Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

148. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany⁰

Washington, January 29, 1959, 1:03 p.m.

1646. Please arrange deliver following letter from Secretary to Chancellor as soon as possible: “January 29, 1959

My dear Friend:

You have, I know, received reports from your Ambassador here of the various conversations which Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan had with the President and myself during his visit to the United States.¹ I need not tell you, therefore, that at his departure the Berlin situation stood just where it did at his arrival. Mr. Mikoyan took some pains to convey by his manner an apparent willingness to be conciliatory. His actual words, however, showed no significant deviation from the Soviet position expressed orally by Premier Khrushchev and in the Soviet notes of November 27 and January 10.² It is true that he said the Soviet demands were not intended as an ultimatum. Nevertheless, at no point did he hint that, failing agreement with the Western Powers by May 27, the Soviets would be deterred from turning over their responsibilities to the Pankow regime. He repeatedly asked for counter proposals on Berlin from us, but he made no new proposals of his own, nor of course did we have any to make. On our part, both the President and I impressed on Mikoyan our flat intention to maintain our rights in Berlin.

The fact that nothing of great significance emerged from the talks with Mr. Mikoyan has undoubtedly disappointed many who, before his arrival, had speculated that he would bring a new and more acceptable offer from the Soviets. I cannot say that I was myself greatly surprised. As I told Dr. Dittmann and Ambassador Grewe on January 14,³ it would have been contrary to the normal techniques employed by the Soviets to compromise or retreat at this early stage. They may be expected to press their demands until they have satisfied themselves that we are prepared to fight over Berlin.

I am inclined to believe that the Soviets have been taken somewhat aback by the firmness and unity of purpose on Berlin shown by the NATO countries during their December meeting in Paris.⁴ It is probable that, among his purposes, Mikoyan came to the United States to assess the strength of our determination on this issue as well as the general fiber of the country. I believe that he must have returned to Moscow with no illusions on either score. The time of testing for the West, however, is still ahead. We shall need our unity and firmness over the months to come. This is the indispensable prerequisite for dispelling the crisis over Berlin which the Soviets have precipitated.

We are still far from fully developing a tactical position which offers some prospect for such a solution. We are also, like yourself, engaged in a review of our common position on substance to see if we can find a form of presentation more persuasive than our Geneva efforts of 1955. I think we must realistically admit that the Soviet initiative has added a new psychological element in terms of expectancies, as well as underlining the delicately poised post-war equilibrium in Central Europe. By pressing on the West’s militarily exposed nerve in Berlin, the Soviets have in fact raised in urgent form the closely related, more general problems of a European settlement. Without the reunification of Germany in freedom no such settlement nor any real solution of West Berlin can be found. I doubt that the Soviets are yet ready for any such general settlement on terms the West can accept. I am notwithstanding convinced that we must make another effort in this direction as part of the process of dealing with the Berlin situation.

This, I think, means moving towards a conference with the Soviets. Providing the firmness of the Western allies remains evident, such a conference would provide the Soviets with a certain protective coloration under which they might withdraw from the dangerous position Khrushchev has taken on West Berlin. I believe you will concur that it is unlikely the Soviets will postpone their announced plans in Berlin unless provided with some such face-saving camouflage. If on the other hand the Soviets will not withdraw then a conference will demonstrate to our own peoples how faithfully we sought a peaceful solution before facing the grave risk of a resort to force to maintain our position in West Berlin.

I agree with you, of course, that the draft of a so-called peace treaty attached to the Soviet note of January 10 is not acceptable. Incidentally, one fairly clear impression we did receive from Mikoyan was that, if we did not get involved in some sort of discussion, the Soviets and their satellites would proceed with the signing of a peace treaty with the Pankow regime.

This is another factor which makes clear that we cannot merely reject the Soviet proposal and expect them to come up with a more acceptable one. I do not think this would be either realistic or tactically sound. We would wish to avoid too much delay in getting the Soviets around a table.

Under these circumstances, flexibility as to the agenda of such a conference would be to our advantage. We might simply say to the Soviets that it would be fruitless for either side to attempt to dictate the agenda for discussions on a subject as broad as Germany. Accordingly we might suggest that the Foreign Ministers of the four powers meet at Geneva in mid-April to discuss ‘the question of Germany’. We might further suggest something along the lines of the arrangements made at Geneva for consultation with other interested parties. In all the preparation of our position we naturally want to work closely with your representatives. However, we do not have much time, and we have welcomed the general willingness to arrange the early assembly of a four power working group in Washington to serve as focal point for an exchange of views on both tactics and substance. Its first task I suggest should be to prepare a draft reply to the Soviet note of January 10. I would visualize this reply as confined essentially to the procedural proposal which I have suggested above.

We have been in touch with your Foreign Office, as well as with the British and French, to suggest that such a four power working group meet in Washington at the beginning of February and I would hope our reply to the Soviet note could go forward before the middle of February.

As to the content of the Western position, I am persuaded that the West would have much to gain if we could in some fashion take advantage of the great asset which the Federal Republic has in the fact that political ideals and conditions of freedom in the West attract an overwhelming percentage of the population of the Soviet Zone. We have, as you know, urged that your Government give some thought as to how we might take advantage of this fact in any discussions with the Soviets, and we are attempting to come up with some ideas on our part. If it is convenient, I would be willing, perhaps next week, to visit you in Bonn, and away from the pressure of other problems, discuss these questions with you and Herr von Brentano in the light of the developing situation. I would probably stop briefly at London and Paris en route.

I suspect you will not be surprised that Mikoyan was less than complimentary in some of his references, publicly and privately, to you personally and some of your colleagues. One of his efforts—and a spectacularly unsuccessful one—was to seek to drive a wedge between us.

Faithfully yours,

Foster Dulles”

Dulles

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/1–2959. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Merchant and Hillenbrand on January 28 and cleared by Calhoun and Murphy. Bruce received the telegram the morning of January 30 and delivered the letter to the Chancellor before lunch that day. (Ibid., Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327)
1. See Documents 121 and 135–137.
2. See Documents 72 and 124.
3. See Document 133.
4. See Document 112.