Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

385. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, June 12, 1959, 6 p.m.

Secto 232. Paris pass USRO. Seventeenth Plenary Session held June 12, 10 am to 12:55 pm, Lloyd Chairman.

Lloyd, in twenty minute statement¹ traced course conference to date, noting Western Peace Plan put forward after much thought and designed meet Soviet criticisms of earlier Western proposals. Said conference had concentrated during past fortnight on limited proposals re Berlin and he had thought there had been some signs of limited progress on limited front until Soviet proposals made public June 10 put us back to situation at time of Soviet note November 27. These proposals contained no new element and were presented under double threat that if not accepted Soviets would turn responsibilities over to GDR and would do so in any case at end of one year. Soviet all-German committee proposal simply revival of idea peace treaty must be negotiated by two Germanies.

Lloyd then gave background against which Soviet proposals must be viewed. West had two sorts of rights—those flowing from basic fact Nazi surrender and those based on specific agreements. Quoted Khrushchev’s March twentieth statement² that West had legal rights in Berlin but these would be extinguished by signature Soviet-GDR treaty. Lloyd said West maintained such unilateral action would be illegal and a blow at mutual confidence.

West could not agree, as Soviets suggested, to say nothing re rights because no guarantee question would not again be raised by Soviets or, in Soviet view, extinguished by signature treaty with GDR. However, West still believed there are ways to solve this problem. Re situation in Berlin, which both sides agree abnormal, conference has considered three facets (1) presence Western troops (2) various activities (3) free access. Re (1) and (2) Lloyd reviewed Western proposals, saying re (2) that if Soviets object to our formulation that arrangements would cover “greater Berlin,” we would define them as covering East and West Berlin but they must be reciprocal. Re (3) maintained Soviets cannot unilaterally tear up agreements but West thought it possible to work out way to satisfy Soviet wish to give up some of functions they now exercise. Lloyd concluded by noting Gromyko had asked what sort of Berlin there would be access to. Answer was one (a) that posed no military threat (idea suggested by Gromyko that West would place nuclear arms or missiles in Berlin was ridiculous); (b) where troops did not interfere with life of city; (c) where there would be freedom and no violence or subversive activities directed against its neighbor.

Secretary then (Secto 229)³ noted earlier comments by himself and Couve on threats contained in Gromyko’s proposals and called on Gromyko to repeat in plenary what he had said the day before on subject in meeting with Secretary.

Gromyko, in thirty-minute statement,⁴ reiterated past assertion that Soviet proposals contained no threat or “diktat” and hoped such terms would no longer be used. Soviets put forward proposals for temporary Berlin regime, to facilitate liquidation outdated occupation regime. West says occupation would last only until German reunification. But reunification impossible under Western proposals. West must realize Soviets, GDR and other states do not like occupation regime and desire new arrangements satisfactory to all states concerned. West says troops are no danger to Soviets and must stay in West Berlin to guarantee social order there, but why are guns needed to support an order which no one wishes to change? Re Western objection to one-year time limit for work of all-German Committee, West itself proposed two-and-one-half year limit and thus accepts principle. If one year too short, why not propose another? Re parity, Dr. Bolz has shown this is only arrangement compatible with facts and international law. West says membership should depend on population but this not so in UN or at this conference. Gromyko accused West of threatening Soviets by insisting on maintenance of occupation regime in West Berlin.

Gromyko then turned to Summit conference, saying it cannot be approached on basis of deal that it depends on progress at Geneva. If powers really desire find solution for problems, then Summit, or series of summits, could bring about lessening of tensions and strengthening of peace. Anyone who sets “artificial obstacles” on road to summit would accept “grave responsibilities”.

Re Lloyd’s statement that Soviet proposals old, maintained two new elements were one year time limit and linking of Berlin proposals with activities of all-German committee. Re statement Soviet suggested ban on missiles and nuclear weapons ludicrous said what is ludicrous is attempts to minimize this issue and West should have no trouble accepting Soviet proposal. Ended by reiterating Soviet desire reach agreement but repeated Soviets could not sign agreement which perpetuated occupation regime.

Grewe said⁵ that after carefully considering Soviet proposals he could only conclude they designed to end private talks which attempting find limited solution Berlin problem. Soviet proposals only increase tension by linking questions which may be soluble with those which are not. Connecting all-German committee established on parity basis with proposals on Berlin is merely device for shifting to Federal Republic blame for failure this conference. Federal Republic agreed to an all-German committee on understanding it would operate within framework of Western proposals for German reunification and its membership would be based on relative populations of two Germanies. Soviet proposals re all-German committee would perpetuate split because GDR representatives would be able prevent any reunification on basis of freedom. Denied there any universal rule supporting parity principle, saying even in UN some states have certain rights not possessed by others and Soviets themselves had assigned differing role as among states they propose take part in drafting and signing treaty with two Germanies. “Free city” proposal unacceptable because would establish three Germanies and would leave West Berlin open to arbitrary interference by GDR. Finally, Grewe noted time limit in peace plan not linked to announcement unilateral measures would be taken at its expiration.

Couve said⁶ he felt discouraged and concerned at present serious situation of conference. Noted Soviets objected to continuation of West Berlin occupation but had proposed as one alternative stationing of token forces of four powers. Where was difference in legal basis for presence of troops of four powers as against three?

Lloyd, in short statement,⁷ reiterated that West saw threat in Soviet proposals because of contents and fact Gromyko had made them public. Also noted Soviet denial there was threat. Regretted certain of Gromyko’s statements today which might be taken as barring door to further progress. Suggested conference could resume plenary or private session in afternoon or adjourn until Monday, June 15.

Gromyko said⁸ Lloyd had reproached him for making proposals public on June 10 but he had told Western Ministers in private session the day before he would not do so if West agreed to continue discussions in private session with representatives of both Germanies present. Mr. Herter, however, had wanted plenary.

Secretary, to set record straight, noted⁹ he had suggested plenary because only alternative was private session with Germans present. This was type of meeting Ministers had never held and, he thought, would not hold.

Lloyd denied⁹ he had reproached Gromyko, had merely noted facts including Soviet denial of ultimatum.

It was agreed next meeting would be private session at 3:30 p.m. June 15.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/6–1259. Official Use Only; Priority. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, Berlin, and USUN. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of this session, US/VR/17 (Corrected), and a summary of the verbatim record, US/VRS/17, June 12, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1373.
1. For text of Lloyd’s statement, circulated as RM/DOC/46, June 12, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 279–284 or Cmd. 868, pp. 164–168.
2. The statement was made at a press conference at the Kremlin on March 19 and printed in Pravda on March 20. For an extract from the press conference, including the statement mentioned by Lloyd, see Moskau Bonn, pp. 534–538.
3. Dated June 12, (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/6–1259) For text of Herter’s statement as recorded in the U.S. verbatim record, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, p. 284 or Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1959, p. 951.
4. For text of Gromyko’s statement, circulated as RM/DOC/47, June 12, see ibid., pp. 285–291 or Cmd. 868, pp. 168–173.
5. For text of Grewe’s statement, circulated as RM/DOC/A/12, June 13, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 551–553 or Cmd. 868, pp. 216–218.
6. For text of Couve de Murville’s statement, circulated as RM/DOC/48, June 15, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 291–293 or Cmd. 868, pp. 173–175.
7. For text of Lloyd’s statement as recorded in the U.S. verbatim record, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, p. 293.
8. For text of this statement, see ibid., p. 294.
9. For text of this statement, see ibid.
9. For text of this statement, see ibid.