Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

230. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State⁰

New York, March 18, 1959, 6 p.m.

782. Re: Berlin; mytel 776.¹

1. My chief impressions emerging from exchange of views reported by paraphrase in reftel are as follows:

A. All three dels agree there should be no recourse to SC prior four power negots despite risk involved this may later permit Soviets seize initiative.

B. Basis for this agreement is US-UK view that no matter how we might view such recourse, Soviets could successfully portray it as our attempt obstruct negotiated settlement. French agree not for this reason but because up to now their only concern is that UN be kept totally out of picture until after three powers have reacted on ground to physical interference with our access to Berlin.

C. My personal belief continues to be contrary to statement in Department’s 747² that a démarche in SC would necessarily give Soviets chance in SC to circumvent FM meeting. Realistic management should be able prevent this, particularly as SC is a forum where we have such an advantage. Nor do I agree that such a démarche, if it were linked to US willingness to attend a summit meeting as this was expounded by the President last Monday night,³ could inevitably be successfully portrayed as an attempt to obstruct settlement.

D. We and British agree there is strong probability that mere transfer of Soviet rights to GDR would result quickly in introduction of new situation into UN, either by Soviets or some other party, and that under these circumstances we would be subjected to strong diplomatic pressures to accept new status quo.

E. We and British agree there is slight likelihood Soviets would transfer rights during course of FonMins negots but strong likelihood they may do this if they view negots as unsatisfactory. Likelihood would increase if Soviets believed we were not willing go to summit.

F. With this in mind we and British see strong advantage if we seize initiative at UN (in SC) before Soviets have chance to change status quo by transferring rights. Our main purpose would be to seize SC of present situation and build pressure against any unilateral Soviet move to alter it while at same time preserving our ability to respond to any alteration and calling for renewed negots.

G. In support of such initiative we and British believe we should have some substantive proposal we could point to which on the face of it would appear to offer basis for negotiated settlement—at least of those problems resulting from Soviet attempts deny our rights in Berlin and access thereto. We also agree this would lead to renewed pressures for further negots at summit level.

H. We and British agree on need for further study here of (1) possible uses of UN machinery which might be included in three-power substantive proposals to Soviets during negots, and (2) possible diplomatic uses of UN to support three-power position.

I. As reported mytel 767,⁴ French thinking has not evolved this far and further tripartite exchanges here are stymied.

Lodge

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–1859. Secret; Limited Distribution.
1. See footnote 1, Document 224.
2. Dated March 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–959)
3. See Document 225.
4. Document 224.