295. Editorial Note
At the 453d Meeting of the National Security Council on July 25, Allen Dulles reported during his intelligence briefing on “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security” as follows:
“Mr. Dulles then said that the Soviets had made a new approach to the Shah of Iran on July 19, suggesting that Iran and the USSR exchange assurances that no third party would be allowed to station forces on the territory of either country. The Shah continues under pressure from neutralist politicians to reduce U.S. influence in Iran and balance it by an agreement with the USSR. Mr. Dulles felt it would be desirable for us to find some means to reduce the pressures on the Shah but believed the Shah would not take any action inimical to the West.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
Telegram 162 from Tehran, July 20, reported on a meeting the U.S. and U.K. Ambassadors had with Iranian Foreign Minister Aram at the latter’s request. At the Shah’s request, Aram read a rough translation of a July 19 note from the Soviet Chargé on behalf of Khrushchev. Wailes’ notes follow:
- “1. Soviet Union is trying its best to bring back to normal relations between the USSR and its neighbor Iran.
- “2. These relations were most friendly after His Majesty’s visit to Moscow two years ago.
- “3. They changed for the worse however after Iran signed bilateral with US last year.
- “4. USSR feels present situation fraught with danger and therefore it is necessary to bring about some improvement.
- “5. His Majesty should have no doubt whatever about friendly intentions of USSR. For example border problems and financial matters between the two countries have been amicably settled.
- “6. Even after signing of US bilateral Soviet Union indicated its willingness to find with Iran a remedy which would lessen dangers inherent in bilateral and thwart aggressive actions of Pentagon.
- “7. The talks of year ago February related to question of no military bases—these talks have not ended and there is still a chance to improve situation. The question is not to find words of justification for oases but actually the danger of having bases.
- “8. Bases can be used for air espionage of USSR. This could well be cause of attacking these bases. Mr. Khrushchev has no desire to express threats on this subject. His only care is for security of USSR.
- “9. Iran is full of American advisors, thousands of them, who have penetrated even into Iranian military establishment. Obviously US will bring Iranian Army under American control. US also has men in the police, Savak and in economic areas.
- “10. The Shah can obviously choose his own advisors but the Soviet Union cannot remain unconcerned if they are drawn from a government hostile to USSR.
- “11. Soviet Union desires friendship with Iran and no territory from Iran but it cannot have normal relations if there shall be foreign military bases on Iranian soil either in open or secret.
- “12. Let us then conclude an agreement not to have any third country use, construct or maintain military bases including missile bases—likewise there should be no armed forces of any third country.
- “13. You, your Majesty, should not fear entering into an agreement with USSR. Such an agreement would result in Soviet assistance and probably increased aid from US.
- “14. Do not listen to flatterers. Turkey presents proof of neglecting its national interests and dealing with foreigners. On other hand Afghanistan is an example of friendly relations and no conflict.
- “15. The way is now open to better relations between Soviet Union and Iran through joint operations along contiguous borders—for example irrigation, electric plants, et cetera.
- “16. The USSR therefore remains ready to discuss practical way for improvement of relations on confidential basis and on any level which you may wish.”
Aram then stated that the Shah was giving some consideration to replying that the responsibility for the present situation rested upon the Soviet Union; Iran would permit no alien reconnaissance flights to take place from Iran; and it would not permit the establishment of missile bases by third countries. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.88/7–2060)
In telegram 272 to Tehran, July 27, the Department of State instructed the Ambassador to use every opportunity to point out to Aram and the Shah the consistency of U.S. support for the “free world” and the necessity for a “solid front vis-à-vis USSR during this period of uncertain Soviet intentions.” Exchanges of assurances or a unilateral assurance as envisioned by the Shah would, in the Department’s view, gain Iran nothing and provide the Soviet Union with a potent propaganda weapon to weaken “free world morale.” (Ibid.)