225. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State0
873. While I do not disagree with position of Bonn and Berlin in necessity reacting vigorously to East German initiatives in Berlin in order to impress East Germans and Soviets with seriousness our position as [Page 597] well as to maintain morale West Berliners and West Germans, I suggest following factors should be kept in mind.
It appears probable that if Khrushchev still desires serious negotiations with West, he has decided that a crisis offers best approach and his probable choice is Berlin question. Although recent actions East Germans may be preliminary build-up of such crisis, seems almost certain Khrushchev does not intend bring crisis to head until next year. Suggest we should be careful that our present actions not contribute to establishment of vicious circle which would automatically lead to crisis at early date. If crisis is to come, as I believe it must, should think we would be better off if Berlin is enjoying something like its present prosperity that time rather than suffering from softening effects on morale of economic measures by East Germans. High level approach by us to Soviets at this time as suggested by Berlin seems to me dubious since Soviets will be thinking of attitude of next administration. In any event Soviet must believe there is real possibility that US would fight for its rights in Berlin and problem rather is to convince them that we would not have to do so alone. Believe would therefore be most helpful if British in particular could be persuaded make statement along lines suggested in Berlin tel 120.1 Suggest we should also consider extent in which attitude of West Berlin and West German politicians is due to election considerations.
In view economic vulnerability Berlin, suggest that rather than becoming involved in measures that might lead to economic blockade, we should consider possibility of psychological warfare measures. For example if we could convince East German regime that we were considering steps such as calling for a slow down of East German workers by clandestine radio broadcasts or other means, believe both East Germans and Soviets would be greatly concerned. This would of course be dangerous operation if actually carried out as it might get out of hand.
In my opinion discussion in West German press of possible necessity of campaign of this sort or other similar measures might be more effective in restraining East Germans than actual steps to restrict trade, where they are apparently in position to out-trump US. Although trade blockade is in any event possibility, would seem important that onus be kept clearly on East Germans.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9–3060. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received October 1 at 7:29 a.m. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.↩
- See Document 209 and footnote 1 thereto.↩