Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

235. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler)⁰

Washington, November 2, 1960.

As you know, I have had like yourself Berlin on my mind, particularly with reference to (a) whether we should take any nearby initiative in seeking to open private negotiations with the Soviets, and (b) the type of agreement which we should seek if negotiations are resumed in the next few months, either by our own or Soviet initiative.

I recently reread your memorandum of July 6, 1960¹ on the Development of U.S. Position in Berlin, which deals at some length with Solution C. I am not aware as to the status of the proposed surfacing again of Solution C in the Four Power Working Group of Germany.

If talks are not under way with our allies in that forum, I think we should plan to initiate them.

I have come, myself, to the following conclusions:

(a) In any foreseeable future negotiation with the Soviets the objective of an interim agreement a la Geneva is neither realistic nor achievable.

(b) I think we must accept as an inevitability the signing by the Soviets and their satellites of a separate peace treaty with the GDR before twelve months are up. Parenthetically, I do not regard this as catastrophic or even calamitous unless by our own intervening position and statements we make it such.

(c) Solution C, or an arrangement closely resembling it, if negotiable, would enable us to live with the signature of a separate peace treaty by the Soviets, and if abided by on the part of the Soviets would enable West Berlin to live economically and in freedom.

(d) It would be desirable for us to take the initiative in at least seeking to reopen negotiations on Berlin with the Soviets, most preferably quietly through diplomatic channels. This probably is not practicable prior to the new Administration coming into office. There is in the meantime, however, much work which could be done if the foregoing conclusions were accepted within our own Government and with our three allies principally concerned.

After you in EUR have given some thought to this matter, I suggest we plan an early meeting, with Messrs. Bohlen and Smith invited, with a view to formulating recommendations for the Secretary’s consideration.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11–260. Secret. Drafted by Merchant and initialed by both Kohler and Merchant. Copies were also sent to Bohlen and Smith.
1. In this memorandum, Kohler offered four possible assumptions regarding the evolution of the Berlin problem: 1) Soviet transmission of a proposal along the lines of its May 9 paper (see Document 154); 2) Soviet call for a new summit meeting; 3) no Soviet move on Berlin until the new administration took office; and 4) the signing of a Soviet-East German peace treaty. Kohler speculated further that “Solution C” (see footnote 8, Document 72) seemed to offer the best possibilities for an interim solution.