Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea⁰

Washington, July 11, 1960, 8:58 p.m.

32. For Ambassador from Parsons. We agree with your points in Embtel 8¹ that Korean problem is long-range one requiring emphasis on encouraging necessary changes over-all situation; that injecting ourselves into ROK affairs poses risks; and that our capacity to influence short-term developments is limited. Moreover some Democratic Party leaders, having been told for many years of our noninterference policy in answer their pleas for help under Rhee regime, may believe they should expect same attitude.

At same time we believe that if short-range Korean instability is too great or too long continued, we may lose opportunity to encourage long-term growth.

Conclude from Embassy analysis in reftel that in regard to the short-term situation our attention should be concentrated on problems of Democratic Party factionalism and of leadership in new administration. These problems are so serious, and so basic to Korea’s future, that I believe US should do what it can to promote best possible solution of them within limits specified in Deptel 1160.²

I suggest therefore that you consider following specific short-run courses of action:

(1) Meet with leaders of both factions of Democratic Party in an informal context, such as luncheon, and stress to them importance that Korean people, United States, and entire Free World attach to their efforts in months ahead. You might refer to party’s successful record so far in overcoming traditional Korean tendency toward factionalism and point out how heavily their own future, as well as Korea’s depends upon continued unity, broad-mindedness, and attention to national rather than factional interests. You might also point out traditional tendency of political ruling groups to disregard and lose touch with desires and aspirations of common people until revolt or revolution topples them, and stress that capacity of a nation to develop politically depends in large part upon responsiveness of leadership to people’s needs, as well as upon popular image of leadership as effective and dedicated to national welfare. Organized, stable political parties, with representation in legislature, can offer channel of communication and interaction between leaders and people far better than shifting conglomeration of small blocs in Assembly without grass-roots connections. Thirdly, you might emphasize need to encourage development of leadership talent among younger people, both to ensure continuity in future years and to demonstrate to young men of April Nineteenth Movement that their effort was not in vain.

(2) Since approach to DP alone might be interpreted by press and public as favoritism, hold similar meetings within space of few days for other major political groups and representative independent leaders, with content of discussion appropriately modified. We believe Social Masses Party should be included, despite its somewhat leftist overtones, to avoid creation of issue and capitalize upon what friendship may exist in that group, but welcome your views on this point as on others.

(3) Inform Huh Chung of general nature of these discussions as your judgment indicates appropriate.

(4) Suggest privately and personally to Chang Myon that he accept Presidency, if offered to him as service to nation, on basis of his obviously great qualifications as Chief of State to advise Korean administration in its formative stages and contribute prestige of international reputation in position of some permanence. In this context and to degree your own judgment indicates advisable, you might directly or indirectly suggest desirability as Prime Minister of a respected “old faction” leader like Yun Po-son, backed up by an able Cabinet of younger men, one of whom–such as Cho Chae-ch’on–with proven ability and administrative experience might step into Prime Minister’s role at later time. (In this connection noteworthy that Chang singled out Cho for mention in conversation reported in Embtel 3.)³

(5) Maintain close touch with DP through Embassy officers during and after election campaign and renew cautions against factional strife if it reaches serious proportions, keeping in touch with other political groups as well to demonstrate impartiality and for information purposes. Embassy might indirectly and subtly hint at tacit US support for DP if this advice is heeded.

Regarding basic long-range recommendations in reftel, agree all are sound, essential, and deserve support. With particular reference to point (1), we believe that prompt attention to development of an effective, motivated, adequately paid bureaucracy would be highly productive in terms of prospects for Korean stability and progress, both short-run and long-run. Believe Embassy already at work on this problem and suggest assigning top priority to it. In this connection we have recently reviewed Embdes 641 of April, 1958,⁴ many points in which seem valid in present context. Your own extensive FE experience makes hardly necessary the caveat that efforts at change in Korea must be made by and through Koreans if they are to have validity and impact on general public. US can supply impetus, support and some advice from usefully objective viewpoint, but our capacity for directly producing permanent Korean social change, except in special areas like technology and military science, is extremely limited. Subject of social change itself now under study in several American universities, notably MIT, and this field might be useful one for Fulbright-sponsored group.

We recognize that short-term actions above proposed, especially meetings with political parties, might expose US to charges of intervention in domestic affairs, but believe they are worth risk. (Somewhat similar meetings were held with Liberal and Democratic leaders in 1956, with no known repercussions.) Moreover, if meetings held in context next preceding paragraph, with judicious flattery re accomplishments of April revolution, any impression of intervention could be softened and made to appear as benevolent and constructive interest in ROK success.

It also recognized that indications of a post-election split in the Democratic Party are multiplying, and that our efforts to hold it together may be unsuccessful in immediate terms. Nevertheless points about dangers of factionalism and need for broad base of stable party organization would be equally valid in any regrouping of alignments–such as merger of DP “old faction” and ex-Liberal reformists–which might subsequently emerge. The suggested meetings might help to underline in leaders’ minds the importance of these considerations, and thus help to stabilize a new political spectrum if the DP breaks up.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/7–360. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Macdonald and cleared by Bane, Steeves, and Parsons.
1. Document 324.
2. Document 321.
3. See footnote 3, Document 324.
4. Not found.