Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France⁰

October 25, 1958, 7:14 p.m.

1508. Paris for Embassy and USRO. Following is summary Secretary’s talk on de Gaulle memorandum with French Ambassador afternoon October 25 based on uncleared memorandum of conversation:¹

Alphand referred to Secretary’s suggestion to Couve in Rome re sending new and more general letter which could be published if necessary and said Couve had instructed him inform Secretary he saw great difficulty with this. Alphand said deGaulle did not wish appear be changing his mind. Furthermore if second letter were published, those who already knew of first letter would be suspicious, and first letter might be made public anyway. French Ambassador said Couve had already informed UK Ambassador Paris along these lines with expression hope tripartite talks could begin here. He quoted British as not opposed to such talks. Alphand said therefore he wished know if we were ready for discreet talks either on bilateral or tripartite basis. He believed such talks should begin well in advance of December NATO meeting.²

Secretary explained our principal worry was not with proposals reorganize NATO though this was difficult enough, but with concept of extending NATO area to Middle East, Africa, etc. Should this idea become current, effect in these areas would be extremely bad. Alphand said even if memorandum published we could always indicate we disagreed with its contents, but repeated hope we could discuss substance of problems raised by deGaulle because they do exist.

Secretary said he preferred first meeting be bilateral, since tripartite meeting might well attract attention. Purpose of first meeting would be to decide on public line should letter become public. He stressed we did not wish to advertise our differences which might be case in event of publication before agreed line reached.

Secretary repeated that extension NATO to Asian and African countries would obviously require consent these areas. We could agree that threat to peace anywhere in world is of course concern to all, but extension scope of NATO treaty was more difficult. Alphand said he was sure deGaulle did not have in mind imposing our will on anyone since this was contradictory to policy he was following in other problems. He did not believe deGaulle had in mind tripartite world directorate.

Secretary suggested bilateral talks on this point of public line be followed. After that were decided he thought we could go on to tripartite talks, but stressed bilateral talks first preferable to avoid attention before we are ready cope with this attention. Alphand said he would report Secretary’s views to Paris. Secretary added he had no objection to concurrent Franco-British talks here, and thought we could come together at later date. Alphand concluded that bilateral talks might cover point of what to say if deGaulle letter published and what to say if tripartite meeting were held and this fact became public.

Dulles

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/10–2558. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted and approved by McBride and cleared by the Executive Secretariat. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Rome.
1. Copies of the memoranda of conversation summarizing this discussion and other topics discussed (Guinea, Formosa situation, nuclear test suspension, and FLN political activity in the United States) are ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
2. For documentation on the December 16–18, 1958, NATO Ministerial Meeting, see Part 1, Documents 166 ff.