217. Letter From the British Ambassador (Caccia) to Acting Secretary of State Herter0
Dear Acting Secretary of State, Immediately on his return to London this evening, the Foreign Secretary sent a telegram asking me to let you know that the Prime Minister and he have had a prolonged discussion with Chancellor Adenauer and Herr Von Brentano about our Note to the Russians.1
[Page 470]The Germans agreed with the arguments which the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary used about a Summit Meeting. They were:
- (a)
- Khrushchev is the only Russian with whom a negotiation could be successfully conducted;
- (b)
- We cannot be expected to take vital decisions involving the possibility of war before there has been a Summit Meeting;
- (c)
- If it is known that there is going to be a Summit Meeting, then the meeting of Foreign Ministers is more likely to produce some useful results;
- (d)
- The Russians would have no incentive to precipitate a crisis if a Summit Meeting was fixed, and world opinion would be against them if they started something in the meantime;
- (e)
- If, on the contrary, no date had been fixed for a Summit it would be in their interest to start something precisely in order to force us to a Summit under the pressure of a crisis;
- (f)
- A wide agenda including e.g. disarmament could only be obtained at a Summit Conference.
The Chancellor thought that we should so word our Note as to suggest that the Summit Meeting which we were proposing would be the first of a series. As to the date, he prefers “August” to “the end of July or beginning of August”.
As regards the agenda of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting, we accepted the view that if a definite date was proposed for the subsequent Summit Meeting Khrushchev would be less likely to resist a formula such as that suggested in the American draft reply2—“Questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin”. If the date for the Summit was included in the Note, we would accept such a formula. In fact we recognized that one of the arguments in favour of fixing this date was that it would probably have the effect of enabling us to avoid a wrangle about the agenda of the Foreign Ministers’ conference with which public opinion would have little patience.
The Chancellor made the point that in offering Khrushchev a Summit Conference, we ought somehow to tie him down to taking no unilateral action to disturb matters in the meantime. Although it would go without saying that our offer was made on this understanding it would nevertheless be better to say it. The Ministers discussed whether this might best be said through the diplomatic channel or in the Note itself and left that over for further thought.
The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary agreed with the Germans that until they had had time to discuss these ideas with you in Washington, it might be best for the Working Group in Paris to suspend [Page 471] their discussion about the Note and turn to other matters, e.g. the questionnaire, and possible Berlin solutions.
The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary realise that large issues are involved about which the United States Government may wish to have time to reflect before reaching a decision. They thought that you would like to know what passed in Bonn and they look forward to pursuing the discussions next week.
Of course if you have any preliminary view about the matters raised in this letter, I shall be glad to convey them to the Foreign Secretary. As you know, he will be leaving London with the Prime Minister next Tuesday evening, March 17, for Ottawa.
Most sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret.↩
- On March 16 Ambassador Whitney reported that the Foreign Office had briefed the Embassy in London along similar lines. (Telegram 4782 from London; ibid., Central Files, 033.4162A/3–1659) For two other accounts of the visit, see Macmillan, Riding the Storm, pp. 639–640, and Document 219.↩
- See Document 242.↩