Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

323. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Seoul, June 20, 1960, 2:10 p.m.

PRESIDENT’S FAR EASTERN TRIP

June 1960¹

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • The President
  • Ambassador McConaughy
  • Lt. Col. Eisenhower
  • Mr. Parsons
  • Lt. Underwood (Interpreter)
• Korea
  • Prime Minister Huh Chung
  • Amb. Chung II Kwon
  • Vice For. Min. Lee Su-yong
  • Press Secy Lee Chae-hyon

SUBJECT

• Post Summit Situation; Japanese-Korean Relations; The Future of Japan

[Here follows a briefing by President Eisenhower on the failure of the Summit Conference in Paris in May and his discussions with Chiang Kai-shek in Taipei.]

Prime Minister Huh Chung expressed his appreciation for the President’s exposition and agreed that the USSR would not start a large scale global war immediately. He asked the President if he did not think the Communists might not start limited wars, however, in order to discover weak spots.

The President replied that he thought Khrushchev would refrain from starting small wars that might readily become big wars. He might use some of the satellite countries to fight small wars for him, believing that the risks would be less. Khrushchev probably believes that he has better ways than warfare to achieve his objectives.

The Prime Minister turned to issues between the Republic of Korea and Japan. He said he wanted to make some mention of U.S. policy and attitudes toward Japan. He said that as a Korean who had worked for eight or nine years for normalization of relations with Japan, he feels keen regrets that his efforts have had no results.

Ex-President Rhee had given him an unexpected appointment last October as the head of the Korean mission to negotiate with the Japanese. He had headed the mission for three or four months. At first he had considerable optimism that he might be able to solve the outstanding problems. Unhappily his enthusiasm and optimism were not well founded. The improvement he had hoped for was not achieved. He had met a number of Japanese people, had done extensive research on the issues, had devoted much effort to the problems of the “peace line”, property restoration and the legal status of Korean residents of Japan. He had concluded that these issues could be settled with the exercise of “good common sense.” However, these did not constitute the fundamental problem in Japan-Korea relations. He had met with Prime Minister Kishi, Foreign Minister Fujiyama and others. He had found that the Japanese did not fully understand or appreciate the deep national sentiment of the Korean people on Japanese questions. The Japanese did not take full account of the inevitable hatred and resentment of the Korean people growing out of the years of Japanese rule.

Japan has profited from generous United States aid and has grown prosperous despite the fact that it was a defeated nation. With the benefit of American assistance Japan has become one of the most advanced countries. This has given the Japanese an attitude of superiority and they look down on the Koreans. He said these elements are basic factors in the situation. The Prime Minister said he had told Kishi that the problem could not be solved until the Japanese understood the national sentiment of the Korean people and made some effort to “soothe” the Korean people. Unless this were done a serious situation would be created. The Prime Minister said that the Japanese instead of trying to help the situation had made it worse by sending Korean residents to Communist North Korea.

The Prime Minister said that when he took over the Government at the end of April, he had hoped to solve the outstanding issues in one or two months. He had discussed the situation repeatedly and at length with Ambassador McConaughy. He had felt that if the United States could influence Japan to stop sending Koreans to the Communist north, he could resume the negotiations with Japan with prospects of success. The Prime Minister said he had expected and waited for some US action. But the US had failed to act.

He said that Japan was claiming that the Koreans had a “free choice of residence.” They are pretending that the repatriation scheme is a humanitarian endeavor. He said, “This is not exactly so.” He said that “free choice” is just a mask used by the Japanese.

If the United States had shown that it was not fully in accord with the Japanese action, the Japanese program for shipping Koreans to the north would not have been successful. In the beginning of the negotiations when the U.S. expressed objections the agreement was blocked; but when the United States “kept silent” the Japanese were encouraged to reach the Calcutta Agreement of last August² with the North Korean Communist regime. Even after that, if the United States had exerted its influence on the Japanese, the shipments could have been stopped. Then the situation in Japan would have developed differently. Now the situation has changed and he has little hope of finding a solution. He expressed deep concern. He felt that the Japanese are likely to “turn to a neutralist trend,” if not an actual pro-Communist orientation. Then negotiations between Japan and Korea would become “more difficult.” Also a “non-Communist system” in Asia would become “more difficult to maintain.”

He said that if the emphasis which the Department of State has placed on Japan in an effort to bring about stabilization there could instead be placed on a staunch anti-Communist country such as Korea, Free China, Viet Nam or the Philippines, that would be the best way to preserve a strong anti-Communist system in Asia. Korea was strongly anti-Communist “to the last person” and U.S. efforts to further strengthen Korea economically or militarily would be well justified.

The Prime Minister said that finally in view of recent developments in Japan, especially the reactions against the Security Treaty, he would like to know if there was any change in the U.S. attitude towards Japan.

The President agreed that the consequences of adoption of a pro-Communist or even a neutralist policy by Japan would be most serious. He felt that no security system we could set up in the Far East without Japanese participation would work satisfactorily. The military burden that would have to be assumed would be back-breaking. He felt that it must not be allowed to happen and that Japan must and can be saved.

The President said that he could see some justification in the grievances voiced by the Prime Minister. He expressed regret that the right formula for solving the problems had not yet been found. He felt that a way must be found to cooperate on fundamental matters without waiting for a solution of all outstanding problems. He felt we must all try to prevent the development of an adverse situation in Japan which would call for a far reaching reappraisal.

The President recognized the need to help the Republic of Korea to develop economically and otherwise–but not at the expense of Japan. He said that we must all put our minds to the urgent problem of keeping Japan in the right camp. With a population approaching 100 million people and with a high stage of industrial development, Japan by joining up with Communist China even in the economic field alone could place the rest of the countries in the free world alignment in an extremely adverse position.

The President thought we should all consult together on the problem since we face a tricky situation in the light of the new elections which presumably will be held soon in Japan. We must not give up trying to make the Japanese recognize the realities of the current situation.

He hoped the Japanese could be brought to respect the national attitudes of neighboring countries. He would be glad to have the further views of the Korean Government on this problem which could be expressed either through the Korean Ambassador in Washington or the American Ambassador in Seoul. He added that we did not want to take any action in Japan which would have the effect of driving the Japanese further in the wrong direction.

The Prime Minister said that he agreed completely. He had not meant to imply that the U.S. should abandon Japan. He said that we should certainly do our best to hold the line in Japan. He assured the President of the Korean intent to cooperate fully with the United States but he could not help but express his deep concern as to the future of Japan. He said that if Japan became pro-Communist or even neutralist it was a life or death matter for Korea. So the Republic of Korea was understandably more concerned than any other country with the developments in Japan. While not considering it inevitable that the worst would occur, he thought we must be prepared for that.

At this point the Prime Minister said he would like to call in the Ministers of Reconstruction and Defense to brief the President on economic assistance and military matters.

The President remarked that the allotted time was already used up and that a continuation would mean that he would be late. He said he would continue if the Prime Minister requested it, but he would ask that the National Assembly be notified of the delay. He felt that he owed this to the National Assembly. He did not wish to be guilty of a discourtesy to the Speaker and the Members of the National Assembly.

The Prime Minister assured the President that he would notify the National Assembly of the delay and that the Assembly would not object. He said that the briefing would be made as short as possible.

At this point Reconstruction Minister Chun, Defense Minister Dee and Finance Minister Yun, General Magruder and Dr. Moyer joined the group.³

The President went to the National Assembly through cheering crowds estimated at over 1 million people. (Telegram 1380 from Seoul, June 20; ibid., 711.11–EI/6–2060) His speech to the Assembly, in which he renewed a pledge of full U.S. support for the Republic of Korea, was, the Embassy felt, a great success, as was the entire visit. (Telegram 1382 from Seoul, June 20; ibid.) Eisenhower held, the Embassy noted, “a special place in the hearts of the Korean people.” (Despatch 717 from Seoul, June 29; ibid., 711.11–EI/6–1960) A breakfast hosted by Eisenhower at the Embassy on June 20 gave Democratic Party leader Chang Myon, who was seated on Eisenhower’s right, a chance to talk with the President. Marshall Green noted, in a July 21 letter to David Bane, that Chang recognized and appreciated the considerations accorded him. (Ibid., FE/EA Files: Lot 63 D 168, K22.6 President Visit 1960) See Supplement.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material. Secret; Limit Distribution. The meeting was held at Kyung My Lai. No drafter is indicated, but a note on the source text states that the text was approved as accurate in the White House on June 27.
1. President Eisenhower was visiting Korea as part of an East Asian trip that was revised at the last moment. He was initially scheduled to visit Korea on June 22 for one day. On June 16, however, the Japanese portion of the trip was canceled because of anti-American demonstrations, and the President’s visit to Korea was moved up to June 19 and extended to 2 days. Prior to his stop in Korea, the President visited the Philippines, June 14–16, the Republic of China, June 18–19, and the island of Okinawa, June 19. After leaving Korea, Eisenhower returned to Washington via Hawaii. For texts of public statements made by Eisenhower in Korea, including an address to the National Assembly on June 20, and a joint statement issued with Prime Minister Huh Chung on June 20, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61, pp. 512–522.
2. On August 13, 1959, an agreement was concluded in Calcutta, India, between the Japanese and North Korean Red Cross societies, providing for a repatriation program to North Korea of those Koreans in Japan who so elected. The agreement was to be implemented under the supervision of the ICRC. Additional information on the background and implications of this agreement is in a July 8 memorandum from Bane to Parsons. (Department of State, FE/EA Files: Lot 63 D 168, K1/A2 Political Briefing Papers)
3. Another record of this conversation prepared by Colonel Eisenhower indicates that, because of time limitations, the only presentation made to President Eisenhower at this point was made by Minister of Reconstruction Chun, who pointed out that South Korea was spending one-half of its total revenue for national defense and continued to need U.S. assistance. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series) A more complete summary of the presentation by Minister Chun was transmitted to Washington in telegram 1403 from Seoul, June 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/6–2360)