Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

73. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to Acting Secretary of State Herter⁰

November 28, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Franco-American Relations

Since my return¹ I have been both struck and disturbed at the manifest deterioration of our relations with France. Of course for a number of years we had always expected that the return of General deGaulle, if it occurred, would make our problems with the French more difficult, and that France, under these conditions, would follow a more nationalistic line. Our fears have certainly not proved groundless. At the present time there are an inordinate number of problems which are causing difficulties in our relations with the French. Most of our problems both in NATO and in the UN in some way involve the French. The over-all state of our relations can only be summarized as unsatisfactory. In view of the fact that we have been able to give little or no satisfaction to France on most of these problems, I am concerned that there may be a major blowup on the General’s part, and that we may be publicly blamed for current difficulties in which France may find itself. These problems currently fall into three principal areas: (1) Africa, (2) Europe, and (3) atomic and disarmament questions.

Under the first general heading should be listed the following:

1) UN debate on Algeria.

2) Activity of FLN agents in US.

3) Moroccan base negotiations and “Moroccanization” of US bases through elimination of French intermediary role.

4) Tunisian arms and continuing Tunisian demands for additional arms even after completion of the present program.

5) Guinea, with a special reference to UN admission during present UNGA session.

6) Cameroons, problem of resumed session of UN.

Under the second general heading should be listed:

1) DeGaulle Memorandum.

2) Common Market and Free Trade Area.

Finally, under the third category should be listed:

1) IRBM’s for France.

2) NATO atomic stockpile.

3) Atomic submarine.

4) Treaty on suspending nuclear tests.

5) Maintenance of disarmament “package”.

6) Undesirability of any European zone resulting from surprise-attack talks.

It would be too lengthy to detail the differences of US and French views on all of these problems, most of which are extremely well known to you already. However, it makes an impressive list and in almost every case there is a serious divergence of view. Although the problems are of a different nature and in many of these cases it is impossible to give any degree of satisfaction to the French, I nevertheless believe that we should examine all French problems confronting us in the light of our total relationship with France, and the extremely thorny nature of our relations at the present time. It is for this reason also that our tripartite talk in Washington on the deGaulle memorandum may be of some use in smoothing down the generally ruffled nature of French feathers. While it is unlikely that we can give satisfaction to any of the principal objectives of deGaulle in the memorandum itself, it is possible that our acceptance of a tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris at the time of the NATO meeting would also be most helpful in this context.

In certain other fields we are also attempting to satisfy French feeling. There is relatively little that can be done in Morocco or Tunisia, but we should certainly make every effort to mitigate a bitter debate on Algeria in the UN. Likewise, we must continue to make every effort to prevent the issue of Guinea’s membership in the UN from arising, although success of these efforts appears extremely unlikely. We should also continue to give serious consideration to abstaining in the event that a debate does arise in the Security Council. Likewise, it is possible that we may be able to solve the submarine problem and we are making efforts in this direction. It would also be highly desirable to continue to give as much weight to French views as possible in connection with the possible breaking of the link between the cessation of nuclear tests and progress in other aspects of disarmament. Furthermore, we should also continue to oppose the concept of a limited European zone which the Soviets have fostered through the Rapacki Plan and other maneuvers.

Conclusion: There is perhaps little that can be done to improve our relations with deGaulle at this time, given the complex and fundamental nature of most of the problems involved and the difficulty of the U.S. position which is satisfactory to the French. However, in view of the very wide ranging nature of these problems it would be desirable if the totality of our relationship with the French could be considered in dealing with each of these individual problems. This is particularly true in the light of certain French policies which we desire to continue to foster—especially the French contribution to NATO, the development of a stable French Community, an Algerian settlement, the settlement of the Free Trade Area question, the continued non-recognition of Communist China by France.

We should, however, gratefully note that there now appears to be no basic difference between the French and our own reaction to the Soviet note of November 27 on Berlin.² Moreover, de Gaulle’s attitude insofar as it has been revealed seems stout with respect to the U.S.S.R.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51/11–2858. Secret. Drafted by McBride.
1. Merchant was Ambassador to Canada until November 6 and became Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs on November 18.
2. For text of the November 27 Soviet note on Berlin, which proposed the transfer of East Berlin from Russian to East German jurisdiction and the establishment of a “free city” of West Berlin, see Department of State Bulletin, January 19, 1959, pp. 81–89.