Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

218. Memorandum of Discussion at the Second Meeting of the Berlin Contingency Planning Group⁰

Washington, March 14, 1959, 10 a.m.

IN ATTENDANCE

• Christian A. Herter, Acting Secretary of State
• Neil H. McElroy, Secretary of Defense
• Donald A. Quarles, Deputy Secretary of Defense
• Gen. Nathan F. Twining, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
• Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State
• G. Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor, Department of State
• Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
• Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
• Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
• Loftus E. Becker, Legal Adviser, Department of State
• John N. Irwin II, Assistant Secretary of Defense
• Rear Adm. C. O. Triebel, Joint Chiefs of Staff
• Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, White House Staff Secretary
• James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, NSC and other Staff officers

Secretary Herter opened the meeting by reading points which he understood had been agreed upon by the Inter Departmental working group on the Berlin situation.¹ The first point was that all of the actions contemplated in a discussion paper² which had been circulated depended to a greater or lesser degree upon cooperation and support of our allies, U.K., France and West Germany. It was agreed that there should not be any added public opinion drive at this time, also that the President should not be asked to rescind his decision on the 30,000 man reduction in the Armed Forces, but that strength in Europe should be restored. The desirability of referring the question of the Soviets turning over to the Germans control of allied access to Berlin to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion should be examined. While noting the President’s opinion that we should not accept East German credentials, the working group pointed out that K-Day would actually occur when allied access to Berlin is forcibly blocked and we have to mount a probe, rather than automatically on May 27. If the East German officials attempt to exercise sovereignty by stamping documents, we will not accede, but will then move ahead until forcibly blocked.

Mr. Gray cited the importance of determining what we mean when we say “forcibly blocked”.

Secretary Herter continued the list of agreed working group points, the next of which was that in no event would the U.S. initiate general war. Even if negotiations are still under way and our access forcibly blocked, we would still want to try a probe. It was agreed that we should take the problem to the United Nations after we have been forcibly blocked and tried a probe. Secretary McElroy questioned when general war would happen, for example, suppose our people had been subjected to military action by the Soviets in connection with Berlin. Secretary Herter said that then the Soviets would have been the ones who had initiated general war. Secretary Quarles thought that the working group’s statement was not referring to initiating general war, but rather to preventive war. Secretary Herter thought that this point was already clearly covered in existing approved policy.

Secretary Herter said the next point agreed by the working group was that general mobilization should be deferred until after K-Day. Then we would probably go into general mobilization, although it might be only partial mobilization. Secretary Herter cautioned that whatever was put in writing on this subject and submitted to the President was liable to leak. He, therefore, felt that any such written documentation should be looked at from the point of view of what would happen if it got out publicly. Secretary Herter thought that after various points were agreed by the President we should then look at what the Russians should know.

Secretary Herter said that there would be many variables which could not now be foreseen, especially when K-Day occurs. He thought K-Day was unlikely before May 27, but from there on we might have to deal with the East Germans. From then on we would have to make clear our response. One of the questions would be what we do if a single East German sentry refuses us access. Would we then go immediately to the United Nations. There is also a question of whether, following our initial probe, we try a second probe of considerable force. Secretary McElroy said he did not think much of the latter idea. Secretary Herter said he did not either. Secretary McElroy thought that we must assume that if we get into a fight it will be a big one.

General Twining then read a list of actions³ which the Joint Chiefs were now taking. Concerning the types of convoy, both General Twining and Secretary McElroy felt that we should do the same thing after the Soviets turnover to the East Germans as we did the day before. Secretary Quarles thought it might be desirable to build up the type of convoy before such a turnover, although not necessarily including a scout car in the convoy. Secretary Quarles noted that our military planning was based upon the assumption that we would not negotiate with the East Germans as Soviet agents.

Secretary Herter said that this assumption was correct, but that it was possible we might be able to negotiate an acceptable settlement before the turnover takes place. Secretary Herter said that it would be all right for the East Germans to request identity papers but any inspection or blocking by them would not be accepted.

Secretary McElroy thought that it was necessary that we send some people (preferably someone who understands the problem fully) to go up and down the corridor with convoys. He said it is extremely important to avoid the appearance of being very aggressive on what may be construed publicly as a technicality. Secretary Quarles said we must distinguish between policing of traffic and control of access. General Twining said that the Joint Chiefs would send someone from the Joint Staff. Secretary McElroy questioned whether someone from State should also go, probably from Mr. Becker’s office.

Mr. Herter said that Secretary Dulles feels that what the Soviets will try to do is to force us to negotiate with the East Germans. That in itself would constitute a recognition that the Soviets have the right to turn over to the East Germans. Secretary Herter thought that it was very important to have clear instructions for the first convoy after such a turnover.

Secretary McElroy asked whether acceptance of the stamping of papers by the East Germans would constitute recognition. Mr. Murphy said that if we accepted such stamping, we would then be on a slippery slope, with the danger of losing our entire rights in Berlin. Mr. Merchant pointed out that the right of the East Germans to regulate civilian traffic has already been recognized. We were prepared, therefore, to accept an East German request for identification to distinguish an allied convoy from civilian traffic.

Secretary Herter said that if we do not recognize East German rights, they must then be forced to stop us. Secretary Quarles said that the trouble is if the East Germans gave one of our convoys a mark of identity, the next convoy would be required to have such a mark. Mr. Irwin said that if we accept East German identification, we are then saying that the East Germans have a right to question such identification.

Secretary Herter thought that this problem involves two inter-related steps. First, if the Soviets turn over to the East Germans, we will protest and say that it does not affect our rights. If the East Germans then say they have the right to question our free access, the minutiae regarding clearance procedures will have assumed new proportions. If the East Germans say nothing, but then move to control our traffic, that will constitute K-Day.

Mr. Wilcox said that the problem of refusing to accept East Germans stamping documents would be difficult to explain in the United Nations. He pointed out that we must be able to get support in the United Nations that what we are doing is right. Secretary Herter said that is why we are considering referring the question of credentials to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. Mr. Becker said that we must have someone check as to whether any East German stamp would constitute control of access. Secretary McElroy pointed out that such questions testify to the need for a thorough understanding of convoy procedures. He thought we should not reach any final decisions regarding these procedures until after people have been sent to study the existing procedures. Secretary Herter thought that we could agree now that we would not accept any forcible denial. Then later we could determine what constitutes denial in terms of the minutiae of clearance procedures.

Secretary Quarles thought that the study of the convoy procedures should also include the following points: First, a careful study of the existing forms of Soviet access to West Germany, and how important such access was; secondly, what is done on the railroads where there is customs control when it passes from East to West Germany; third, a study of the procedures for access by air.

Secretary McElroy pointed out that we have now been flying in the corridors above 2,500 feet and below 10,000 feet. He said that if we have to start an airlift to Berlin, we would want to use new aircraft at higher altitudes. Defense, therefore, thought that they might start now using C–130’s at around 25,000 feet. Secretary Herter said that they had discussed this question in the State Department and that they did not feel that they were savvy enough to make the military judgment involved. He felt that if Defense needed to do this, then they should. Mr. Merchant pointed out that the Russians had said that if we fly over 10,000 feet they cannot give assurance of air safety. Mr. Murphy questioned why we could not start flying above 10,000 feet with the type of aircraft now in use. He suggested that this would not give away that we were contemplating the use of an airlift.

Secretary Herter pointed out that the NATO defines an attack on one as an attack on all. Therefore, the British and French are in the same position as the U.S. Secretary McElroy said that this was why he felt we should have a solid position before Mr. Macmillan arrives.

General Twining referred back to the question of airlift and said that a plane flying between 25 hundred and 10 thousand feet was very vulnerable to ground fire. Secretary Quarles said he thought that the 10 to 20 thousand-foot altitude was reserved for civilian traffic control, and that this is why we wished to fly at 25,000 feet and above. Mr. Murphy said this problem also raises the question of whether the Russians will pull out of the Berlin air control center.

Secretary McElroy proposed that the question of flying at higher altitudes be put up to the President. Secretary McElroy also said that Defense will send people to get a specific report on ground, rail, air, and canal procedures for access to Berlin. Secretary Herter said that the State Department would also have someone from Mr. Becker’s office go over to study these procedures. Secretary Quarles again recommended that we not overlook the reciprocal aspects of Soviet access into West Germany. Mr. Merchant suggested that when the people come back from their study of access procedures, it would also be desirable to bring back a U.S. official from the Three-power working group on Berlin contingency planning.

Secretary Herter pointed out that Mr. Reinhardt was coordinator within State in preparing for the Macmillan visit. He suggested that Defense let Mr. Reinhardt know anything that they wanted on the agenda.

Mr. Irwin returned to the question of what actually constitutes obstruction of our access. Mr. Murphy said that there has got to be an element of force used in stopping us. Mr. Reinhardt said that we would not be able to get on the Berlin road without some form of action, because there is a bar at the East German checkpoint. Secretary Herter said that we would try to get through without shooting so that they would be the ones who would have to shoot first.

Secretary Quarles pointed out that if they stop us to check identity then there is a question of what they will accept. If they do not accept our identification, Mr. Quarles said he understood we would not then attempt to raise the bar. Mr. Irwin questioned what we would do if the East Germans do the same as the previous Russian pattern. Mr. Murphy said we would deny the East Germans right to do so. Mr. Wilcox pointed out that how we denied that right is very important for U.N. purposes.

Mr. Smith suggested, and it was agreed, that we should have a full photographic record of what happens to convoys going through.

In answer to Mr. Gray, Secretary Herter said that they would have to decide whether to break off diplomatic relations with the Soviets at the time that the turnover takes place. Secretary Herter said they are also looking at the possibility of a limited blockade of the USSR, even though he realizes that the President is not enthusiastic about this idea.

Mr. Murphy asked why we should not take photographs of the present convoy operations, and Secretary McElroy agreed that we would.

General Twining then enumerated various things that the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought should be done. First, he said that the JCS were unhappy about two points. One was that military action should now go beyond those which could be picked up by Soviet intelligence. The second was that we have a firm U.S. position before Macmillan arrives, and a clear decision as to whether we would go all the way down the line to war.

Secretary McElroy asked whether the British questioned this latter decision. Mr. Murphy said the British do not disagree with our basic position, but may want to drag out negotiations for a long time. Secretary McElroy thought we should be prepared to adjust some positions with the British, but not our basic decision.

Mr. Irwin said that the problem may arise with the British as to whether, if we are forcibly blocked, we decide now that we would use force. Mr. Murphy said the British maintain they cannot accept that decision as a matter of principle without joint planning.

Secretary Herter said that if you assume we are stopped and take the problem to the U.N., we are in effect imposing a blockade upon ourselves. He questioned how long we would wait for U.N. action. Secretary McElroy thought that we should test our access each day. General Twining believed that we should use whatever force was needed progressively.

[3 paragraphs (29 lines of source text) not declassified] Secretary Quarles commented that the arrangements for Berlin were created at a time when the Soviets were supposed to be our friends and the Germans our enemies. Today the situation is the opposite. He thought that we should make clear that the issue is not a question of whether the Soviets transfer their rights to the East Germans, but whether they abridge our rights. He thought we were not sufficiently cultivating the attitude of the German people on this question. Mr. Murphy said that the Germans were the ones who put steel into the details of our position, especially regarding East Germans stamping documents. Secretary Quarles felt that we should not be strapped by the West Germans who themselves accept many forms of relations with the East Germans.

Mr. Irwin felt that further efforts should be made to try to clarify the points of issue in the public’s mind, even thought there was not a major campaign. Mr. Herter said that the President’s Monday talk⁴ would be designed to provide such clarification. He expressed his view that not everybody in Government should get in on the act of clarifying our position. He said that Mr. Merchant was working on the drafts of the President’s talk.

Mr. Merchant said that he agreed that we should reexamine our whole position in detail before Macmillan’s arrival, and be prepared to hold a solid line. He said that Secretary Dulles believed that he came back from Europe with a firm agreement with the British, French and Germans that we would not accept a blockade of our access to Berlin. Mr. Merchant thought that the British differ with us on two points. First, they have doubts as to whether we should refuse to accept East Germans stamping documents; second, they contemplated a longer negotiating period before more force is applied. However, Mr. Merchant said that there was a basic agreement with our allies and, in fact, with NATO.

Secretary Herter said the problem was mainly one of hashing out the details of our position. Mr. McElroy commented that the French seem to be taking a tough position with our troops.

Mr. Gray asked whether there was anything which the Joint Chiefs wanted to do, to which the British and French could contribute. General Twining said that some of the steps would involve or be taken by our allies. Mr. Murphy commented that the British have long urged joint plans but we have been opposed. Secretary Quarles differed with Mr. Murphy’s statement, saying that we have only declined joint planning in Washington but that such planning had been done in Europe.

Mr. Gray reported that he has set aside on the President’s calendar the time from 9 to 10:30 a.m. on Thursday morning for the regular NSC meeting. This time would, therefore, be available if it was needed for other purposes.

Mr. Smith said that if we assume that we have failed in a diplomatic solution to forcible denial of our access to Berlin, we will then be faced with three choices: One would be further military action to gain entry to Berlin; the second would be a possible blockade of the USSR; and the third would be general war. Mr. Smith suggested that there should be a joint State–Defense study of these alternatives in the same manner that had been done regarding possible action in Korea.

Mr. Irwin said it was his understanding that the Joint Chiefs are planning that, if our diplomacy fails, we will attempt to force access to Berlin. He said that what was puzzling is what would happen if our allies do not go along with us on that. Secretary McElroy thought we should say that we are going to maintain access to Berlin.

Secretary Herter said that there will be probing as to the actions we are going to take from all sides. He proposed, and it was agreed, that Mr. Smith and Mr. Irwin would prepare recommendations to the President along the lines discussed in this meeting, including the question of a possible joint State–Defense study of alternatives.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records. Top Secret. Another record of this meeting, drafted by Smith, is in Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Germany.
1. See Document 208.
2. Presumably a reference to Appendix A to Document 212.
3. See footnote 8, Document 201.
4. See Document 225.