Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

236. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Bonn, November 4, 1960.

PARTICIPANTS

• Foreign Minister Von Brentano
• Ambassador Dowling
• Ambassador Burgess
• Herr von Etzdorf, Foreign Office
• Mr. Williamson, Embassy

SUBJECT

• Discussion on France, NATO, Berlin and East-West Problem

Ambassador Burgess explained in some detail the timing of the long range planning exercise for NATO and the background of the American paper which is now circulated in the Council.¹ Foreign Minister Brentano stressed the urgency of the situation confronting the Alliance and urged that agreement be reached on the whole broad problem of the organization of the military power of the Western Alliance. He stated that the central point is, as it has been for some time, the question of control of nuclear weapons both in the tactical as well as in the strategic fields. He recognized the legislative limitations placed on American action in the field of controls, but pointed out the urgent necessity of improving the organization of the Alliance in order to provide for an effective defense of Europe. He hoped that sufficient pressure could be brought on the French to lead them to modify their current conception concerning integration of forces and the control of the striking force. Every effort must be made to swing the French over to the concept of integration as well as to urge them to build up the gaps in their conventional forces in order to contribute to the total defense effort.

Ambassador Burgess said that, in the forthcoming long range planning exercise, the suggestions which might be made should prove interesting to the French. Brentano replied that critical developments could be expected in the Berlin problem in the spring of 1961. Disaster could be avoided only if the Soviets are made to understand that solidarity and unity of purpose prevail in NATO. Brentano believed that even a hint of differences of opinion within the Alliance might provoke aggressive Soviet action. He discounted any idea of “a new attitude” towards Germany on the part of Khrushchev following his return from the UN which has been hinted in the German press. The reports from Ambassador Kroll in Moscow gave no indication of any change in Khrushchev’s policy. Brentano said that it was a pity that people in Europe believed that an international détente existed simply because Khrushchev refrained from removing his shoes and banging on the table.

Ambassador Burgess inquired about the possibility of a Summit meeting in 1961 and Khrushchev’s statement that until such time the status quo could be expected in Berlin.² Ambassador Burgess wondered how such a statement could be reconciled with recent actions by the East Zone authorities. Brentano replied that the statement of Khrushchev concerning a Summit and the actions of the GDR were a part of a well considered tactic. Khrushchev’s objective was to increase unrest in Berlin and to prepare the ground psychologically for the time when he would sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR. Khrushchev has already made it plain, as brought out in his conversation with Macmillan on October 15,³ that he wants a Summit solely on Berlin and the German problem without any reference to broader questions of disarmament and security. At such a Summit he would present, in typical Soviet fashion, an ultimatum to the Western Powers and then proceed in his own time to conclude a separate treaty. Brentano did not believe that negotiations with the Soviets could take place at this time, as demonstrated both by Khrushchev’s statement with respect to Berlin and Zorin’s action in the UN with respect to disarmament.

In response to a question concerning the difficulties created in NATO by the denunciation of the interzonal trade agreement, Brentano stated that the Federal Republic regards the denunciation of the agreement as an answer to the unilateral measures taken by the East German authorities on order from Moscow and that no new proposals will be made. He stated that the Federal Republic would wait until the 21st of December to see whether or not the East German measures would be withdrawn. In any event the Federal Republic could not give up its position in this matter. He stated that he had explained the German position to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Six in Paris last Monday⁴ and that full appreciation existed for the German position. He stated that he had received enthusiastic support from Couve de Murville. Brentano stated that there was by necessity a conflict of interests between the Executive branch and the Bundestag on the current procedures in dealing with the East Zone. He pointed out the All-German Committee of the Bundestag meeting in Berlin had reached different conclusions regarding interzonal trade. He stated that the Committee often acted in a sentimental rather than a political manner and that the Bundestag must realize that decisions of this type belong to the Executive branch of the Government.

In response to Ambassador Burgess’ question concerning the continuation of trade after the expiration of the agreement on December 31st, Brentano stated that under the old treaty certain arrangements existed which would extend into the next year. He saw no reason to aggravate the situation by refusing to adhere to these arrangements and pointed out that many elements of administrative control could be utilized to regulate interzonal trade. He stressed the fact that the denunciation of the trade agreement would have no economic impact whatsoever in the Federal Republic since interzonal trade amounted to only a minute part of its total trade. The agreement had been concluded in the first instance for political rather than economic reasons. He believed that the impact of the denunciation on the East German economy was even greater than had originally been anticipated.

In response to Ambassador Dowling’s observation about the necessity for support of the German position by the NATO countries, Brentano stated emphatically that NATO nations must not fill the trade gap in the East Zone created by the denunciation. He stated that he had discussed the question of Belgian credit with Winy at the October 31st Paris meeting, and that the Foreign Minister stated that he would look into the problem immediately.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.13/11–860. Secret. Drafted by Williamson and transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 609 from Bonn, November 8.
1. Documentation on NATO long-range planning and the U.S. paper under reference is in volume VII, Part 1.
2. For a transcript of Khrushchev’s press conference in New York on October 7 at which this statement was made, see Embree, Soviet Union and the German Question, pp. 276–278.
3. Presumably reference is to McMillan’s conversation with Khrushchev at New York on October 4 during the 15th session of the U.N. General Assembly. For MacMillan’s account, see Pointing the Way, pp. 280–281.
4. October 31.