Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

51. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom⁰

October 8, 1958, 9:17 p.m.

3587. Paris for USRO and Embassy. Dept has had informal discussion with British Embassy on de Gaulle memorandum on reorganization NATO.¹ Difficulties posed by de Gaulle suggestion for joint military planning explored. Noted this idea not new with French; was proposed at Bermuda meeting² and was Bidault suggestion in 1953.³ Reluctance military enter into such planning with French noted and it informally agreed obstacles probably too great be overcome.⁴

In discussing political aspects de Gaulle proposal noted that our initial reaction had been one of realization adverse effect acceptance would have on Germans⁵ and Italians. Effect would not be confined to NATO allies alone; Morocco and Tunisia, for example, would probably react adversely. In view all problems memorandum raises, first thought might be wholly negative reply. Recognized, however, such attitude could seriously damage relations with France and perhaps lead French initiate actions unfavorable to present NATO cooperation. While it thus seems necessary work out some sort of mechanism with French which might partly meet de Gaulle desires, must be recognized problem increased as result leaks of substance de Gaulle proposals. Leaks have already generated hostility and suspicion which could make any tripartitism more difficult.

British stated they without precise instructions. Their impression from messages seen is that UK believes extreme care must be exercised in handling replies in view French situation and de Gaulle personality. UK has, of course, special interest in not arousing unnecessarily French hostility as, for example, in view Free Trade Area negotiations.⁶ Also important prevent French receiving impression that US and UK had been heavily pressed by other countries and had made their decisions as result these pressures rather than on substance. British believe that while formal tripartite machinery is probably out of question, there is perhaps room to expand present tripartite discussions to broader areas and subjects. Africa, Middle East, and Far East provide areas about which we could talk to French.

Dept. noted point four of memorandum suggested discussions in Washington on its substance. Such discussion might prove easier course than full substantive reply dealing with details of French proposal.

UK representatives felt it undesirable attempt now full substantive reply. Noted even first course presents considerable difficulty as French could be expected press for implementation suggestions as, for example, enlargement of competence of Standing Group which other NATO nations would resist.

British said problem basically two part: how to develop some form informal tripartitism and how to reply to French. Latter could take either form of suggesting talks or noting difficulties with certain proposals and suggesting others. On balance, believed it better course send de Gaulle further interim reply in which we state (1) our belief NATO is effective instrument which we wish maintain and strengthen, (2) idea basic revision NATO raises many problems, (3) US and UK willing talk about matter with French.

Dept suggested possibility some informal tripartite meeting in Washington. Such meeting could address itself to broad range problems and situations and to de Gaulle proposals.

All above was tentative exploration courses open to US and UK. No commitments made. Each side will explore within own department.

Addressees comments invited.⁷

Dulles

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/10–858. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by L. Dean Brown, cleared by the Office of European Regional Affairs and the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, and approved by McBride. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, and Rome.
1. A copy of the October 6 memorandum of conversation between Caccia and Herter about the de Gaulle letter is ibid., 751.11/10–658. Telegram 1167 to Paris, October 3, relayed information about the letter given to the Department by the British Embassy. (Ibid., 611.51/10–358)
2. Reference is presumably to the Bermuda Conference December 4–8, 1953.
3. Reference is to Bidault’s proposal to Dulles in July 1953 during the Tripartite Ministers Meetings at Washington July 10–14, 1953, that the tripartite political standing group handle worldwide problems.
4. For a detailed account of the military objections, see JCS 2278/5, October 17, 1958, published in Declassified Documents, 1981, 301.
5. In telegram 728 to Bonn, October 8, Dulles reported that German Ambassador Grewe had called on him that day to state his government’s concern about the recent communications from de Gaulle and the repercussions they might have on the NATO community. The Secretary reassured the Ambassador that de Gaulle’s points deserved consideration but that he doubted the necessity or practicality of enlarging the NATO area, and that any attempt to establish a three-power political directorate within NATO would cause difficulties within NATO. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/10–858)
6. Regarding the breakdown of the meetings of the Intergovernmental Committee on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area in Paris November 13–14, see Part 1, Document 39.
7. Telegram 1303 from Paris, October 11, indicated that the Embassy opposed a negative reply to de Gaulle, favored preliminary discussions in Washington, and stressed the seriousness of de Gaulle’s views on France’s role and on the necessity for recognition of France’s position as a world power. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/10–1158) In telegram 1980 from London, October 10, the Embassy replied that de Gaulle’s proposals posed a difficult problem for the United States and the United Kingdom, and questioned the wisdom of informal tripartite discussions because of the risk of offending the Germans and the Italians. (Ibid., 740.5/10–1058) In telegram 1157 from Rome, October 10, the Embassy replied that any suggestion of a tripartite meeting would have serious adverse effects in Italy. (Ibid.) No reply from Bonn has been found.