325. Memorandum of Conversation0
MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959
PARTICIPANTS
- United States
- The Secretary
- Mr. McElroy
- Mr. Merchant
- Mr. Reinhardt
- Ambassador Thompson
- Mr. Irwin
- Mr. Sullivan
- Mr. Hillenbrand
- United Kingdom
- Mr. Hope
- Mr. Lloyd
- Sir Anthony Rumbold
- Mr. Hancock
- Mr. Wilkinson
- France
- Mr. Couve de Murville
- Mr. Lucet
- Mr. Soutou
- Mr. Froment-Meurice
- Mr. Legendre
- Mr. Baraduc
- Mr. de Beaumarchais
- Federal Republic
- Dr. von Brentano
- Ambassador Grewe
- Mr. Duckwitz
- Dr. Fechter
- Mr. von Eckardt
SUBJECT
- Problems Relating to the Conference
The meeting opened with an account by Couve of the conversation which he had just concluded with Gromyko. He said Gromyko had noted that not much progress was being made at the conference and that the two sides seemed far apart. Couve had agreed and pointed out that the Western Powers and the Soviets seemed to be talking about two different things. Both sides knew that the other side could not accept its proposals. He had indicated that he could not see any use continuing with a discussion of this kind, and if the conversations were to go on some different basis must be found. All the Western Powers asked was peace in Europe, free of incidents or threats of war. He had then said to Gromyko that, if he had any worries from this point of view, he should let the Western powers know and they could discuss it. Couve then had mentioned the proposed Western statements for this afternoon and had asked Gromyko what he thought would happen next week. Couve had added that if he had any ideas, we would be prepared to discuss them in any convenient forum. To this Gromyko had merely responded that the Soviets attached no importance to the forum but were prepared for discussions anywhere. Neither went further. During the conversation Gromyko placed great stress on German militarism with particular reference to the atomic armament of the Federal Republic. Couve said he had tried to explain that tactical rather than strategic weapons were involved and that all the warheads remained in American hands. Gromyko had replied that, while this might be true, how could one be sure that it would continue to be the case in the future. Couve commented that he had the impression that the question of the installation or non-installation of strategic weapons in the Federal Republic was an important matter to the Soviets.
In response to the Secretary’s query, Couve said that he also had the impression that Gromyko was not willing to ask for a new type of meeting between the Foreign Ministers but was willing to accept Western proposals for different kinds of meetings.
The Secretary said he assumed that none of the Western Foreign Ministers would make any further reference to specific Articles of the Soviet peace treaty in their discussions. It seemed that this was going to be a waiting game from here on out, and that individual discussions with Gromyko would provide the best hope of making any progress. Perhaps an effort should be made to get Gromyko to talk about what he was willing to accept in our peace plan. If the Western powers attempted to have formal restricted meetings with him, even if on a small scale, the same problem of the East German advisers would arise.
Lloyd said that he had the impression from Gromyko that the latter did not want to use one of the formal rooms in the Palais for restricted [Page 749] meetings of the Four, but might be willing to meet in one of the private offices. He would probably prefer to come to one of the private villas. Couve commented that it would probably be best to have private meetings in one of the villas rather than at the Palais.
The Secretary observed that, from conversations among ourselves, it was pretty well agreed that only two subjects sooner or later might evolve as a basis for some agreement: Berlin and disarmament. The immediate problem was one of tactics—how not to show too much eagerness. The question to be considered is how long the waiting game should go on. Should we wait for some move from the Soviets or attempt at some point to take the initiative? Whatever we said on Berlin, of course, must be understood to be within the framework of an interim arrangement pending eventual reunification of Germany.
Lloyd said his main concern was to avoid giving any impetus to the “disengagers” in the United Kingdom. Undue protraction of the Geneva Conference would strengthen such forces. Therefore he could not favor dragging things out too long.
Von Brentano noted he was inclined to think it too early to raise the Berlin issue in quest of some modus vivendi. Public opinion and the Soviets would interpret this as meaning that the West had dropped its entire Peace Plan.
Lloyd observed there was some truth in this. Perhaps the Western Powers should try to get Gromyko to talk about those elements which he found constructive in the Peace Plan.
The Secretary commented that Couve’s statement this afternoon would draw out Gromyko’s negative views on the Berlin proposals in the Peace Plan.
Lloyd said it would probably be a good idea to recess formal meetings for a day or two. On Monday Gromyko will presumably wish to reply to the Western statements this afternoon. What is required is a little more organization of the private talks; they should not merely consist of sitting around on sofas after a bountiful dinner.
After a brief noting of engagements for next week, it developed that the only scheduled social meetings with Gromyko were Couve’s invitation to have lunch with him on Monday and the invitation extended to all three Western Foreign Ministers to have dinner with Gromyko on Tuesday evening.
If there were going to be a recess for a couple of days, Lloyd then continued, the press should be adequately prepared. The point might be made that this was nothing abnormal, that daily meetings throughout the conference should not be expected. Western press officers might start hinting at this tonight.
[Page 750]The Secretary pointed out that he might have to go home for a few days, and might have to request a recess of the conference to enable this. He would take the opportunity to mention this possibility to Gromyko.
It was agreed that the Western Foreign Ministers should meet before lunch on Monday (Rumbold would represent Lloyd, who would not be returning to Geneva until 1:30). This would be in keeping with the general idea that the Western Foreign Ministers would attempt to concert their line prior to any individual meetings with Gromyko. It was also agreed that they would meet at 3:00 p.m. before the plenary session on Monday, and that the Coordinating Group would meet once before Monday to discuss tactics for next week, giving particular consideration to the question of how long the Western Powers should wait before taking the initiative.
Ambassador Grewe at this point reported briefly on the Coordinating Group meeting which had taken place earlier in the morning.1 He said it had been thought that it would be good to try to introduce a more colloquial style into the meetings next week. It might likewise be desirable if, in a private conversation, one of the Western Foreign Ministers raised the question of a possible termination date for the conference. Couve said he had some apprehensions about attempting to fix a date for ending the conference. This would be sure to leak out and the West would be blamed for pressing for a premature end of the conference. The Secretary mentioned that there were certain little signs that the Soviets envisaged a somewhat lengthy conference. For example, Gromyko had, in discussing the nuclear test question, asked that a report be submitted to the Foreign Ministers. Since this could not be accomplished before June 8, the implication was obvious. Couve said that there was no question in his mind but that the conference was going to last a while yet. He should say two weeks.
Von Brentano said he had a matter to raise on a confidential basis. The presidential elections were due to be held in Germany on July 1. Last fall, prior to the receipt of the Soviet note on Berlin,2 the president of the Bundestag had agreed to call the Federal Assembly (which elects the Federal President) in Berlin as had been done for the previous presidential elections. Chancellor Adenauer now had some doubt as to whether it was desirable to hold the meeting of the Federal Assembly in Berlin under present circumstances. He felt that such action might be construed as provocative, and would appreciate the views of the other Western Foreign Ministers. Von Brentano said he would see the Chancellor [Page 751] tomorrow and convey to him these views. If the decision were in the negative the fact that the Western Foreign Ministers had so advised would of course not be given as a reason for the decision against holding the meeting of the Federal Assembly in Berlin.
The Secretary said that he would agree that, if it could be so arranged as to not involve the Western Foreign Ministers, it would be preferable to call the Federal Assembly in Bonn rather than in Berlin. Couve expressed the same view, and mentioned he had already said the same during his recent visit to Bonn.3 Lloyd asked what reason could be given for the change. Von Brentano said that the Bundestag President could simply say that it was a matter of simplifying procedures and of other practical reasons such as avoiding the longer trip for the members of the Assembly. Everyone would know the real reason, of course. Lloyd then said that he likewise felt it would be better to avoid having the Assembly meet in Berlin.
Von Brentano said that it was clear the Western Foreign Ministers all proceeded from the assumption that the conference would have no final results, but as the Secretary had indicated, it was necessary to establish conditions for a Summit meeting. These conditions presumably should be some arrangement on Berlin and some arrangement on disarmament. How must such a Berlin arrangement work? He was of the opinion that, if the West were to be satisfied with a standstill, that is, a Soviet agreement to take no unilateral action before or during the Summit meeting, the Soviets could claim that this in effect authorized them to take such action if the Summit failed. He wondered whether the Allies should not insist on an unqualified acknowledgement of their right to stay in Berlin as a condition for going to the Summit. Lloyd said the German Foreign Minister had raised an important point, and the Western Foreign Ministers should discuss this early next week. It seemed partly a matter of presentation. The West must, of course, avoid giving any implied authority to the Soviets to change the situation in Berlin.
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1338. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved by Herter on May 25. The meeting was held at Villa les Ormeaux. A summary of this memorandum was transmitted in Secto 105 from Geneva, May 22. (Ibid., Central Files, 396.1–GE/5–2259)↩
- The Coordinating Group, led by Merchant, Laloy, Rumbold, and Grewe, met at 10:30 a.m. A memorandum of their conversation, US/MC/41, is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1338.↩
- See Document 72.↩
- See Document 287.↩