Office of the Historian

229. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McElroy and Acting Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower0

Washington, March 17, 1959.

SUBJECT

  • Berlin Contingency Planning
1.
You asked recently to be brought up to date on Berlin contingency planning.
2.
Berlin contingency planning has proceeded on the basis of guidance which you approved at a meeting on January 29, 1959,1 with Secretary Dulles, Secretary McElroy and General Twining (Tab A).2
3.
In order to obtain full understanding of the access control question, a joint State–Defense team of officials acquainted with current contingency planning will proceed promptly to Germany to make first-hand observations of current Soviet practice concerning access.
4.

The following steps are now recommended for your approval:

(a)
At an appropriate time before May 27, test flights should be made in and out of Berlin above 10,000 feet. The Soviets have denied that we have a right to fly above that ceiling. We have maintained that we do have such a right, but have never in fact exercised it.
(b)
Present contingency planning provides that after the attempted or announced substitution of GDR for USSR, the first unit to go through would be a truck or trucks accompanied by a scout car or some other vehicle with a capability for shooting. We recommend that this concept be changed, and that the first unit to attempt passage in such circumstances should be a routine convoy to emphasize our intention to continue past practices. If this unit is blocked, we recommend that the next unit should be accompanied by a scout car or similar vehicle. Its purpose would be to establish the existence of forcible blockage.3
(c)
We recommend that you ask the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CIA to prepare for you on an urgent basis an analysis of the political and military implications of the four alternative courses of action with respect to the use of force, discussed in paragraph 7 below. We suggest a deadline of April 7. You may recall that a similar study proved useful in connection with the Korean War (NSC 147 of April 2, 1953).4

[Page 501]

[1 paragraph (2–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified] Open Questions

5.
Concessions for the sake of unity. At the meeting in your office on March 55 after the NSC meeting, it was agreed that continued Allied unity on Berlin was essential That leaves open the question whether and, if so, to what extent we should modify our basic position if that turns out to be necessary in order to get Allied agreement.
6.

Substitution. The doctrine that we will allow “no substitution” of GDR for Soviet personnel (at least unless there is an acknowledged agency relation between the two) is being questioned in various quarters—both foreign and domestic. Attention is focusing on the “no stamping” application of the “no substitution” doctrine, i.e., the proposition that we will refuse to allow paper stamping as a means of identifying allied military traffic to GDR personnel since this would imply acceptance of control.

[4 paragraphs (17 lines of source text) not declassified]

7.
Alternative uses of force.
(a)
Recent discussions between State and Defense officials confirmed agreement that we should be prepared to resort to force if necessary to maintain access to Berlin—even at the risk of general war.
(b)
Four alternative uses of force, in the event of failure of political negotiations, have been discussed:
(i)
A substantial effort to reopen ground access by local action.
(ii)
A substantial effort to reopen air access, if blocked.
(iii)
Reprisals against the communists in other areas, e.g., Western naval controls on bloc shipping.
(iv)
General war measures.
(c)
In paragraph 4 (c) above, we recommended that you direct preparation of an analysis of the implications of these alternative courses of action on an urgent basis.
8.
Timing of force. It may be difficult to maintain a state of high military readiness over a long period. On the other hand, there would be political difficulties in breaking off negotiations, or a debate in the United Nations, and resorting to force, especially if civilian traffic to Berlin was still moving freely.
[Page 502]

If political negotiations prove prolonged, at what point should we be prepared to resort to one of the four alternative uses of forces described above? The answer to this question will, of course, hinge in considerable measure on your decision after the completion of the study recommended in paragraph 4 (c).

  • Neil McElroy
  • Christian A. Herter

[Tab B (2 pages of source text) not declassified]

  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret.↩
  2. See Document 149.↩
  3. Tab A is airgram G–397, printed as Document 181.↩
  4. Next to the last two sentences in the source text is the handwritten note “Doubtful as to this. C.A.H.”↩
  5. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XV, Part 1, pp. 838–857.↩
  6. See Document 201.↩