59. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- DeGaulle Letter
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
- Lord Hood, Minister, British Embassy
- Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, EUR
- Mr. Robert H. McBride, WE
The Secretary stated that we had developed second thoughts on the question of tripartite talks on the deGaulle letter. He was concerned lest we set a pattern of tripartite talks which should be avoided. We must avoid creating the impression that the “three” are deciding the future of NATO. Therefore as a first step we thought it preferable to address certain questions to Ambassador Alphand bilaterally, requesting clarification on the significance of some of the points raised by the General. The Secretary added that the President agreed with him that we should not hold tripartite talks unless we had to.1
Ambassador Caccia stated that Selwyn Lloyd felt strongly about the need for tripartite talks. The US and the UK have been placed in the middle of this problem and of course we do not wish to offend the Germans, the Italians or NATO. However, we must keep deGaulle friendly, and he is also important. Since we will in all probability be turning deGaulle down on the substance of his proposals, at the very least we should agree to tripartite meetings which would be restricted to a discussion of the memorandum itself, and not get into other fields. We would keep the Germans, Italians and Spaak informed, and would inform the French that we would have to follow this procedure. Spaak expects tripartite talks, and indeed apparently feels the next step will be for the US and UK to discuss the whole problem with the French in order to ascertain more fully the views of the latter.
The Secretary said that we were not turning down the French, nor refusing to meet with them, but we merely thought it was preferable first to ask Alphand certain questions, particularly with regard to such ideas as the revision of the North Atlantic Treaty, and how it was [Page 102] envisaged that areas outside NATO would be persuaded to accept extension of NATO to cover them. The Secretary added that much depended on Spaak now. He noted that, with regard to tripartite talks, once they started, it was difficult to stop them. He also raised the question of how to handle the public relations problems. He realized it was hoped nothing would become public, but he thought maintaining secrecy was most unlikely, and that furthermore if tripartite talks began, the French would thus have achieved one of their objectives, and would be likely to publicize this fact.
Ambassador Caccia said the UK envisaged that we would explain in NATO first why we were having these talks, and that this would take the sting out of a leak. The Secretary said we should prepare to meet a wave of indignation in Italy if this became public, and that the Germans and others would also be unhappy, particularly if it appeared that the three countries were discussing the future of NATO.
The Secretary added that, if the fact of the talks become publicly known, we would be obliged to give out something regarding the substance. Publicizing the deGaulle memorandum was highly dangerous. The Asian and African nations would be opposed to this concept, and the entire idea of tripartite operations outside the NATO area was unacceptable to them. We could not maintain the position publicly that we were merely discussing a letter, without being willing to say something of its contents. Therefore tripartite talks could be a very costly operation, and could spread consternation in NATO, and in the Asian and African countries.
Ambassador Caccia noted that deGaulle had written a letter to two other parties and it was natural for the recipients to discuss the communication with the sender, providing others concerned were kept informed.
The Secretary proposed that the decision should be held up for a couple of days since he was seeing Fanfani on Saturday and Lloyd on Sunday. He thought the question of tripartite talks raised problems which had not been fully thought through. Ambassador Caccia repeated that the British position was that, since we were turning deGaulle down on the substance of his plan, we should make concessions on form.
The Secretary repeated that this was a problem of presentation, and, if it appeared we were seriously considering some form of tripartite world directorate, this would be a catastrophe in Italy and Germany, and would have terrible repercussions in Asia and Africa. He said by far the best development would be the withdrawal of the deGaulle letter.
Ambassador Caccia said he assumed the British could at least delay the delivery of any letter to deGaulle until Monday since this had been [Page 103] the original planned delivery date of the British letter. He assumed there would be no trouble in withholding delivery of the British reply to deGaulle until after the Secretary saw Lloyd on Sunday night.
In the meantime, the Secretary believed we should concentrate on the problem of presentation if the existence of tripartite talks should leak. He added there would be a storm here if the substance of the letter were revealed, and it appeared that we were considering the revision of the NATO treaty. It was agreed there would be no action vis-à-vis the French until after the Secretary and Lloyd had talked, and a study had been made of the public impact especially in the Asian and African countries.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/10—1758. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McBride.↩
- See Document 58.↩
- No record of such a study has been found.↩