386. Memorandum of Conversation0
MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959
PARTICIPANTS
- United States
- Mr. Hillenbrand
- West Berlin
- Mayor Willy Brandt
- Senator Guenther Klein
SUBJECT
- Berlin Problems
At Brandt’s request, Mr. Hillenbrand saw Mayor Brandt this morning at his hotel. He seemed tired after what he described as his hectic two days in Paris, but reasonably relaxed although he said he had been harassed by journalists ever since his arrival in Geneva. He wondered whether he should keep the schedule of meetings with journalists which his press officer had already arranged. Mr. Hillenbrand suggested maximum discretion in dealing with the press, particularly with reference to any subject which might be discussed with the Foreign Ministers during lunch. There was always the possibility that, if he created too much of a stir in Geneva, the Soviets and East Germans might decide [Page 889] they wanted to send Mayor Ebert of East Berlin here to make a personal appearance.
In response to Mr. Hillenbrand’s query, Brandt said that he was now reasonably satisfied with the arrangements to keep him informed. The Federal authorities were making their daily reports available to him through the Foreign Office representative in Berlin. Moreover, Mr. Gufler’s briefings had been helpful. He said he had had a long talk earlier this morning with von Brentano during the course of which he complained about the refusal of the German Delegation to show to the Berlin representative in Geneva, or to him, the text of the proposal made by the Western Powers on June 3, 1959.1 It had seemed absurd to plead secrecy as a reason for not keeping the Mayor of Berlin informed when the Soviets obviously knew all about the proposal anyway.
At this point Senator Guenther Klein entered the room and joined the conversation. Mayor Brandt said he was seriously concerned about the situation which had developed in connection with the presidential elections. If the Federal Government had some months ago decided that it was unwise to have them in Berlin and had taken normal measures to hold the elections elsewhere, such action would have been deplored but it would not have become a major issue. However, the whole situation had been handled with maximum stupidity, and failure to hold the elections in Berlin would now be interpreted only as a sign of Western weakness by the Soviets and East Germans. He said everyone in Bonn seemed confused and was giving different reasons for not having the elections in Berlin. Von Brentano had dwelt at some length on the necessity of avoiding any action which could be criticized as a Western attempt to sabotage the process of negotiations. On the other hand, Dr. Gerstenmaier who, as President of the Bundestag, had to make the ultimate decision as to where the Federal Assembly would be convened, [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Personally, Gerstenmaier had said, he favored being firm on this, but he could not contemplate being responsible for a situation in which the entire German Bundestag as well as many other leading German politicians might be stranded in Berlin. If he could be assured that the U.S. Air Force would guarantee to fly the political leaders out should access be hindered, that would make a difference.
Mayor Brandt showed Mr. Hillenbrand a letter which he had written to Dr. Gerstenmaier, dated June 11, in which he had stressed the various arguments in favor of holding the Federal Assembly in Berlin. In this letter he emphasized the unfavorable effect on the Soviets, as well as on the Western negotiating position at the conference, which such an [Page 890] evident sign of Western weakness would have [3 lines of source text not declassified]
Mayor Brandt said that Dr. Gerstenmaier would have to make up his mind in the next day or so, but was more or less committed not to do so until he (Brandt) had returned from Geneva and spoken to him tomorrow. Brandt said that he had seen a memorandum of conversation drawn up by the German Delegation covering the May 22 meeting at which von Brentano had first raised the question of the Presidential elections with the other three Foreign Ministers.2 It was quite clear to him from this that, while the Western Foreign Ministers had expressed preference for holding the elections elsewhere than in Berlin, they had certainly not made the kind of specific recommendations which the German Foreign Office had alleged, nor had they taken the initiative in raising the question in the first place, as von Brentano had apparently informed certain correspondents. (In a brief subsequent conversation with Senat Press Chief Hirschfeld, Mr. Hillenbrand was informed that Sidney Gruson of The New York Times, who is one of the correspondents to whom von Brentano had allegedly said this, was filing an article today asserting that von Brentano had deliberately deceived him as well as other Western correspondents as to who had taken the initiative in this matter.)
Both Mayor Brandt and Senator Klein talked at some length about their concern at that “failure” of the Western Powers during the conference to drive home the point that Berlin’s associations with the Federal Republic, both political and economic, must be maintained. Brandt admitted that he, as a leading proponent of the “Haupstadt Berlin” movement, which supports greater use of Berlin as the capital of the Federal Republic, had advocated action which went considerably beyond that which the Western Allies had considered practicable. However, he felt it somewhat unfortunate that the emphasis in the conference had been so completely on Three Power responsibility with nothing much said about the de facto relationship with the Federal Republic which had grown up. Mr. Hillenbrand noted that freedom of access, as well as maintenance of the right of Berlin to choose its own social system, obviously implied continuation of the links with the Federal Republic, if the Berliners desired to maintain them. This was so implicit that failure specifically to underline it on every occasion did not mean it was not in the minds of the Western Ministers.
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1340. Secret.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 358.↩
- See Document 325.↩