Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

55. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Jandrey) to Secretary of State Dulles⁰

October 9, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Reply to de Gaulle Letter

Discussion:

Now that the President has sent an interim reply (Tab A)¹ to General de Gaulle’s letter (Tab B),² we must face the problem of coping with the thoughts contained in the letter, though there is no particular hurry about replying. We are discussing what might be next steps with the British Embassy here.

In general we have had the following approach to the de Gaulle initiative:

1. The General proposes the “expansion” of NATO in the military field to a form of tripartite military planning, while in the political field he proposes the old idea which Bidault first outlined to you in July, 1953 of the tripartite political standing group to handle worldwide problems.

2. The concept of tripartite military planning stands very little chance of acceptance in U.S. military circles. Even bilateral military planning with the British has met serious obstacles in Defense, and we feel relatively certain there is no possibility in this direction. It is possible that there could be some expansion of at least the information made available to the Standing Group (without expanding its responsibilities) and there may be some other way in which the French can be given an additional role in military planning, but this is extremely doubtful. We have discussed this matter with Mr. Irwin who will look into such possibilities as may exist.

3. Although de Gaulle refers only briefly to the problem of nuclear cooperation, we know this is much in his mind from his presentation to you on July 5 (Tab C).³ Therefore, this question may arise in more acute form with the French later. It is doubtful, for reasons which you know, that we will be able to satisfy the French to any substantial degree in this field.

4. The idea of a formalized tripartite political standing group is likewise unacceptable to us, particularly since to de Gaulle publicizing the existence thereof would probably be a major factor. There are both NATO and extra-NATO reasons which are overriding against an attempt to establish this type of organism. Although the Italians have been the most vociferous in opposing the idea, others both in Europe and elsewhere would react against the tripartite concept, and it would unquestionably be counter-productive for the U.S.

5. However, because of the problem of our relations with de Gaulle, whose position in France is obviously much stronger than that of the prime minister during the Fourth Republic, and the necessity for maintaining good relations with France, it is not possible, as the President indicated to the Italian Ambassador (Tab D),⁴ to envisage a flat rejection of the de Gaulle proposal. Since, in the military sphere, the de Gaulle ideas seem impossible of achievement, it is the political field where we must find a counter-proposal or counter-suggestion sufficiently substantive to prevent a major explosion on his part with the concomitant loss of French active participation in NATO, etc.

6. Since the French political proposals are likewise unacceptable, our tactic must be that of the counter-proposal. As it is unlikely that any counter-suggestion will go far enough to meet the General to any great extent, we should attempt to allay the effect of our negative reaction.

7. All of the above corresponds closely with the working level thinking of the British insofar as we know it.

8. In the light of the above analysis, we would propose as the next step the following:

a) We should each send in the next few weeks a further rather brief reply to the French to the effect that these problems seem extremely difficult to handle, and that their proposals are not entirely spelled out in the de Gaulle memorandum. In this reply we would raise a few warning flags and take issue with one or two of the de Gaulle statements with which we disagree, such as the thesis that NATO is superannuated. We could also indicate the trouble which a revision of the NATO treaty would cause in our view. We would conclude that in view of the complexity of the entire matter, it would seem desirable to have some initial tripartite talks in Washington along the lines which de Gaulle suggests. These could be at the Ambassadorial level with Mr. Murphy or Mr. Elbrick, or possibly a tripartite meeting at the Murphy–Joxe–Hoyer–Millar level could be arranged.

b) The above suggestion would provide an opportunity for spelling out the reasons for our difficulties with the de Gaulle plan, and also for clarifying certain points which are really unclear. It would be a much better means of thrashing out the problem with the French than by a relatively negative written reply. Furthermore, it would both give the three countries concerned an opportunity of seeing if there were areas for greater tripartite cooperation, and also would in fact, by the very occurrence of such talks, be a step in the direction which the French desire.

c) Furthermore, such talks need not be limited to the de Gaulle proposal but could include a rundown on other problems of interest. We would be interested in discussing both North Africa and Black Africa with the French, and it would seem that we could arrange to give them, and the British, a good briefing on the situation in the Far East and the Near East. Such an exercise might be useful per se.

d) While it is recognized the above does not represent any large degree of satisfaction for the French, it might be the best first step and perhaps during such talks we could work out certain procedures and programs which might find favor with de Gaulle, though it is clear any form of tripartitism must remain on an informal and flexible basis. Furthermore, any steps in this direction must be explained most carefully in advance at least to the Italians and Germans, as well as to Spaak who has indicated a feeling that the three powers should provide leadership in NATO.

e) It is possible that in discussions with the British and French, we could at least identify areas where tripartite consultation on a more or less regular basis might be justified (i.e., through common SEATO membership; through perhaps a greater identification of position in the Middle East than has heretofore been true). Then, at a later date, when a final reply is sent to de Gaulle it could embody the results of these talks, and might contain additional positive elements to anything we could envisage now. Furthermore, the French would be thoroughly conditioned as to the U.S.–U.K. view.

Recommendation:

That you authorize EUR to explore the possibility suggested in (a) above further with the British. If they agreed, we would try to draft two similar but not identical brief letters to de Gaulle for delivery in two or three weeks, as outlined above, and proposing talks in Washington as the French have suggested at the Ambassadorial or “Permanent Undersecretary” level.⁵

0. Source: Department of State, WE Files: Lot 72 D 441, de Gaulle Letters. Secret. Drafted by McBride, concurred in by the Office of European Regional Affairs and the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, sent through Murphy and Calhoun, and initialed by Calhoun and Jandrey.
1. Document 48.
2. Document 45.
3. See Document 34.
4. See Document 50.

5. Dulles initialed approval of the recommendation on October 10. In a memorandum to Elbrick, October 10, Greene wrote that the Secretary’s approval of the recommendation was subject to the following:

   • “1) The ‘next few weeks’ mentioned in 8(a) should be foreshortened as much as possible. In this connection the Secretary understands that you are starting the discussions with Lord Hood on October 11.
   • “2) The Secretary is concerned that there be prepared in advance an adequate explanation, for public use, of the tripartite meeting envisaged at the end of 8(a). Particularly if these talks were to be at the Permanent Under Secretary level, it would be impossible, and probably imprudent, to try to keep them secret. Explanation would also have to be given other interested governments, probably privately, before the talks begin.
   • “3) Might it not be desirable to include Spaak in these talks?” (Department of State, WE Files: Lot 72 D 441, de Gaulle Letters)

   Greene based his remarks on Dulles’ handwritten notations on the memorandum printed here.