61. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State0
Secto 5. Secretary today discussed de Gaulle proposals successively with Fanfani, von Brentano and De Murville, each of whom has also talked with the other. To Fanfani he said he was not so much worried about proposals themselves which would in any event not be adopted but by possible disastrous effects of discussions of letter on rest of NATO and on a number of states in North Africa and ME. He commented thing to be avoided at all costs was publication of text of letter. He saw in his view there was validity to analysis of certain NATO limitations and problems contained in note but remedies suggested were faulty.
Fanfani agreed on all counts. Said he had discussed matter with Couve at dinner October 17 and had told him second part of letter, i.e., remedies could have effect of atom bomb on NATO. He said Couve was having numerous second thoughts and was in full agreement that general NATO discussions should be avoided while still insisting suggested remedies “constructive”. Fanfani pointed out publication of letter and inference it being seriously studied would place disastrous weapon in hands of Nenni and Ollenhauer.1 We must hope elements of story which have already leaked will be lost in discussion of current French problems. If nevertheless story becomes publicly inflated we must attempt pass it off as one of numerous routine attempts to lubricate NATO machinery which received only passing consideration. He [Page 106] agreed most emphatically on importance of avoiding any formal discussion since it might reach public attention.
Secretary observed British had proposed informal discussions in Washington between British and French Ambassadors and someone below Secretary’s level, possibly Murphy, which would allow French feel they having chance to expose position and modify it gracefully. Fanfani, while appearing unenthusiastic did not take exception this idea, merely observed that any action which would calm the situation down and save face for author of the note was a good idea.
In subsequent conversation with von Brentano, Secretary noted French pressing for agreement to initiation tripartite talks in Washington. Von Brentano agreed with his thoughts that while problems de Gaulle raised need to be considered, proposals for amendment North Atlantic Treaty and establishment of world triumvirate wholly unacceptable, impractical and dangerous, latter especially in Africa and Middle and Far East. Secretary said that while USG disposed to agree to French request for conversations it would, in the event they occur, take this line.
Secretary and von Brentano also agreed that public knowledge of fact of de Gaulle proposals would be dangerous and even fatal for NATO. Hence the German Government is trying to keep the whole affair quiet and the Chancellor has written de Gaulle suggesting that if it must be discussed it is better discussed in NAC.2 As it seems unlikely to the Germans that de Gaulle would withdraw his letter, the purpose of discussion in NAC would be to demonstrate to de Gaulle how bad his idea is. Von Brentano said he would speak frankly to De Murville along these lines when he saw him later in the evening after the Secretary.
On tripartite discussions in Washington, the Secretary told von Brentano British are willing even though opposed to de Gaulle program and von Brentano said that such discussions would be all right if directed toward convincing the French of the dangers.
Secretary then saw De Murville and reiterated his concern at the danger of de Gaulle’s letters becoming public. He expressed readiness to discuss the matter privately “among ourselves” but thought it would be better not to start tripartite talks in Washington without first thinking through how a leak would be handled. As a new thought he asked De Murville to consider the possibility that he might write a supplementary letter to the Secretary, along the lines that it is necessary to consider certain problems confronting the Allies (i.e., the first part of de Gaulle’s letter). The Secretary said that if there were a leak such a letter could be published in explanation without running the grave risks, on which he [Page 107] elaborated further. De Murville undertook to consider this suggestion. He went on to criticize Spaak who he thought responsible for de Gaulle’s letters getting around in the first place and observed that the effects in the Middle and Far East of its publication would be the opposite of what France intends in those areas. He also seemed uneasy about extent to which Fanfani has been talking against the proposals and implied he disagreed with the thought he attributed to Fanfani that the matter should be discussed in NAC.