Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

71. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

November 20, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Atomic Submarine for France

[Here follows the same list of participants as Document 70.]

M. Joxe said he would discuss a variety of subjects with Mr. Merchant tomorrow¹ but did wish to raise the problem of the atomic submarine for France. He said it had been reported to him that there was now a certain reticence on the US part on this subject. He said it would be more than regrettable, indeed it would be catastrophic, if, after so much discussion, the sending of security teams, etc., the US were not to deliver on this commitment. Furthermore this would nullify much French research which had been done with the clear understanding of US cooperation in this field. He added we must not reverse ourselves on this subject.

Ambassador Alphand said he had seen Mr. McCone on this subject,² and added that the latter appeared not to know about the extent to which it had progressed, or about the security investigation which had been held. He said Mr. McCone had said it was not clear that the existing legislation gave the AEC the authority to give France a reactor for example for this purpose. He quoted Mr. McCone as saying that the legislation was subject to varying interpretations on this point, but concluded that Mr. McCone had been pessimistic. Ambassador Alphand said he had been shocked to learn that if Senator Anderson did not accept the interpretation that the existing legislation gave the necessary authority, the whole effort to obtain a nuclear submarine for France would have to start over again.

The Acting Secretary said that the President would have to make a certification on the security point, following receipt of a recommendation from the AEC and the Defense Department. The legislation was curious in not permitting the President to take the initiative without the receipt of advice from the AEC and Defense. Ambassador Alphand said Mr. McCone had said he must see Senator Anderson on this problem. This was a surprise to the French as they had thought this point had been clear. The Acting Secretary noted that the AEC could act only as a body and that the Chairman could not proceed alone. Furthermore the AEC was very much subject to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the Congress.

Ambassador Alphand concluded that the French wished to send a team here on this subject in early December so that the agreement could be signed before Congress convened, and the lying-in period could begin promptly in January.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/11–2058. Confidential. Drafted by McBride and approved by Herter on December 11. See also Document 70. Another copy of this memorandum of conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 751.5621/11–2058.
1. During a luncheon with Merchant on November 21, Alphand and Joxe briefly mentioned the tripartite talks. Alphand suggested that “NATO not be brought into these talks but that we might inform Spaak personally regarding them.” He said that he expected no difficulty with the Germans and that the Italians were the most difficult. (Memorandum from Murphy to Merchant, November 21; ibid., WE Files: Lot 72 D 441, de Gaulle Memos, Nov. 1–Dec. 31, 1958)
2. No record of this meeting has been found.