Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

39. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

July 9, 1958.

SUBJECT

• The Secretary’s Talks with General de Gaulle

PARTICIPANTS

• French Ambassador Hervé Alphand
• M. Charles Lucet, Minister, French Embassy
• Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary
• Mr. Matthew Looram, WE

The French Ambassador stated that he thought the Secretary’s meeting with General de Gaulle at Paris had been a great success.¹ The Secretary had made a brilliant exposé which had obviously impressed the General very much. Mr. Elbrick agreed that the conversations had been very useful.

M. Alphand stated that a great deal would need to be done to put into action the thoughts that were expressed at Paris. He had no instructions at the moment, but he wished for his own benefit to clarify his thinking on some of the aspects of the talks.

The Ambassador stated that during the conversations de Gaulle had emphasized the necessity of France playing a greater role in NATO and world affairs and the Secretary had agreed that some nations, presumably the U.S., U.K. and France, had special responsibilities and interests in the world. The Secretary and de Gaulle apparently felt that no spectacular agreement between the three powers was necessary and no impression should be given of a three-power world directorate. This relationship should therefore not be formalized but should exist in practice. The Ambassador stated that it had not been clearly spelled out in the talks, however, just what had been meant by this and how it should be realized. The Ambassador opined that it might not be appropriate to create a political standing group; nevertheless, there should be much greater coordination between the three.

Mr. Elbrick recalled that during the conversations, the Secretary had indicated the importance he attached to NATO consultations despite the obvious inconveniences. It would thus be impractical and undesirable to set up any world triumvirate; on the other hand, it was clear that certain countries would continue to exert very great influence on world affairs. Mr. Elbrick stated he had spoken to the French Foreign Minister about this, emphasizing that any impression that there would be established a political standing group in NATO would be counterproductive.² There was an intention, nevertheless, to coordinate closely and discreetly our policies on a wide range of subjects.

M. Alphand stated that when he had seen General de Gaulle the day prior to the meeting with the Secretary, de Gaulle had been much more legalistic in his concept of the tripartite relationship. The Ambassador had warned him that the basic objective could be attained without formalization. In fact, de Gaulle had replied to the Secretary, M. Alphand said, that he did not attach importance to the legal framework, but was more interested in such a relationship existing in practice. Actually, the Ambassador stated, we did have coordination on summitry, Germany and Lebanon. However, he felt that it was important that no individual action be taken on these matters without prior consultation between the three. For instance, he said, in the case of Lebanon the French had recently been informed that after U.S.–U.K. consultations, instructions had been sent out to the U.S. and U.K. Ambassadors in Lebanon to urge President Chamoun to consider finding a successor, when it was well known that France was opposed to this course of action. [4–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (4–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

The Ambassador stated that de Gaulle had also indicated that the three military members of the Standing Group should have greater responsibility with regard to strategic world plans. The Ambassador accordingly thought that the three military members should deal with other areas of world defense rather than just NATO. Should this develop, it might be necessary to give greater stature to the military members. Mr. Elbrick stated that he would give consideration to this over-all idea. The obvious difficulty was that any such activity might become generally known.

Mr. Elbrick asked what de Gaulle had meant by suggesting the extension of NATO to North Africa and the Middle East. It seemed to him the application of this concept would involve many serious difficulties. He supposed that the Algerian problem would first have to be on its way to being resolved before this concept could begin to be implemented. However, did the French Government have in mind eventually including Morocco and Tunisia in NATO?

The French Ambassador said he thought so, but he recognized the obvious difficulties and would first have to have instructions from Paris before he could speak authoritatively on this question.

The Ambassador also stated that he understood the U.S. had military boards which were concerned with the study of world strategy and the use of modern weapons. He believed that both the U.K. and France had some representation on these boards, although the French representation was small and should be increased.

M. Alphand stated that he was not sure that he fully understood what the Secretary had stated with regard to atomic weapons in Europe. He gathered that the purpose of the Secretary’s concept was to allay the fears of some NATO members regarding the possible hesitancy on the part of the United States in giving the order in the event of an emergency for the use of nuclear weapons located in Europe. However, the Ambassador asked, he was not sure how these weapons would be made available, to exactly whom they would be made available nor who would have the last say as to their use.

Mr. Elbrick stated that this concept had not been sufficiently thought out here to permit explanation of the details at this juncture. Our concept, however, which had considerable significance, was that we might be prepared to make arrangements so that weapons located in Western Europe would be made immediately and dependably available in the event of a major attack and in accordance with the established NATO plans. The purpose was to ensure that a NATO government, such as the French Government, would never have any doubts as to the use of such weapons should French forces be subject to a major attack in Europe. Mr. Elbrick stated he did not think that General de Gaulle had fully understood this.

The Ambassador said he thought this was the case. De Gaulle had referred to IRBM’s, which he believed should be given to France, to include also continued U.S. participation in control and for use in accordance with strategic plans. However, M. Alphand said, there was a fine distinction on the question of control. He was not sure that U.S. legislation would permit the fulfillment of General de Gaulle’s wishes in this respect. Mr. Elbrick agreed that he was not sure at all. The Ambassador stated that he understood that U.S. IRBM’s would soon be ready to be shipped. He supposed that if there were no agreement with France shortly, they might be shipped to another country. He thought that it might be preferable to have this matter negotiated directly between the U.S. and France rather than by General Norstad with the French Government.

Mr. Elbrick stated that we might be confronted with considerable difficulties on this over-all subject in view of the limitations of our own legislation—difficulties which might not be able to be surmounted without amendment to the legislation. On the other hand, he said, the Secretary was anxious to do something quickly on this whole nuclear problem.

The Ambassador stated that according to U.S. legislation, the missile itself could be in the hands of local authorities but not the warheads. Actually this was a theoretical distinction, as each would be an integral part of the whole weapon which would necessarily imply joint U.S.-French control. It was, therefore, possible that something mutually satisfactory might be able to be worked out. He noted that General de Gaulle had stated that he did not intend to use these weapons beyond the limitations of NATO’s strategic plan.

The Ambassador said that the Secretary had stated that the United States was prepared to cooperate with France on the question of the nuclear submarine. It was obvious, however, that given the recent U.S. legislation, France was not yet qualified to receive an over-all exchange of nuclear military information.³ In fact, according to a strict interpretation of the Joint Committee’s Report,⁴ one explosion would not be sufficient and under the circumstances it might take as many as ten years before France would be qualified to obtain such information. De Gaulle had not insisted on this matter, but the Ambassador knew that he was anxious to have an exchange, which would be only normal between allies. He hoped that it might be possible to alter the interpretation as contained in the Joint Committee’s Report, as greater stability was developed in France.

Mr. Elbrick said that this might be possible. Certainly the previous unstable political situation in France had had an influence on the legislators. However, there were also other important considerations, namely the desire of the Congress not to encourage proliferation of nuclear weapons. If the interpretation were changed for the benefit of France, this would tend to encourage other countries to enter into the production of nuclear weapons.

On summitry the Ambassador said he thought there was really no basic disagreement between the two governments. It was certain, nevertheless, that the French Government was concerned by the Soviet intention to split up the disarmament package and concentrate on bringing about both a cessation of nuclear tests and an inspection zone to include Western Europe. The French Government felt strongly that it should be made clear to the Soviets that the study of an inspection zone against surprise attack should refer solely to the Arctic zone. The French Government felt that the inclusion of a European inspection zone would only be possible if it were an integral part of an over-all disarmament plan. He therefore thought that it was most important that we consult closely on the U.S. reply to the latest Khrushchev note.

Mr. Elbrick stated that the Secretary felt that the concept of a zone of inspection against surprise attack might be the only dependable step leading toward gradual and effective disarmament. Obviously the United States Government could not agree with the Soviet proposal for a European inspection zone extending on either side of the demarkation line of Eastern and Western Germany. Nevertheless, we were inclined to reply affirmatively to the Soviets on the question of technical studies on an inspection zone against surprise attack. These would have to be solely technical talks; the question of the zone would be one for political negotiation.

The Ambassador stated that he thought that discussion of an abstract inspection zone was dangerous and that it should be made clear to the Soviets that we were thinking solely in terms of the Arctic zone.

CBE

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51/7–958. Secret. Drafted by Looram.
1. In telegram 120 from Paris, July 9, Houghton reported that Dulles’ talks with de Gaulle and Couve de Murville were an “outstanding success” and that Dulles’ visit might be regarded as an “important historical development in French-US relations.” (Ibid.)
2. No record of this conversation has been found.
3. The amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, passed by Congress and signed by the President on July 2, 1958, which permitted the transfer of nuclear materials and information to other nations, stipulated that the transfer of such material to that nation had to be necessary to improve its atomic weapons design, development, or fabrication capability. Sections 91c and 144c of the Act authorized the furnishing of nuclear materials for weapons and weapon fabrication information to an ally which “has made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons.” (P.L. 85–479; 72 Stat. 276)
4. Reference is to the Report of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to Congress of June 5, 1958, written in support of the 1958 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The distinction adopted by the Congress under P.L. 85–479 provided that non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons could be transferred only to a nation that had made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons. (S. Rept. No. 1654, H. Rept. No. 1849, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. p. 12)