Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

326. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington May 22, 1959.

SUBJECT

• The President’s Meeting with Hammarskjold

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Mr. Hammarskjold
• Ambassador Lodge
• Mr. Dillon

From the conversation it appeared that Hammarskjold’s primary purpose was to convince the President of the usefulness of a Summit meeting with Khrushchev. Hammarskjold spoke extensively of his talks with Khrushchev and indicated his belief that there was a possibility of making progress through Summit negotiations with him. Hammarskjold also indicated his belief that Khrushchev was now the absolute and sole ruler in the Soviet Union. He cited as an instance of this belief the fact that when it become known that he was going to see Khrushchev none of the other top leaders of the Soviet Union would discuss any subject with him which they thought might conceivably be the subject of a later conversation between him and Khrushchev. This indicated very clearly that none of them wished to have the slightest possible difference of opinion with Khrushchev. Hammarskjold commented on the unusual relationship between Khrushchev and Mikoyan in which Khrushchev treated Mikoyan as sort of a jester. Hammarskjold used the words “a Sancho Panza”. But nevertheless, it was clear that Mikoyan had a great deal of influence with Khrushchev. Hammarskjold did not at any time say anything about holding a Summit conference under UN auspices.

Regarding the German situation, Hammarskjold said that he had gathered from Khrushchev that Berlin was not really of major importance to the Soviets but what was of supreme importance to them was the status of East Germany. Regarding a possible use of the UN in Berlin, Khrushchev told Hammarskjold¹ that he had no fixed ideas as to how this could be done and said that since he had accepted the principle of such a connection he thought it was up to the Western powers to indicate whether and how they would like this accomplished.

Hammarskjold thinks that Khrushchev does not consider the possibility of the use of the UN in Berlin in some form as a Soviet proposal, but rather as a Soviet concession to the West to make some sort of different regime more palatable.

Hammarskjold said that the Soviets were deeply influenced in their attitude toward Germany by their belief that no one, except possibly the United States, really desired the reunification of Germany. This was a cardinal tenet of their belief and was the reason they treat the subject of unification in such a cavalier fashion.

The major substantive comment by the President was a statement that while he does not believe in threats, and had never talked of United States or Western military power himself, he was determined to stand absolutely firm wherever he felt that we were fundamentally in the right. He said he was convinced that to show weakness in such situations would be very dangerous as it would only serve to encourage the Soviet appetite and thus the threat of future war. The President also expressed his strong belief in increased trade and increased exchanges of all sorts as a useful mechanism for reducing tensions and increasing Soviet understanding of Western ways of life.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Dillon.
1. See footnote 2, Document 246.