embtel 3.)³

(4) At least over short-run government almost certainly will be handicapped by lack strong leadership at top level. Embassy inclined agree with view Deptel 1160 that Chang Myon better suited for Presidency. (Embtel 3 also indicates Chang may be inclining this direction.) Chang not only better qualified for this post by reason temperament and talent but removed from partisan politics he might be able provide necessary national symbol stability and sense direction. Additionally Chang’s departure from active participation DP probably would reduce severity factional struggle which now encouraged not only by fact old faction has been at disadvantage since death Cho Pyong-ok but by Chang’s personal inability rise above pretty factionalism as well as his unacceptability to old faction as leader entire party.

On other hand it should be recognized that apart from Chang, no individual comes readily to mind who, among leadership ranks either faction, is qualified by experience and age to fill Prime Ministership. Even Chang’s availability this post not assured since he will encounter stiff opposition in campaign for Assembly seat. Such leadership as suggested reftels may develop over time, given reasonably stable political situation. Until such leadership available, however, direction government and party politics likely depend more on emergence of working team of younger leaders than upon any single individual.

(5) It difficult foresee probable effects formation upper house on polit situation. In view limited powers upper house and fact that with few exceptions, membership likely be undistinguished, effect this development in immediate situation likely be marginal, other than in election of president.

Embassy entirely agrees with views indicated Deptel 1160 as to polit situation most likely contribute to development stable and effective democratic govt, as well as with analysis Deptel 1317 of pitfalls which threaten such development. In Embassy view however extent our ability influence directly emergence certain individuals to particular positions responsibility or affect configurations power within and between polit parties is decidedly marginal. Moreover extent to which we would be required inject ourselves into active polit situation in order exert even this limited influence, presents serious dangers not only of evoking adverse criticism of our interference but encouraging polit leadership shift or evade responsibility.

Further our experience in Korea suggests that however much particular individuals and groups may appear to understand requirements and basic values of effective representative democracy, they function within a total situation which is uncongenial to their realization. Longer-range polit stability within democratic framework therefore depends essentially upon changes in such aspects of total situation as psychological climate, patterns and values polit behavior, and economic situation as will encourage: A) development of experienced and responsible leadership in Govt and polit parties; B) greater concern for translating realizable popular aspirations into sound national policies together with higher standards probity and efficiency in administration Govt and management party affairs; and C) achievement measurable progress toward self-supporting economy.

In Embassy view therefore it essential US influence be brought bear more effectively in direction encouraging such changes in total situation. In this an important objective should be to lend support to those many Koreans particularly younger citizens and Govt officials including educators who are fired by genuine desire set country’s polity and economy in order and whose views given effective expression can condition policies and actions polit leadership.

All these questions currently under informal consideration by members Country Team and it hoped to develop in near future concrete activities and programs to this end. Sound beginning already being made in administration economic aid along lines indicated Embtel 871,⁴ to encourage imaginative and responsible leadership and constructive policy planning free from corruption and polit favoritism. Among other possibilities being considered are: 1) assistance to Hoover commission-type public study of specific problems facing development effective representative govt; 2) adult citizenship education program; 3) Fulbright exchanges directed to close examination problems Korean politics and development practical understanding functioning democratic institutions in Korean context.

Embassy would appreciate Dept’s comments and suggestions re this approach. We of course appreciate importance our continued encouragement those politically active individuals and groups who can contribute most to realization stable democratic Govt Korea, but we believe our major effort must perforce be directed on broader and more fundamental plane if effects such individuals and groups to have any realistic hope for fulfillment.

McConaughy

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/7–360. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections.
1. Document 321.
2. See footnote 1, Document 321.
3. Telegram 3 from Seoul, July 1, reported on a conversation that day with Chang Myon in which he expressed concern about the danger of factional strife within the Democratic Party and indicated that he would prefer the position of president should his party win the election. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/7–160)
4. See footnote 5, Document 297.