Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

227. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State⁰

Bonn, October 3, 1960, 7 p.m.

504. Reference: Moscow’s 873 to Department.¹ One of basic questions involved Soviet-GDR moves is to determine cause/effect relationship. There is apparent widespread conviction that Khrushchev plans cold-blooded provocation of Berlin crisis aimed at forcing another summit under shadow of ultimatum and thus winning concessions on Berlin and/or Germany. There is also some reason to accept timetable connected Khrushchev’s statements on negotiating with new US administration. Thus assumption is that crisis would be forced out of considerations partly external to German issue, and breaking point not be reached without what Khrushchev considers potential negotiational way out.

If this assessment correct, allied counteraction on GDR alone will likely be inadequate to forestall eventual test of strength. We do not propose total trade embargo on GDR now, for which in any event both our present planning and NATO coordination hardly adequate, we do believe we must be prepared to apply selective restrictions of increasing severity against further GDR encroachments, and, though progressive, such counterharassment should not necessarily be confined to pure tit-for-tat.

There is of course chance this may accelerate timetable, but alternatives as we see them are either to set high price for GDR to pay, or sit like chickens fascinated by snake. And no matter what sequence developments take, it is doubtful whether GDR and Soviets, if they resort to blockade, can justify threat to West Berlin civil population to world opinion.

British and some NATO thinking on economic countermeasures shows ambivalence, ranging from fears that West Germans will themselves weasel out of commercial consequences, to frequently expressed doubts as to effectiveness. These reservations often reveal less conviction that measures would be ineffective than reluctance on contemplated trade stoppages which would adversely affect respective economies and commercial interests. While these doubts are hard to rebut in present stage of planning, we must beware lest they acquire collective weight, or solidify into broad position which could serve to delay acceptance of program, later stages of which unpalatable.

One of best by-products of pushing consideration and selective application of countermeasures is that they counter tendency towards softness and skepticism re this area of which Sept 30 NAC meeting gave evidence.² Concrete FedRep actions to date in abrogating trade agreement, discouraging participation Leipzig Fair, and supporting Allied travel restrictions on GDR, undercut much of negative argumentation. From this viewpoint we think present course necessary if we are to hope for later essential NATO-wide acceptance of joint action.

Although perhaps inadequate to stop total Soviet maneuver, these measures add indications of willingness to proceed further, may have real utility in discouraging both Moscow and also GDR capriciousness in excess of presumed Soviet instructions. Intelligence reports already suggest GDR dismay at anticipated damage to economic plan. Believe should rest content with present psychological impact achieved, rather than risk threats to urge slowdown of GDR workers, which would be risky and also fortify charges that we, not they, are provoking crisis.

We do not believe that FedRep election considerations primary in determining present German reactions to Berlin pressures. Basic reasons for German firmness appear be, on one plane, consciousness that public mood requires it, and on other plane growing conviction that crisis shaping up, for which it high time to make preparations. Latter sense of urgency, which long present in FonOff, now spreading through upper FedGovt and Berlin administrations. In our view this is salutary development, and absolutely requisite preliminary if public opinion to be prepared for possible showdown.

Finally, following questions appear pertinent: (1) If in fact Khrushchev plans to provoke crisis, should we permit him to choose his own time for so doing, and in particular delay such crisis until early next year, when General Assembly no longer in session and free world and neutral concern provoked by other Soviet pressures, including Congo and drive against UN, may have subsided? (2) Similarly, morale and economy of West Berliners presumably in as good shape at present to stand crises as later. And while we agree completely as to desirability of British and other Allies making clear to Kremlin their determination to hold Berlin, can we be sure that Khrushchev entertains no doubts regarding US determination as well?

Morris

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10–360. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, and Berlin.
1. Document 225.
2. At the North Atlantic Council meeting on September 30, the Federal Republic of Germany announced its decision to denounce the interzonal trade agreement, but the United States was the only NATO member to directly support this action. Several representatives, including the British and French, expressed strong doubt about the appropriateness and timing of economic countermeasures. (Department of State, Secretary’s Daily Summaries: Lot 61 D 258, October 3, 1960)