Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

9. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State⁰

Paris, May 21, 1958, 5 p.m.

5429. Reference: Embtel 5299.¹ Tournet, accompanied by Col. Sternberg, called at Embassy this morning, at his suggestion, to establish “informal contact between De Gaulle and Embassy. Tournet made clear he not under instructions from and had no “message” from General, but stated latter knows of his démarche and has given it tacit approval. Tournet stressed that it essential, however, that this contact not become public knowledge. Tournet reiterated remarks reported reference telegram. He stressed that there would be “no rupture of alliances” under De Gaulle, but there would merely be change in attitude and behavior of France. Substance would remain the same but “form” would be different. France would act as full-fledged partner who would have suggestions to make, and would expect to be heard. Although perhaps appearing more difficult to deal with in some respects, France under De Gaulle would have strong and responsible government which could take firm and clear lines of action which could be depended on. De Gaulle strongly favors concept European integration (Common Market, Euratom, etc.) but modalities for achieving this would be different. It would be essential for French to put its own affairs (political and economical) in order first in order to be able to play its rightful role in any European ensemble. Describing France’s position in system of alliances he said that under De Gaulle France would come first and alliances second. On North Africa, Tournet said it was certain De Gaulle would pursue a liberal policy. He would never challenge independence of Tunisia and Morocco, and would surely give considerable autonomy to Algeria. Tournet called attention to fact De Gaulle never said “Algeria is France” in his lengthy press conference, and instead spoke of “associating” African countries with France.

Exact framework of such association, said Tournet would depend on circumstances prevailing at time De Gaulle took office. De Gaulle would never reverse trend of history and would even accept independence of Algeria if such had come about by time he called to head government. What he would seek to do, however, would be to bring North African countries into some “association” with France. He would expect a closer relation between France and Algeria than with other North African countries but Tunisian and Moroccan independence would be respected. Tournet said that de Gaulle’s recent mood has been very critical of U.S. When asked to explain reasons for this, Tournet said that General was very sensitive man who believed he misjudged by Americans. Also De Gaulle very critical of Monnet-Pleven-Gaillard policies and U.S. role in working with these men and U.S. support given to their policies.

Concerning means whereby De Gaulle might return, Tournet said there were several possibilities and that exact procedure would depend on circumstances (i.e., whether initiative came from Coty, Pflimlin, or Assembly, or combination). Tournet said emphatically De Gaulle would make no attempt to seize power and was strongly opposed to any street agitation, whether for or against him. Tournet felt, however, that if present authorities failed to act there was always danger of a coup or other extremist action.

Embassy officer stressed that problem facing France obviously internal French matter in which U.S. could not take sides. Tournet agreed complete U.S. neutrality was only wise course. On departing Tournet offered to continue contact with Embassy for purpose of mutual information, but again stressed importance of secrecy as De Gaulle headquarters anxious avoid any appearance of having made overtures to U.S.

Comment: Embassy believes Tournet, though probably not very close to General de Gaulle, is close friend of Foccart, who we know, is member General’s entourage.² Tournet believed to be giving us his sincere appraisal of General’s views (probably phrased in most palatable form for us). Although there is strong likelihood Tournet’s interpretation not too distant from General’s thinking, it remains second appraisal.

Embassy will continue to exercise greatest discretion in exploitation this contact in accordance policy we have followed to date which completely in line with Deptel 4326³ just received.⁴

Houghton

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751.00/5–2158. Secret; Limited Distribution.
1. Dated May 16, telegram 5299 from Paris reported that de Gaulle’s first contact with the U.S. Embassy was made by Henri Tournet, a member of de Gaulle’s entourage, on May 16 when he communicated with Colonel Sternberg, Executive Officer of MAAG in France. Tournet informed Sternberg of de Gaulle’s position on key issues, such as NATO. Tournet said de Gaulle intended to honor the Alliance, to maintain full participation in it, and not to disrupt it. (Ibid., 751.00/5–1658)
2. Jacques Foccart, one of de Gaulle’s close associates and an organizer of the Gaullist movement.
3. Dated May 17, telegram 4326 to Paris expressed thanks to the Embassy for the information on the Gaullists. (Department of State, Central Files, 751.00/5–1758)
4. In telegram 5583 from Paris, May 27, Houghton reported that Tournet had called at the Embassy that morning and stated he was authorized by Foccart to communicate the following points: 1) to repeat that de Gaulle wished to assume power in a legal government which would obtain popular consent and support; and 2) that the present stumbling block in the Assembly was the Socialists. Tournet also said he hoped the United States would take a benevolent position toward de Gaulle. (Ibid., 751.00/5–2758)