133. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany0
1517. Paris for Embassy and USRO. Dittmann and Grewe called on Secretary afternoon January 14.1 Dittmann said he had come to United States with two tasks: to hand over letter to Secretary from Chancellor2 and to transmit preliminary views of Chancellor on recent Soviet note and draft peace treaty. As to letter which suggests President not receive Mikoyan, it had been written on January 12 before White House announcement made of intended Mikoyan call on President January 17. Cable from Bonn this morning instructed him not to hand over signed copy of letter and to request that Secretary consider advance copy already in his possession as void. Dittmann’s presentation of views of Chancellor along same lines as reported Deptel 1488 to Bonn, 2464 to Paris, 6403 to London and 1074 to Moscow.3
Secretary said he was not surprised that Soviets had not retreated or weakened substantive position regarding Berlin or Germany as whole. However, they have indicated primarily through Mikoyan that November 27 note not to be treated as ultimatum. Soviets may be expected to press their demands until they establish whether or not we are prepared to fight over Berlin. Secretary stated we must show we are prepared to fight as at Quemoy–Matsu, or Soviets will push us from retreat to retreat. Here we were in somewhat different position in having Allies directly involved with whom we must consult and work out common position.
Application this principle of firmness in Berlin situation, Secretary continued, presents difficulties. Soviets have us in position where they can perhaps make us shoot first. They could by blowing up bridges and erecting road blocks isolate Berlin and maneuver us into having to use force initially to maintain land access. To obtain support public opinion our Allies and in US involves some real problems.
[Page 267]For Soviets to start compromising at this relatively early stage, Secretary noted, would be contrary their normal techniques. After we have satisfied them they cannot gain their objectives without fighting, we may have to provide them with discussions as a means to save face. US has been having talks with Communist China since 1955. These are not very promising but their existence tends to provide protective coloration under which fighting can be suspended. Secretary thought it might perhaps be useful to have talks with Soviets regarding Germany and meeting of Foreign Ministers but without agenda limited in such a way we would only be discussing what Soviets want to discuss. Their draft peace treaty was obviously unacceptable. General talks regarding Germany might provide cover at least for suspension planned Soviet measures regarding Berlin.
Secretary said he felt there could with advantage be greater flexibility in FedRep thinking on reunification. FedRep had tremendous assets in fact overwhelming percentage East German population opposed to present Government and would like to join in free institutions of West Germany. Secretary had impression that aloofness which exists to some extent plays into hands of Soviet and Pankow authorities by making it impossible for FedRep to utilize these favorable assets in East Germany. This was only a general observation which might be difficult to express in concrete proposals. Secretary felt that if FedRep came up with proposals involving more contacts with people of East Germany without interposition of Pankow regime East German officials would be very frightened.
Secretary thought we should therefore explore possibility of meeting with Soviets about Germany with dual purpose of resolving Berlin situation and perhaps coming out with some advantage. It was perhaps remote prospect but Soviets sometimes made sudden and unpredictable moves as in case of Austrian Treaty. Soviets might after unknown period of time come to conclusion situation deteriorating in East Germany and they may want to find a way out. We must keep pressing as we did for eight years on Austrian Treaty.
Regarding suggested Working Group discussions among four Western Powers, it was noted that Washington as locus which desired by FedRep acceptable to US and we understood probably also to British and French at least insofar as drafting reply to January 10 note was concerned. Meeting of four Western Foreign Ministers might not be necessary if progress in Working Group satisfactory.
Grewe said he had received instructions to express concern as to interpretation and effect of Secretary’s statements at press conference [Page 268] January 134 regarding relationship free elections to German reunification. FedRep Government afraid would be interpreted as support for idea of confederation as first step towards German reunification, and that opposition would take advantage of situation. Feared position of Government would be endangered unless some clarification made. Coming at time of Mikoyan visit press would inevitably interpret as marking change US policy.
Secretary noted press can be troublesome when leading questions asked, answers to which are then misinterpreted or exaggerated. Referring to specific three comments on free elections which he had made during press conference, Secretary asked what could be answer to query “Do we say, no free elections, no reunification.” One obviously could not take position that reunification without free elections would not be accepted, as for example in case of successful revolt in East Germany. Unification of US not achieved via free elections but by legislative action of different states, nor was reunification in 1865 so achieved. If reunification came in Germany it might well be by some other method than free elections. To seek free elections is our policy and we see no better method now to achieve reunification. However, Soviets rightly fear reunification might be forced by people East Germany and we have no desire to allay their fears in this respect. When they agree to reunification it will be because their hand forced by situation in GDR.
Secretary said that confederation as proposed by Soviets obviously did not mean reunification but consolidation division of Germany. Any idea confederation of this kind acceptable to US was wrong. However, Secretary could conceive of confederation on terms that might enable FedRep to capitalize on feeling East German people and get rid of Communist Government. If confederation gave opportunity for free expression of views by East Germans regarding form of government, not likely Soviets would be pleased.
As to Mikoyan visit, Secretary commented that talks would not lead to any change US policy, which would be reaffirmed. Mikoyan has been treated very well by American people, but latter would not basically be fooled. Communiqué was not envisaged after Mikoyan meeting with either Secretary or President. We will undoubtedly have to give some sort of background briefing to press so as to make it more difficult for Soviets to falsify. When Mikoyan saw Secretary,5 latter said he assumed Mikoyan not here to negotiate and we were not planning to negotiate with him. Mikoyan had apparently acquiesced though [Page 269] unenthusiastically. We would make efforts to minimize misconceptions which Soviets might try to create regarding talks.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 662.001/1–1559. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand, cleared by Merchant and Calhoun, and signed by Dulles. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.↩
- No memorandum of this conversation, which was held from 3:41 to 4:34 p.m. according to Dulles’ Daily Appointment Book, has been found. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) For Grewe’s account of the meeting and the controversy sparked by Dulles’ comments at his January 13 press conference (see footnote 4 below), see Grewe, Rückblenden, pp. 374–377. See also Document 130.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 128.↩
- See the source note, Document 129.↩
- For a transcript of Secretary Dulles’ press conference on January 13, see Department of State Bulletin, February 2, 1959, pp. 156–162.↩
- See Document 121.↩