Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

149. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower⁰

Washington, January 29, 1959, 2:30 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Dulles
• Under Secretary Herter
• Deputy Under Secretary Murphy
• Assistant Secretary Merchant
• Secretary McElroy
• Deputy Secretary Quarles
• General Twining
• Mr. Gordon Gray
• General Goodpaster
• Major Eisenhower

Secretary Dulles opened the meeting by defining the problem as twofold; first, we must decide our own policy with regard to meeting the Soviet threat to Berlin which will mature as of May 27, 1959 (the date on which the USSR turns over control of access to Berlin to the GDR), and second, we must determine what can be sold to our allies as a course of action on an international basis.

Time wise, the first problem we must face is whether we acquiesce in the turnover of control of access from the USSR to the GDR. (Here the President confirmed with Secretary Dulles that the quadripartite control council for Berlin no longer exists.) The position of the Foreign Ministers at the NATO Council meeting in December was that we should not accept this substitution. Such acceptance would enhance the GDR’s prestige. As the result, the GDR would soon stiffen up the requirements levied upon allied forces for access to Berlin and would apply pressure gradually, without creating a situation nearly so dramatic as the initial action. We have a strong case against this turnover in that the USSR has responsibility to us in this matter and there is no reason why we should have to accept the substitution of a dummy government, the GDR. It is therefore recommended that we not accept this substitution. This recommendation is backed up by the public position which we have taken. It is only fair, however, to note that the British are wobbling in this matter.

The President then brought up the question of degree of provocation versus degree of response. For example, if the Soviet official at a check point is replaced by an official from the GDR, and this GDR official requires the mere showing of a card, then this happening appears so slight that it would not, in the eyes of the world, be cause for drastic action on our part. Some way must be found to make this small action look “tremendous.” To this Secretary Dulles agreed that if a GDR official appears at a check point, and merely waves traffic through, our vehicles should not turn back. The line should be drawn, he feels, at the point where the official attempts to stamp the papers or search the trucks.

Mr. Quarles then brought up a refinement of this point. It is his understanding that a GDR man is present at each border check point at this time, and he is responsible as a traffic officer for all commercial traffic. It is not apparent how you can avoid accepting this man as a traffic officer in order to validate the fact that any given vehicle is under military jurisdiction. On this point the President, although recognizing that we must uphold our rights as conquerors, approved the principle that U.S. traffic going through check points manned by GDR personnel may show identification to establish that this traffic is in fact military. U.S. drivers will not permit GDR personnel to stamp identification papers or to search trucks.

The Secretary of State then continued outlining his approach. He feels that we should begin, in the near future, to effect some military preparations, which may be detected by Soviet intelligence but which are not sufficient to create public alarm. Such measures would include increasing military traffic patrols and guards on trains, etc. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff contingency plan (Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated January 13, 1959, subject: Berlin Situation)¹ was recognized by Secretary. McElroy and General Twining as an all-inclusive document, covering more measures than could in practicality be implemented. Once the substitution of a GDR official for a Soviet official has been completed, on May 27, we should then send a small armored unit to ascertain whether or not the Soviets will obstruct. If this armored unit is obstructed by some means, it should, without firing unless fired upon, return to its point of departure. We should then suspend our transit effort and mobilize world opinion against this action on the part of the Communists. Actions to do so would include bringing the matter before the Security Council of the United Nations and, in the event of Soviet use of the veto, to the General Assembly. We should also at this time proceed with further military preparedness. (This dual approach the Secretary of State refers to as the “double-barreled” approach.)

At this time a discussion as to the nature of this probing unit ensued, with Secretary Dulles answering the President’s query as to the necessity for armor in a non-resistance situation, by stating that scout cars only are anticipated and their use is contemplated primarily as protection against miscalculation. The President checked with General Twining on the presence of visible armament on our convoys as of today. General Twining pointed out that we do not send vehicles with visible armament, or even covered trucks, through check points today. Our trained guards are present and could be augmented, but no tactical units, even of squad size, ride the trains.

At this time Secretary Dulles defined the difference between his approach and that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JCS have recommended preparation for a large-scale use of force on May 27, to include meeting resistance with a large force, rebuilding of bridges, obstructions, etc. This force can comprise strength up to a division. Secretary Dulles would prefer to execute this operation in two stages, allowing a lapse of time between the first probe and the use of appreciable force. To this Secretary McElroy agreed.

General Twining then spoke up in defense of the Joint Chiefs of Staff point of view. They recommend that we make up our minds now as to our sequence of action rather than attempt to address the problem only after we are stopped. (The President recognized that the wait-and see approach was also the de Gaulle approach.)

As a final measure, Secretary Dulles pointed out the necessity for starting talks on the whole German problem as of the middle of April in order to allow the Soviets the opportunity to withdraw without loss of face. The President agreed enthusiastically.

The President then checked on the supply levels in Berlin. Mr. Murphy pointed out that the military in Berlin have a ninety-day level of supply. In answer to the President’s question on the civilian levels, Mr. Quarles estimated this to be six months. Mr. Quarles further pointed out that in no categories do the stocks fall below the two-months level. This satisfied the President. He then reviewed the sequence of action which involved: 1) the initial probe, which should return without resistance followed by 2) a time space in which we show more concern accompanying military preparations with action in the United Nations. He asked Secretary Dulles in this regard whether our allies will go along with this procedure. The reply was affirmative, with the Secretary stressing the stake that the Soviets have in their position before the world as a peace-loving nation. He stressed again his position that the decision to use force must not be automatic.

The President then turned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff contingency plan with a criticism of the size of force recommended in that plan. In the President’s view one division has insufficient capability to do an acceptable job. In the event we resort to force, we will have to conquer the entire German zone. On this matter, Secretary Dulles expressed his agreement that we are risking defeat and humiliation by the use of one division. Mr. Quarles remarked that we are risking the same thing with an unsuccessful small convoy.

At this point General Twining forcefully injected the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff fear that the United States will go half way and then quit. They feel that if we do not carry through with our resolution to risk general war we might as well get out of Europe. To this viewpoint the President pointed out the weakness of taking unilateral action. Without our allies we have no lines of communication and no support. In the President’s view, Secretary Dulles’ plan is designed to carry our allies with us, demonstrating that the Soviets are primarily at fault. The President feels that even Adenauer might not go along with a “Berlin or bust” action. Secretary Dulles reaffirmed his own history of willingness to risk war when necessary. He stressed, however, that in a situation of this type it is essential to give peace forces a chance to work. The first obstruction, in his view, is insufficient reason to precipitate a war. For this reason he regards extensive military preparations as the “second barrel.” There is plenty of time in his view to send a division after due contemplation.

A discussion then followed regarding our ground capabilities vis-à-vis those of the Soviets in Europe. General Twining pointed out that our policies forbid a limited war in Europe, that we cannot fight the USSR on the ground conventionally, and that if we make up our minds to go through we must be prepared to fight a general nuclear war. To this the President expressed the view that the Soviets will not interfere with direct use of force. They will, instead, use obstructions. He agrees that we do not have sufficient forces in Europe, that six equivalent divisions are not enough to do this job conventionally. Our policy must be to force the Soviets to use military force, after which we are in a position to issue an ultimatum prior to initiation of general war.

At Secretary McElroy’s initiation, the problem of ambiguous, piecemeal tightening of restrictions was again introduced. It was reiterated at this point that we refuse to deal with GDR officials at the point at which they stamp papers or search trucks. At this time, we implement Secretary Dulles’ “double barrel.” Our position is then strong enough to take the matter to the Security Council. During this discussion Mr. Quarles introduced the proposal that allied guards, probably British, be prepared to step into the present Soviet check points and take over at such time as the Soviet officials are first removed. Allied convoys would then present identification to these guards rather than the GDR officials on post. The Secretary of State replied that this idea had already been considered, but admitted that it is worthy of further consideration. The President agreed that there is some merit in this proposal.

The President then outlined his concern over our position with relation to public opinion. He pointed out that we must realize that we have in many ways already recognized two Germanies. He and Secretary Dulles agreed that the public opinion for firm action is at this moment solid, but he is concerned about the “nibbling” problem, in which the man in the street is likely to question why we worry about the shape of the helmet of the official to whom we present credentials. He and Secretary Dulles agreed on the cleverness of the Soviets in their facility in working the West into a state of tension, only to release the pressure for a period of about thirty days. The President pointed out that the United. States would like to think that public opinion pushes us into war. Under circumstances which might be created he is not so sure they would even follow us into war. To set the climate of public opinion right, we must preach 1) the rights of the occupying powers, and 2) our responsibility to two million Berliners.

Mr. Gray then brought up the timing of evacuation of dependents from Berlin. In Secretary Dulles’ view, this should be done at some stage after the initial effort—i.e. in the “double barrel” stage. In answer to the President’s question as to the number of dependents in Berlin, Mr. McElroy estimated that there are approximately twelve thousand. Although there are only four thousand military personnel, there are a great number of civilians who are not actually dependents. Secretary McElroy assumes that we will evacuate all noncombatants.

The President then inquired regarding the ability of Templehof Airfield to take our largest jets. (General Twining said he would check.) The President expressed a view that sending in about ten B–58s on a normal routine training flight properly announced would have a salutary effect psychologically. Secretary Dulles stated doubt in this matter as to the permissibility of jets in the Berlin corridor, primarily because of the ability of jets to stay in the landing pattern. In answer to Secretary Quarles’ proposal that we send in Globemasters, Secretary Dulles voiced an objection that such action might give the impression that we are preparing for an airlift. Above all, he considers it essential to avoid this since Berlin cannot be kept going today, as in 1948, by an airlift. People could be fed but the economy would shrivel up and the city would lose its vitality. In this way the Soviet goals would be accomplished. With this, the President temporarily gave up his idea of sending B–58s into Berlin. He stated that they might fly along the border but then apparently overtook this idea with that of an air show (including 2.0 mach B–58s) over Washington on Lincoln’s Birthday. He feels that the intense speed of these aircraft would make a great impression.

Secretary Dulles then brought up a matter related to feasibility of an airlift. On the advice of Mr. Murphy, he pointed out that thus far there has been no suggestion of a total blockade which would include civilian traffic, implying that Berlin might not shrivel up if only military needs were to be met by airlift. This revelation appeared to open a new viewpoint to the President. He stated that this now is obviously a direct challenge to the Big Three and such a differentiation between civilian and military traffic might be designed to split off Germany from the others.

By way of summary, the President stated that the scheme as set forth by Secretary Dulles is generally the best way to start. However, in developing this scheme, the Secretary of State will staff out for further consideration the proposal of Mr. Quarles with regard to substituting allied guards for Soviets when the substitution of GDR officials is attempted. In the meantime, it is essential to find out whether there is a possibility of discussing the entire German problem with the Soviets. (In this connection he mentioned the idea of Berlin as a location for the talks.) He instructed Secretary Dulles to start now to determine under which particular conditions our allies will go along with this. (Secretary Dulles assured the President that his program would be satisfactory to the French; indeed, it was based on a French paper.) In the event that the Soviets carry through with their threats, we will utilize gradual steps to allow for the breakdown. We will withdraw our Ambassador, then break relations and, if necessary, resort to major armed force. He desires to be logical and moderate in our approach, to build up a cover when the time comes, and to make maximum utilization of a show of military force to indicate to the Soviets our seriousness in this matter.

As the meeting closed, Secretary Dulles pointed out that Mayor Willy Brandt of Berlin will be here soon and that all efforts will be made by way of a hero’s welcome to indicate the solidarity of U.S. opinion, and, therefore, our seriousness in the situation.² This idea brought forth considerable enthusiasm from the President, who desires that we explore the possibilities of utilizing Brandt’s visit to show off our new equipment. One means might be the provision of a fighter escort of B–58s for Brandt’s air trip between Washington and New York.

John S.D. Eisenhower³

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted on January 30. For two other accounts of this meeting, see Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 340–342, and Eisenhower, Strictly Personal, pp. 218–221.
1. See footnote 8, Document 122.
2. See Document 169.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.