Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

165. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/7

Paris, May 15, 1960, 6 p.m.

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The President
  • Secretary Herter
  • Under Secretary Merchant
  • Col. Walters
• France
  • General de Gaulle
  • Prime Minister Debré
  • Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
  • Mr. Andronikov
• United Kingdom
  • Prime Minister Macmillan
  • Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd
  • Sir Derek coyer-Millar
  • Sir Anthony Rumbold

SUBJECT

• U–2 Plane; Summit tactics; disarmament; Berlin

General de Gaulle opened the meeting by saying that we were face-to-face with the incident. He suggested that perhaps Mr. Macmillan talk about his discussion with Khrushchev earlier in the afternoon.¹

Mr. Macmillan suggested that, as General de Gaulle had seen Khrushchev first,² he might give them his impressions.

General de Gaulle said that Khrushchev had been calm but obviously intent. He emphasized that just as the President had said he could not go to the Summit under threat, so he could not go under a threat. He said that his sovereignty had been violated and wondered if the U.S. really wanted a détente. He had said that the President must make a statement condemning these overflights and indicate they would not occur in the future, as well as punish those responsible for past overflights. But he did indicate that he would appear for the meeting at 10:00 Monday morning.

The President said that he was the only one that Khrushchev had not sought out in person to make his complaint.

Mr. Macmillan said that he had asked Khrushchev why he had not seen the President, and he had replied that he had not been asked. Mr. Macmillan went on to say that Khrushchev had said very much the same thing to the British that he had said to General de Gaulle, only he had not left a note with the British but he did have his interpreter read the text. Mr. Macmillan had told Khrushchev that such incidents prove the need for these meetings, and that after some talk and some threats of a not particularly violent nature Khrushchev had made the following points. He had admitted that we all carry on espionage but felt that when we were caught we ought not to admit it or say that it is right. He had then told Mr. Macmillan some story about his boyhood when he had been caught trapping sparrows, the upshot of which seemed to be, “when you’re caught don’t admit it.”

The President had said that he could not negotiate under a threat, and the President added that this threat related to a blockade of Berlin.

Mr. Macmillan said Khrushchev went on to say that governments should not say they were doing this sort of thing and he wanted some expression from the President. Mr. Macmillan said that he had the impression that Khrushchev had in some way been put in a bad political situation at home. He said that Khrushchev, while talking, had looked frequently at Marshal Malinovsky and Gromyko as though seeking support for what he was saying. Usually, in previous meetings, it was the other way around.

The President said he had never said it was right. He had emphasized that it was distasteful and disagreeable but said that we had to have information in order to defend the free world and ourselves against surprise attack. It was not legal, it was not right. He was damned if he was going to be the only one at the conference to raise his hand and promise never to do again something that everybody else was doing, particularly when we had hundreds of Soviet spies in the U.S. and they were carrying out espionage of a most flagrant type. He did not know how it was in their countries but certainly there was a great deal of it in the U.S. We had caught a spy with all his signal equipment. We knew with whom he was communicating and it had taken us two to three years to collect all the evidence against him. We were certainly as much victims as criminal in this matter. He was prepared to say that spying was illegal, distasteful and wrong if all said it. We could not protect the free world and the U.S. unless we made efforts to collect information. We had been caught. However, the U–2 was now almost obsolete. But he was not going to pledge not to take measures to defend ourselves and fulfill our obligation to our people to insure their safety.

General de Gaulle said that there was an additional question of the fact that probably in a year or so reconnaissance satellites would be in a position to take photographs. We have no guarantee that some of Khrushchev’s satellites have not taken photographs. General de Gaulle thought we might say we would look into the whole broad question and see what could be done. This was a suggestion we might put forward.

Mr. Macmillan said he felt there was a misunderstanding as to what Secretary Herter had actually said, and it had been badly written up in the press. The actual text of what the Secretary had said was then read.³

The President said that he was prepared to say we had not said we would fly the U–2 again over the Soviet Union. He had said we would protect ourselves and we will.

The Secretary said we were quite ready to see if we could work something out to protect ourselves and to protect them against surprise attack.

Mr. Macmillan said that there was a face-saving element involved here in the Russian note.⁴ The text of what purported to be the Secretary’s statement was not correct.

The President said he thought we all know our own attitude but the question is what would our tactic be if Khrushchev opens the meeting tomorrow morning with a blast. How would we go about answering it?

Mr. Macmillan felt that an important element was the fact that the Russian note said that “two days later the President confirmed that flights over the Soviet Union have been and remain the deliberate policy of the United States.”

The President said that he had not said that, and read aloud the transcript of what he had actually said.⁵

General de Gaulle thought that if Khrushchev comes out with a violent blast at the opening we should indicate that “everyone does this, you, the Soviets do it too,” and Khrushchev would then go into his routine. He will undoubtedly read the letter for the third time. There was general agreement that he probably would.

Mr. Macmillan asked whether Khrushchev had spoken to the press regarding the Khrushchev–De Gaulle talk? He himself had told Khrushchev that he would not talk to the press and that Khrushchev had said this was all right. He felt that it was good that Khrushchev had not made this public as he was not committed publicly before his own people.

The Secretary indicated that the Soviets had issued a two-sentence release⁶ which indicated that Khrushchev had met with General de Gaulle and they had discussed procedures and matters relating to the Summit conference.

The President indicated that some of our press people were aware of this Russian note.

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville said they had been told to say nothing on it.

The President then said that if this is in the morning newspapers he for one would not be at the 10:00 meeting the following morning.

General de Gaulle said that Khrushchev was aware of this fact and had indicated that he is coming in the morning.

Prime Minister Debre felt that there would be at least 24 hours thereafter in which to think this matter over.

General de Gaulle said they would meet, the four of them, alone with their interpreters and note-takers in the morning, and we could see what happens then and decide what to do.

The President felt that it would be better if they could settle this among the four of them rather than throw it into a larger meeting. When he came to the Summit meeting he knew that Khrushchev would take this matter up. If he had brought it up at the first meeting of the four, the President had planned to say that this concerned only two of them. But now Khrushchev had gone to both General de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan on the matter. He could, however, still offer to see him in the afternoon.

General de Gaulle said he had told Khrushchev that there was absolutely no relation between this incident and the need for relaxing tensions. He said that it would be fine if the President wanted to offer to see Khrushchev alone.

The President said that he now felt it might be best to settle it in the presence of the four since Khrushchev had already seen the other two, but if the others preferred he would be quite ready to see Khrushchev alone in the afternoon.

General de Gaulle then asked Mr. Macmillan whether he had asked to see Khrushchev.

Mr. Macmillan replied that he had not. Khrushchev had quite suddenly asked to see him and he did not even know what the subject of the discussion was going to be.

Mr. Debre commented that Khrushchev had come early in order to carry out his operation.

General de Gaulle said that he had told Khrushchev that they had intended to meet in the mornings and they would leave the afternoons free for bilateral talks.

The President then said that he would tell Khrushchev that he would be glad to see him but that if he walked out of the conference the President felt he would have to say something or did they feel it better if all of them said something together?

General de Gaulle said that if Khrushchev walked out all of them should say something, but that, of course, would not prevent the President from adding anything he wished. General de Gaulle said jokingly that for his part he would not say anything in favor of Khrushchev’s walking out.

Mr. Macmillan said that his impression is this. Khrushchev has said many harsh public things but he had not made this statement publicly and is therefore not committed in the eyes of his own people. This is an advantage. He had constantly referred to Gromyko and Malinovsky as though looking for approval. He had made no effort to see Mr. Macmillan alone and the Prime Minister felt he was probably on the spot politically. Khrushchev had mentioned the President several times in friendly terms. He had committed himself to a détente and was perhaps under criticism within his own country. He had agreed at Camp David not to push the time limit on Berlin. He might, on the one hand, decide to seek a friendly talk with the President in order to find some formula such as the President had referred to. Something face-saving and then carry on with the discussions, or he may be switching tactics and leave the conference in a great scene in response to pressures at home, in which case it is probable that he will go ahead on a separate treaty with the GDR. We should be prepared for either of these alternatives and try to keep him on the former track if we could do so without any loss of our own dignity. Mr. Macmillan repeated that Khrushchev had referred constantly to Gromyko and Malinovsky (and he, Macmillan, had never seen him do this before).

General de Gaulle pointed out that Khrushchev had said that the President had indicated that Khrushchev had made a threat on Berlin, but it wasn’t a threat. And now Khrushchev says that the President was threatening him with further overflights. Perhaps both threats could be withdrawn and that would be a way out.

The President said that he was not threatening Khrushchev. We know well the main targets. Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Kuibyshev, etc. We were merely trying to protect ourselves against a surprise attack. He lives in a closed society, we live in an open one where it is easy to find anything out. Everything is published in our newspapers, even our inventions. We have an obligation to find out what he was doing. Someone had to take the risk, we took it and got caught in this case. This was an unarmed plane. It was really a powered glider. Otherwise it could not have flown at such great heights. Mr. Khrushchev is well aware of this.

General de Gaulle said that he understood this feeling. This was merely a tactic of Khrushchev. Perhaps if the U.S. would promise not to overfly him, then he would promise not to make a treaty with the GDR.

The President smiled and said he would buy that.

The President said that we felt that this note had been drafted for publication; for propaganda purposes in case he decided to use it. He may not. The others nodded. The President then said perhaps the best thing would be for him to make a prepared speech as words seem to be important to Khrushchev. He then read from Mr. Herter’s statement on the U–2 and General de Gaulle underlined the words, “in the absence of Soviet cooperation.”⁷

The President said that we had not said that we would continue the flights.

Mr. Macmillan said that the press had reported this whole matter of the President’s and the Secretary’s statements very badly.

The President said that he would prepare a reply covering all points and give a copy to Khrushchev if necessary.

General de Gaulle said that he would like to go back to Mr. Herter’s statement concerning the absence of Soviet cooperation and said that if Soviet cooperation could be obtained there would be no need for such activities.

The President and the Secretary both said this was what we had proposed in the open skies proposal in 1955 and we would propose it again at this Summit.

General de Gaulle interjected, “If there is a Summit.”

The President said that he was sure his invitation to Moscow would not be renewed.

General de Gaulle said that first we must talk to Khrushchev regarding the need for relaxing tensions and then disarmament and perhaps a beginning of cooperation in aid to under-developed countries. Khrushchev of course would speak of Germany first.

The President said that in connection with the matter of disarmament there was a French proposal on missiles and the question of its connection with the Western plan. The U.K. had proposed a compromise draft.⁸ He wondered whether General de Gaulle had seen the U.K. draft. He felt that they might ask the Foreign Ministers to try and work out an agreement. As far as he was concerned the U.K. text seemed acceptable to him.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd said he hoped the officials could meet tonight.

The Secretary said that Lucet, who was representing France, and we had reserved our position on some points.

Foreign Minister Couve said that he felt that the experts should get together first and then the Ministers. The real question was whether to try to put the plans together or bring up the French proposal separately.

General de Gaulle said that if the Soviets take up the Western proposals, fine; if they refuse, that would be all right with us.

The Secretary said that we had six specific points of disarmament to take up and we were willing to discuss them separately if the Soviets agreed.

The President said that if a plan of the type suggested by the French were put up, he would like to see it put up by all of the Western powers. If the Soviets were to reject it, then we could consult and try to modify it in some way.

General de Gaulle said Khrushchev would undoubtedly pull out his old U.N. plan⁹ and we would put up our Geneva plan.¹⁰

Mr. Macmillan said that at that point we could try to pull out three or four general measures to take up separately.

The Secretary indicated that Khrushchev will try to get us to talk principles and not details and then issue a directive.

General de Gaulle said that they could not handle details at the Summit. They could only propose that certain things be studied.

The Secretary expressed some concern that if this study on missiles and other means of delivery were to be isolated, that might enable Khrushchev to say that he had succeeded in banning the bomb. He would hope that all the specific measures could be taken up and that we could work out something along the lines of the U.K. draft.

General de Gaulle then turned to Mr. Macmillan and said, “How far will you go on Berlin and how far will you not go?”

Mr. Macmillan did not reply.

The President said that on Berlin he thought we could talk about some possible reductions in the level of forces. He wondered if we should talk to Khrushchev on the basis of his paper,¹¹ leaving out of course the last part which would lead to a treaty with the GDR.

General de Gaulle said he felt we should not even tacitly accept a change in the status of Berlin in two years.

The President said he would not accept anything for two years that would reduce our rights in any respect. If a formula could be found maintaining all the essentials, and at the end of two years providing for a plebiscite instead of a free city then perhaps he might accept.

General de Gaulle smiled and said that this was not in the Soviet paper.

Mr. Macmillan said that on the basis of his past tactics Khrushchev will try and start on the basis of our Geneva plan and move on from there.

The President said that the Chancellor had emphasized that there was a great difference between a two-year period and a ten-year period.¹² He seemed to feel that beyond ten years everything would be wonderful or Berlin would be gone. He could not see the difference between two or five years. We should try and ascertain exactly what Adenauer was thinking. The President said he did not believe we could go on forever just saying, “No,” taking a completely negative position in which there was certainly a breaking point, on a situation which we are all agreed, is fundamentally a weak one.

General de Gaulle said that he felt that when Adenauer spoke of ten years he meant keeping the status quo indefinitely.

The President said that he had raised certain practical points that had not been dealt with.

General de Gaulle inquired what these points were.

The President replied that they involved progressive harassment of the economic life of Berlin while not actually violating our access, and the Chancellor had not answered these practical problems.

General de Gaulle asked, “What answer could he give?” It depended on what the Soviets really wanted. If they wanted a detente, they would not torture the people of Berlin and we don’t need to make undue concessions. The Chancellor had indicated this morning that Berlin had stocks that would enable it to carry on for a year.

The Secretary pointed out that these stocks were foodstuffs, not raw materials.

General de Gaulle said that on the other hand if Khrushchev did not want a détente he would go ahead and harass Berlin and sign his treaty with the GDR.

The President said that he would like to be in a position where we had plans for such a contingency.

General de Gaulle said that we all knew that the situation at Berlin was awkward and that if the Soviets wanted to create difficulties and make trouble it was easy for them to do so here. The whole question came down to whether or not they wanted a détente. This was a test.

The President said that Khrushchev had told him that he needed ten years to educate the people of the GDR so that they would vote for communism in a truly free election.

The President said that the Chancellor thought he was weakening on Berlin. He was not, he was merely trying to ascertain what the Chancellor was thinking so he could prepare for it.

General de Gaulle said that the Chancellor could not answer the President because it depended on the Soviets.

The President said that it was sometimes not right to refer to the mistakes of those who had disappeared but that in 1944 the military fighting in France and Western Germany had pled for a military occupation capital at the junction of the Soviet, U.S. and U.K. zone (the French zone had not yet been set up) of a cantonment type, and they were told to keep quiet, this was political, Berlin was the traditional capital and that if orders came from the occupation authority other than from Berlin they would not be carried out. But he had lost.

General de Gaulle said that he had also lost, he had not had the hearing then that the President had had, nor did he have it now, but he had been opposed to using Berlin as the capital of Germany.

The President said, “But now we have to live with it.”

General de Gaulle ruefully agreed.

Mr. Macmillan said that he would now like to revert to an earlier point where De Gaulle had said that it would be bad for the morale of the West to lose Berlin. He agreed, but it would be worse to say that we would defend it against a squeeze and then find out that we could not. Hence, it was worthwhile trying to find some solution. Two years’ delay would give us an opportunity to seek such a formula.

The President said that he agreed with General de Gaulle that the real point was whether or not the Soviets wanted a détente. They could starve Berlin and reduce the Berliners to the position of Arab refugees in Jordan but if this were done, then public opinion in the West would force us to do something better than we were doing now.

Mr. Macmillan said that he agreed but he thought we would have to play the game as it was laid out now.

The President said he felt it would be fatal to weaken now.

Mr. Macmillan said he did not feel that for Berlin to become a United Nations city was such a terrible fate.

The Secretary said that this could be explored but not settled at the Summit.

Mr. Macmillan said that if we could gain two years for talks this would be an advantage.

General de Gaulle then asked what about the peace treaty with the GDR?

The President said that we could not prevent the Soviets from doing what they wanted, particularly as we had signed a treaty ourselves with the Federal Republic, but we could not accept their assertion that all our rights on Berlin would be eliminated by such a signature.

Mr. Macmillan said he would agree with that and inquired whether it was just West Berlin that was involved and he was informed that we had spoken of the whole of Berlin but the Russians had referred only to West Berlin. He said that two years would be useful in seeking a formula but the threat remained at the end of that period and the question that we faced was what could we offer in return. There was a brief discussion of the possibility of an all-Berlin solution. The conference then concluded at 7:40.

Vernon A. Walters¹³
Col., U.S. Army

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664. Top Secret. Drafted by Walters and approved in M on May 15 and in S and the White House on May 16. The meeting took place at the Elysée Palace. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Cahto 5 from Paris, May 16 at 5 p.m. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File) For recollections of this meeting by the principals, see Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 554–555; Macmillan, Pointing the Way, pp. 203–204; and De Gaulle, Mémoires, pp. 2627–263.
1. See Document 163.
2. See Document 160.
3. For text of this May 9 statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp 418–420.
4. See Document 160.
5. For a transcript of the President’s press conference on May 11, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61, pp. 403–414.
6. Not found.
7. See footnote 3 above.
8. During a brief meeting at noon, Lucet, Eaton, and O’Neill discussed a draft British proposal on the control of nuclear delivery systems. A memorandum of this conversation (US/MC/4), with text of the British proposal attached, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664.
9. For text of Khrushchev’s address to the United Nations, September 18, 1959, on general and complete disarmament, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. 11, pp. 1452–1460.
10. For text of the Western proposal on general disarmament, April 16, see ibid., 1960, pp. 68–71.
11. See footnote 4 above.
12. See Document 161.
13. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.