161. Memorandum of Conversation0
MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT
PARTICIPANTS
- United States
- The President
- Secretary Herter
- Under Secretary Merchant
- Colonel Walters
- United Kingdom
- Prime Minister Macmillan
- Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd
- Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar
- Sir Anthony Rumbold
- France
- President De Gaulle
- Prime Minister Debre
- Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
- Mr. Andronikov (interpreter)
- Mr. Stakovich (interpreter)
- Federal Republic of Germany
- Chancellor Adenauer
- Foreign Minister Von Brentano
- Dr. Carstens
SUBJECT
- Meeting of Western Chiefs of State and Heads of Government with Chancellor Adenauer
General De Gaulle said that they were met together to discuss problems of Germany and Berlin which would be taken up at the Summit if there were a Summit. He wished to welcome them to this meeting.
The President then said he felt that inasmuch as the Chancellor was present he might wish to suggest subjects for discussion.
Chancellor Adenauer said that this was a problem of general interest and that there were two points relating to policy. First, the problem of Germany as a whole and the problem of Berlin. Khrushchev had tried to separate the Berlin problem from that of Germany as a whole. The Soviet purpose was to dominate all of Germany and we should remember that if this were to occur it would upset the whole equilibrium in Europe. This matter had been exhaustively discussed by him, the Foreign Ministers, and in the NATO Council. He would like to emphasize his strong feeling that Khrushchev should not be allowed to make Germany and Berlin the principal subject of this Summit meeting. He felt [Page 418] that we should put major emphasis on disarmament. The German problem is not the only problem in the world. There are others in Korea, Red China and elsewhere. These can only be solved through progress in disarmament because only by such progress can we establish the atmosphere of confidence and trust which is essential.
General De Gaulle then noted that the Chancellor had made two particular points, namely that the Western powers not allow Berlin to become the chief topic at the Summit meeting, but that disarmament should be the major topic. If progress were made on disarmament, this could lead to a détente. He had pointed out that the Soviets wished to dominate Germany and thereby enhance the position of the Soviet bloc.
The President then said he would like to ask whether the Chancellor had read Khrushchev’s latest proposal on Berlin,1 and, if so, did he have any comments.
General de Gaulle said that this was the one relating to a temporary arrangement at the end of which there would have to be a change in the status of Berlin, and if Khrushchev obtained our agreement to this even tacitly he would have part of the cake.
The Chancellor jokingly said he did not know whether this was really Khrushchev’s last proposal. There had been several of these last proposals. He fully agreed with General De Gaulle that at the end of two years Khrushchev would have part of the cake.
The President said that in this paper of Khrushchev’s he did note one element which seemed new to him, and this was the fact that Khrushchev seemed willing to concede that West Berlin could make any political-economic arrangements that it wanted with other countries (except of course military arrangements). At Geneva he had been unwilling to agree to this and this seemed perhaps one advance by Khrushchev.
General de Gaulle said that at Geneva, where he had not been present—he felt Khrushchev had not excluded relationships of the free city with outside states and organizations but he had made it quite plain that he would not allow West Berlin to belong to the German Federal Republic.
The President said that he had read this paper rather hurriedly on the plane and the Secretary added that it was an English translation from a French translation of a Russian original.
General de Gaulle said he felt what Khrushchev wanted was a city which would belong to no one and accepted the fact that it would not belong to the German Democratic Republic.
[Page 419]The President said that he had understood in this latest note that Khrushchev had withdrawn his objections to a political link with the Federal Republic.
General de Gaulle said that he felt Khrushchev had made it plain on many occasions that he would not allow the city of West Berlin to belong to the Federal Republic but in any case they could ask him.
The President said that the worst part of the paper was the end of it where it was indicated that at the end of the two-year period there must be a new status for the city.
The Chancellor said that he was very fearful that if there were any such two-year undertaking that there would be a flight of people and capital from West Berlin, that the city would be weakened both in its economic life and in its spirit, and would no longer have the same will to resist pressures from the East.
The President said that he would like to ask one question which bothered him, and it was this. If, for instance, we are unable to find a satisfactory solution for the Berlin problem over a period of ten years and we maintain our juridical rights, what could the East do to strangle West Berlin economically by tightening down on communications and trade by means short of war. Khrushchev could allow us to maintain our juridical position but create great difficulties for the city itself.
The Chancellor replied with some animation that the President had spoken of a ten-year period. This was very different from the two years proposed. The great difference lay in the fact that in ten years it is probable that some decision will be taken on disarmament and if that is so, the situation in Europe will be completely changed both for the East and for the West. In such an atmosphere the same importance will not be attached to Berlin. There is a great difference between ten years and two years. The situation in ten years will be very different from what it is now. Khrushchev was using West Berlin as a lever in the cold war to impair the prestige of the free world. In an atmosphere of détente resulting from progress on disarmament it would be relatively easy to solve the Berlin problem.
The President said that perhaps he had not made himself sufficiently clear. He would withdraw the mention of the ten-year term, but we must face practical facts, whether it was over one, two or five years. If we maintain our juridical position in Berlin and keep our troops and supply them, what would happen if the Soviets were indirectly to try to strangle the city, using all possible means while technically leaving open our single access to the city. This is a practical problem we have to face.
The Chancellor said he did not believe that Khrushchev would start a war by strangling Berlin. He also believed that Khrushchev knows that in such a war there would be neither victor nor vanquished. In two [Page 420] speeches he had made great promises to the Soviet people and he himself was deeply committed to an expansion of the Soviet economy. If he were unable to do this, it would produce unforeseeable consequences for him. It was well to remember that he was first of all a Russian Nationalist and only after that a Communist. The Chancellor apologized for mentioning this, but Khrushchev knew that the Americans were not as ill-informed concerning the Soviet Union as he had thought, and he did not believe that Khrushchev would do anything that would jeopardize the existence of Russia. He was confident that Khrushchev would not start a war over Berlin.
General De Gaulle said that in seeking to arrive at a relaxation of tensions it was logical to start talking about disarmament. If he really wants a détente, progress can be made. If not, he can harass us on the issue of Berlin.
Prime Minister Macmillan said that he would like to know what the answer was to the President’s question. We had a legal right to keep our troops in Berlin and to supply them and the population we are supposed to be occupying. The President had asked what would happen if by measures short of war such as saying the railroads were not working, the canals had fallen in, that the roads and bridges were in poor repair, pressure was put on West Berlin.
The President said he agreed. He would like to know what our rights were. Did they include the right of West Berlin to make a living? He felt that we might be able to keep the channel for the supply open but that the city could be put in a difficult economic situation.
General de Gaulle said that Khrushchev could indeed do this but he could not do it if he wants a detente. We should stand on our rights. He shared the Chancellor’s belief that any backing down in Berlin would be a grave blow to the prestige of the West.
The President said he shared that belief but was trying to figure out what we could do. Any soldier in facing war would have to seek another answer. By what means could we keep the people of Berlin healthy, happy and prosperous? He agreed that we are not weakening in our position in maintaining our juridical rights. Khrushchev must want relaxation of tensions. Otherwise he could not see a real answer on the problem of Berlin.
General de Gaulle said that the geographical situation of West Berlin is very awkward but we had lived with it for a long time and we could still live with it.
The President said that he didn’t know about anybody else, but he himself was getting older. General de Gaulle replied “You don’t look it.”
The Chancellor said that he agreed with General De Gaulle. If Khrushchev really wants a détente, Berlin will not be an acute problem.
[Page 421]If he does not, it can become very disagreeable. He had recently made a trip to Japan and he hoped he would have occasion to talk to them later about it. People in Asia were following very closely what was happening between East and West and any loss of prestige for the West, in Europe in particular, would have grave repercussions in Asia.
General de Gaulle said that he did not like the intimation that in two years the status of Berlin had to be changed. To accept a practical arrangement, leaving our rights untouched, was something else again.
Prime Minister Macmillan inquired what was meant by the statute of Berlin (he had misunderstood “status” to mean “statute”), and General De Gaulle explained this.
The Prime Minister then went on to say that the last Soviet proposal was impossible. At Geneva the West had proposed a temporary arrangement following which the discussion would continue, and this had been better. It had not been bad.
The Chancellor said he would like to remind Mr. Macmillan that the status of Berlin was rather clearly set forth in the treaties signed in New York in May 1949 and Paris in June 1949,2 ending the Berlin blockade. The Soviets undertook clear obligations there under and if they were now able unilaterally to repudiate these, what faith could we have in any new arrangement with them.
The President wondered whether Khrushchev had brought up with any of them the question of the borders of Germany. Not long ago he had seen the Deputy Prime Minister of Poland3 in Washington who had indicated that if the United States would guarantee the borders of Poland, this would lead to a great lessening of tension. The President said that he could not discuss this without speaking with his ally, the Federal Republic, but he wondered if the matter had been brought up with any of the others. The Deputy Prime Minister had implied that the Berlin situation would be eased and relations with the Federal Republic improved.
General de Gaulle said that Khrushchev had indicated to him that it would be nice if the Western powers were to recognize the German-Polish border, but that it did not make any real difference if they did not. France hoped that at the opportune time it would be possible to improve relations between Poland and the German Federal Republic. General De Gaulle then said they were all aware of the fact that the Summit meeting itself was open to question.
[Page 422]The President said that it looked as if Khrushchev was trying to put him in the dock and General De Gaulle said he had already started trying.
General de Gaulle said that Khrushchev would talk to Mr. Macmillan in the meantime4 and they would meet later.
The President asked whether they thought he would go through with his threat. He hoped that no one was under the illusion that he would crawl on his knees to Mr. Khrushchev.
General de Gaulle smiled and said that no one was under that illusion.
The President wondered whether he would go immediately to Moscow or not.
General de Gaulle said that Khrushchev would be seeing Mr. Macmillan this afternoon and they would all meet thereafter but he felt the sense of responsibility for the conference.
The conference then concluded.
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664. Top Secret. Drafted by Walters and approved in M on May 15 and in S and the White House on May 16. The conversation took place at the Elysée Palace. A summary of this conversation was transmitted in Cahto 6 from Paris, May 16 at 6 p.m. (Ibid., Central Files, 762.0221/5–1660) For two other accounts of this conversation, see De Gaulle, Mémoires, pp. 261–262, and Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1959–1963, pp. 48–51.↩
- See Document 154.↩
- For text of the May 5, 1949, New York agreement, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. III, p. 751; for text of the June 20, 1949, Paris agreement, see ibid., pp. 1062–1065.↩
- Jaroszewicz visited the United States beginning March 23.↩
- See Document 163.↩