Office of the Historian

150. Memorandum Prepared by Secretary of State Dulles0

Washington, January 29, 1959.

CONCLUSIONS OF WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE RE BERLIN

1.

We do not acquiesce in the substitution of GDR for Soviet officials as regards the Western occupying powers’ movements to and from West Berlin.

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If GDR officials merely demand identification of the vehicles as those of one of the Western occupying powers, such identification will be provided. However, no stamping of papers or inspection will be acquiesced in.

2.
Begin promptly quiet preparatory and precautionary military measures in West Germany and Berlin of a kind that would be detectable by Soviet intelligence but which would not create public alarm.
3.
After the attempted or announced substitution of GDR for USSR, the next unit to go through would be a truck or trucks accompanied by a scout car or some other vehicle with a capability for shooting. This unit, subject to the conditions mentioned in 1 above, would attempt to make the transit from Berlin. If the GDR or the Soviets interposed physical obstructions, then the effort would be discontinued and in no event would the armament be used unless it were fired upon, in which case it would take whatever defensive action seemed necessary.
4.
After the physical obstruction occurred, transit would be suspended for the time being and parallel efforts would be made along the following lines:
a)
Seek to mobilize world opinion against the Soviet Union as a violator of agreements, a user of force and a threat to the peace. The situation could be taken to the Security Council and, in the event of veto there, to a special session of the General Assembly;
b)
Military preparations would be intensified and at this point could include measures which would be observable, as, for example, the evacuation of dependents from West Berlin, and possibly from Germany.
5.

The decision to use additional force would be subject to governmental decision in the event that the double barreled effort mentioned above was not successful.

(Consideration would be given to the possibility of the stationing of Western allied inspectors in lieu of the withdrawn Soviet inspectors at the check points.)

6.

Concurrently with the development of the foregoing program an effort would be made to bring about around the middle of April a Foreign Ministers’ meeting with the Soviet Union on the various aspects of the German question. These talks might provide a cover which would facilitate the indefinite postponement or modification by the Soviet Union of their present ultimatum as regards Berlin.

(It is assumed that allied agreement would be obtainable along these lines. If not the question of U.S. action would have to be considered in the light of the allied position.)

  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material. Top Secret. Drafted by Dulles following the conference reported in Document 149. Greene transmitted a copy of this memorandum to Goodpaster on January 29 and asked if it coincided with his record of the meeting. No record of Goodpaster’s comments has been found, but John S.D. Eisenhower prepared a 1-page 5-point comment adding certain details and suggesting some rearrangement of the paragraphs. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1–2959)↩