Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

216. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France⁰

Washington, March 13, 1959, 8:20 p.m.

3373. For Hillenbrand.¹ Bonn’s 1962; Moscow’s 1747, 1774; London’s 4654, 4671.² Department believes there remains advantage in preserving our long-held position on form of proceeding to Summit meeting, i.e., through Foreign Ministers’ meeting which has dealt in substance with some problems at least, as indication of strength our basic approach to negotiations and to dampen Soviet enthusiasm about their capabilities for shaping form of negotiation. While we inclined agree that any sizeable Soviet concession is unlikely occur except in meeting at which Khrushchev speaks for Soviet Union, Foreign Ministers’ meeting could have value of setting forth in understandable fashion both to Soviets and world public merits of Western position. It could also give some indication of what we might be faced with re Soviet positions in subsequent Summit meeting.

As British have pointed out intervening time between present and proposed mid-Summer Summit meeting can be advantageously used in conditioning public opinion. May Foreign Ministers’ meeting provides both time and forum.

To gain maximum value from Foreign Ministers’ meeting it should be generally understood that meeting would deal in substance. Thus we prefer in our reply to Soviets to indicate readiness for Summit meeting should progress of Foreign Ministers’ meeting indicate that such is appropriate.

Agenda for Foreign Ministers’ meeting clearly raises great difficulty. It must be acceptable to Soviets while giving us opportunity broaden range of questions considered. At same time any language suggested must not give public impression that major unreciprocated concession has been made by West re agenda. Language suggested in US draft note³ was taken from Macmillan-Khrushchev agreed communiqué⁴ as meeting these requirements. Main element in negotiations themselves, of course, is what Western Powers are prepared assert as their interpretation of phraseology agreed upon and program of discussion they will insist upon at meeting. While we do not insist on specific mention of reunification on formal agenda as matter for discussion by Foreign Ministers it difficult see how there could be discussion peace treaty drafts or principles without consideration of subject. Department recognizes difficulty suggested in Moscow’s 1774 for Foreign Ministers in fixing agenda for Summit meeting if reunification discussion becomes pointed issue at Foreign Ministers’ meeting. However Department has some question about Khrushchev’s willingness or capability deal with reunification at Summit meeting since he would be called upon to make concessions concerning system in East Germany, particularly re human rights, which should be applicable by analogy to other Soviet bloc systems but which he could not afford permit. Department believes any concessions he might make, in any event, would be result of pressures on him on specific issues rather than emerging as his voluntary contributions toward compromise. Since our present objective in negotiation is at minimum to develop better public posture, and much of effort in formulating proposals is directed to this end, such clarification of present status of reunification issue as can be attained at Foreign Ministers’ meeting would seem have some value all around.

Re Bonn’s 1962, excerpt from Soviet note of March 2⁵ re access was included in our draft with idea making clear expressed intent of Soviet Government itself and thus underscore its consequent responsibility if it were to conclude separate treaty with GDR. Balance of para was designed reaffirm our refusal tolerate GDR interference with access. Re Moscow’s 1774, Department agrees unilateral Soviet action to hinder access is unlikely before negotiations begin. But negotiations and preparations therefor may extend over considerable time and draft note’s language was meant point out to Soviets detrimental nature of such an act at any time in process.

Re Polish and Czech participation we understand UK now prepared agree this matter should be, in first instance, dealt with as suggested in US draft. In view difficulties connected with additional western as well as eastern participation, we prefer handle it this way at least for now.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/3–1059. Secret. Drafted by Freers and McSweeney, cleared by Vigderman and Kohler, and approved by Merchant. Also sent to London, Bonn, Berlin, and Moscow.
1. Hillenbrand was in Paris as Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Four-Power Working Group; see Document 242.
2. Telegram 1747 is printed as Document 197. The other telegrams dealt with various aspects of the draft reply to the Soviet note of March 2. (Telegram 1962, Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–959; telegrams 1774 and 4654, ibid., 396.1/3–959; telegram 4671, ibid., 396.1/3–1059)
3. See Document 242.
4. See footnote 1, Document 198.
5. See Document 194.