130. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State0
1477. Eyes only for Secretary from Bruce. Adenauer sent for me this morning.1 FonMin also present. He said had just held Cabinet meeting, and discussion largely confined to discussion text your press conference yesterday.
I verified fact he had correct transcript.
He concentrated remarks on that portion concerning free elections not being an absolutely exclusive method.
He said repercussions in Germany would be momentous, and destructive of his long established policy that reunification could only be achieved through free elections. Already most SPD and FDP leaders had favored conversations with Pankow. This was for him inadmissible, since whole East Germany was in effect only an extension of Soviet Union, and idea confederation in any form totally unacceptable. Now those naive people ready negotiate with Pankow would be encouraged by interpretation they would give in their own interests to your having opened door to other possible methods bring about reunification.
I would characterize his and Brentano’s expressions as being little short of violent. I tried to assuage their alarm by placing the matter in proper perspective but to little avail.
Adenauer asked me to communicate to you urgently his preoccupation, and to inquire whether you could not, in response to a planted [Page 259] question, enter into explanation as to why your response in this regard was theoretical, and did not indicate any intention of considering departure from long established policy. When I sought constructive thought as to substance, they were unproductive.
They anticipate shortly violent campaign against govt based on assumption U.S. ready to consider alternative to free elections, including assent negotiations between FedRep and Pankow.
If it be practicable and advisable to try to comply with Chancellor’s request, suggest you might consider some such language as follows:
“There are various theoretical possibilities for bringing about reunification of divided portions of a formerly united country. But, in the case of Germany, since Soviets have invariably denied citizens of socalled GDR right to express their wishes in a democratic manner, no negotiations could satisfactorily result unless they had as a premise the acceptance of free election procedures in both parts of Germany.”
Chancellor said he was more concerned than ever about outcome conversions with Mikoyan. Any communiqué following them should be drafted with utmost clarity so that Mikoyan and Khrushchev could not distort contents to serve their own purposes.
I am following this immediately with another telegram for limited distribution, expressing certain general thoughts on German problems.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/1–1459. Secret; Niact.↩
- According to his diary Bruce met with Adenauer and Brentano at noon. The Chancellor “was disturbed to an uncommon degree” by the report of the Secretary’s press conference (see footnote 4, Document 129). Bruce commented further that he wished the Secretary “would stop dropping tinder into powder kegs by being over-frank in press conferences.” (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327)↩
- Telegram 1486 from Bonn, January 14, commented on Adenauer’s impact on the German political scene, (Ibid., Central Files, 762.00/1–1459)↩