Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

49. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Paris, October 2, 1958.

PARTICIPANTS

• M. Jean Laloy, Director European Affairs, Quai d’Orsay
• Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

In conversation with Laloy this afternoon, he mentioned in passing that one encouraging development during the past few months had been an increased realization on the part of de Gaulle of the international nature of the communist threat. Laloy thought de Gaulle’s trip through Africa had been instrumental in bringing this about. Laloy referred to the Dulles–de Gaulle conversations last July, during which de Gaulle had said he felt the communist threat was largely a reflection of traditional Russian nationalism. There are indications now, Laloy remarked, that de Gaulle appreciates that the danger is considerably broader than this.

Laloy went on to say that this development in de Gaulle’s thinking apparently paralleled a certain shift in the thinking of Secretary Dulles on the problem of nationalism and the emergence of new, independent states. Laloy said that Lucet, an officer of the French Embassy in Washington in Paris on home leave, had brought back word that the Secretary is becoming increasingly concerned at the prospect of backward areas achieving independence prematurely. If this trend continues, Lucet reported the Secretary as believing, the Soviets will be given great opportunities for trouble making and the older Western nations will find it harder and harder to maintain stability in these areas. According to Lucet, the Secretary is even reported as having second thoughts about the advisability of permitting the Algerians to obtain independence if they want it.

Laloy said that, if true, such a trend of thought on the part of the Secretary, taken with the evolution of de Gaulle’s thinking about communism, would be one good augury for US-French relations.

Laloy seemed rather gloomy, however, about questions concerning the NATO Alliance and de Gaulle’s attitude toward the Alliance. Without being specific, he predicted troubled times ahead for the Atlantic Alliance, which would “go beyond” problems of the stockpile, missiles, etc. Given de Gaulle’s firm views on communism, Laloy thought he would not wish to weaken NATO as a force for security, and could be persuaded to develop his ideas within the context of the Atlantic Community. Nevertheless, Laloy felt the process would be difficult and one requiring great forebearance and understanding on our part in order to “bring the General along” and not to arouse his hostility.

Laloy was pleased that the communiqué issued following the Adenauer—de Gaulle talks¹ had brought forth a sharp blast from Khrushchev. The Khrushchev statement on this subject, and his “advice” to French people not to vote for the constitution, seemed to be calculated slaps at de Gaulle.² Laloy thought the Soviets have definitely removed France from the list of “countries to be flirted with” and were resigned to the necessity of dealing with an anti-communist French government. Laloy thought this sentiment had probably been reinforced by the results of the referendum, which, whether de Gaulle intended it that way or not, made him appear as the “man who defeated the communists”.

Laloy thought the Soviets would not delay much longer in recognizing the Algerian provisional government.

0. Source: Department of State, WE Files: Lot 61 D 30, de Gaulle Government—1958. Confidential. Drafted by Stoessel.
1. For text of the “Joint Declaration of Common Aims” issued by Adenauer and de Gaulle at the conclusion of their meeting at Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises on September 14, see The New York Times, September 15, 1958. For Adenauer’s account of this meeting, see Erinnerungen, pp. 436–439. For de Gaulle’s account of this meeting, see Mémoires, pp. 184–190. In telegram 630 from Bonn, September 17, Bruce conveyed Adenauer’s impressions of this meeting. Adenauer judged that 11 years out of politics had drastically changed de Gaulle’s attitude toward world affairs. He believed de Gaulle had vague reservations about the structure and military organization of NATO. De Gaulle had also said he thought it worthwhile to negotiate with the Soviets on measures for curtailment of nuclear and conventional armaments. Bruce reported Adenauer had left Colombey relieved, surprised, and content. (Department of State, Central Files, 651.62A/9–1758)
2. Reference is to two statements by Khrushchev, printed in Pravda on September 16 and 22, which were highly critical of de Gaulle.